

Omaha Public Power District

P.O. Box 399 Hwy. 75 - North of Ft. Calhoun Fort Calhoun, NE 68023-0399
402/636-2000

May 26, 1993
LIC-93-0061

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk
Mail Station: P1-137
Washington, DC 20555

Reference: Docket No. 50-285

Gentlemen:

SUBJECT: Special Report on Inoperability of Fire Protection Equipment

The Omaha Public Power District (OPPD), holder of Operating License DPR-40, submits this report pursuant to the requirements of Fort Calhoun Station (FCS) Unit No. 1, Technical Specification (TS) 2.19, "Fire Protection System."

Technical Specification 2.19(4) requires that the Fire Suppression Water System be operable, except during system testing, jockey pump maintenance or training (not to exceed seven consecutive days), with both fire pumps, each with a minimum capacity of 1800 gpm, with their discharge aligned to the fire suppression header and automatic initiation logic for each fire pump. Per TS 2.19(4)a, with less than the above required equipment, the inoperable equipment is to be restored to operable status within seven days. If the equipment is not restored within seven days, a report is to be prepared and submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, pursuant to TS 5.9.3 within the next 30 days.

On April 16, 1993, Fire Protection Impairment Permit (FPIP) 3202 was issued for Diesel Fire Pump FP-1B. FP-1B was taken out of service on April 19, 1993 in order to support work associated with Maintenance Work Orders (MWOs) 910618, 910234, and 930831. The work involved removing the fire pump's strainer (FP-6B) from service, inspecting/repairing as necessary, and replacing a few sections of eroded pipe and several fittings. Due to the nature of the work, the fire pump remained inoperable for greater than seven days.

Fire Pump FP-1B was returned to service on May 3, 1993. Motor Driven Fire Pump FP-1A remained operable while FP-1B was out of service.

620093

TECH
10

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
LIC-93-0061
Page Two

Technical Specification 2.19(7) requires that all penetration fire barriers protecting safety-related areas shall be functional (intact). With a penetration fire barrier non-functional, within one hour, either a continuous fire watch is to be established on at least one side of the affected penetration, or the operability of fire detectors on at least one side of the penetration is to be verified and an hourly fire watch patrol established. The non-functional penetration is to be restored to functional status within seven days, or a report is to be prepared and submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission pursuant to TS 5.9.3 within an additional 30 days.

On April 26, 1993, FPIP 3207 was issued for Penetration Seal 19-E-30. The penetration was breached so that Heat Exchanger AC-1B could be drained and repairs made to valve HCV-2881A. The Heat Exchanger has been drained and all necessary repairs have been made to HCV-2881A. However, Penetration Seal 19-E-30 remains breached to support subsequent maintenance on Heat Exchanger AC-1A.

The penetration will remain in a breached condition until cleaning and flushing of Heat Exchanger AC-1A is completed. The appropriate compensatory measures (i.e., fire watch) will remain in place until the penetration seal is returned to an operable condition. The penetration seal will be returned to an operable condition by July 1, 1993.

If you have any questions, please contact me.

Sincerely,



W. G. Gates
Vice President

WGG:jrg

c: LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae
J. L. Milhoan, NRC Regional Administrator, Region IV
S. D. Bloom, NRC Project Manager
R. P. Mullikin, NRC Senior Resident Inspector