Commonwealth Edison
LaSalle County Nuclear Station
Rural Route #1, Box 220
Marseilles, Illinois 61341
Telephone 815/357-6761

June 25, 1990

Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Mail Station P1-137
Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Sir:

Licensee Event Report #90-008-00, Docket #050-373 is being submitted to your office in accordance with 10CFR50.73 (a)(2)(i).

WR. Diederich

G. J. Diederich
Station Manager
LaSalle County Station

GJD/DAC/ls

Enclosure

xc: Nuclear Licensing Administrator
NRC Resident Inspector
NRC Region III Administrator
INPO - Records Center

IE22
1/1

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

Form Rev 2.0

Facility Name (1)	Docket Number (2)	Page (3)
LaSalle County Station Unit 1	0 5 0 0 0 3 7 3	1 of 0 5

Title (4)

Missed Technical Specification Hourly Fire Watch Due to Miscommunications

Event Date (5)			LER Number (6)				Report Date (7)			Other Facilities Involved (8)	
Month	Day	Year	Year	Sequential Number		Revision Number	Month	Day	Year	Facility Names	Docket Number(s)
										LaSalle Unit 2	0 5 0 0 0 3 7 4
0 5	2 5	9 0	9 0	0 0 8		0 0	0 6	2 5	9 0		0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)		POWER LEVEL (10)			THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10CFR (Check one or more of the following) (11)								
	1		1	0	0	___	20.402(b)	___	20.405(c)	___	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	___	73.71(b)
						___	20.405(a)(1)(i)	___	50.36(c)(1)	___	50.73(a)(2)(v)	___	73.71(c)
						___	20.405(a)(1)(ii)	___	50.36(c)(2)	___	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	___	Other (Specify
						___	20.405(a)(1)(iii)	X	50.73(a)(2)(i)	___	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)		in Abstract
						___	20.405(a)(1)(iv)	___	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	___	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)		below and in
						___	20.405(a)(1)(v)	___	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	___	50.73(a)(2)(x)		Text)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

Name	TELEPHONE NUMBER
	AREA CODE
Don A. Crowl, HPES Coordinator, extension 2860	8 1 5 3 5 7 - 6 7 6 1

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	
A				N							

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		Expected Submission Date (15)	Month	Day	Year
___ Yes (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	___ X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e, approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On May 25, 1990 with Unit 1 in the Run mode at 100% power and Unit 2 in Cold Shutdown with the Reactor vessel reassembly in progress, the Reactor Building Refuel Floor hourly fire watch was not performed at 2300 hours as required by Technical Specifications (due to fire detection being inoperable). The missed fire watch occurred due to several causes which were as follow; (1) a miscommunication between the Security personnel who needed to perform the fire watch and the Radiation Protection Personnel who needed to authorize Security to perform the fire watch in a high radiation area, (2) due to shift turnover taking place at the time of this event, no personnel were located on the Refuel Floor to allow Security to phone them for verification that no fires were present and (3) inadequate radiation control practices lead to Security not being able to perform the fire watch due to the spread of contamination. The fire watch was re-established at 0013 hours on May 26, 1990, 1 hour and 27 minutes following the previous fire watch and all responsible department personnel will be tailgated on this event. The safety significance of this event is minimal because no work was in progress prior to this event or during this event which would have increased the potential for a fire to occur on the Refuel Floor, only 27 minutes had elapsed since the fire watch was required to be performed.

This event is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10CRFR50.73(a)(2)(i) due to a deviation from plant Technical Specifications.

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION

General Electric - Boiling Water Reactor

Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX].

A. CONDITION PRIOR TO EVENT

Unit(s): 1/2 Event Date: 5/25/90 Event Time: 2300 Hours

Reactor Mode(s): 1/4 Mode(s) Name: Run/Cold Shutdown Power Level(s): 100/1%

B. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On May 25, 1990 with Unit 1 in the Run mode at 100% power and Unit 2 in Cold Shutdown, Security was assigned the task of performing hourly fire watches on the refuel floor. The fire watches were required by LaSalle Technical Specification 3.3.7.9, because the normal fire detection (FP) [IC] system was disabled to prevent nuisance or false fire alarms due to high radiation conditions which result from moving the reactor vessel components (NB) [AD] for reassembly. At 2246 hours the last fire watch was performed for May 25, 1990, the subsequent fire watch was not performed until 0013 hours on May 26, 1990, therefore 1 hour and 27 minutes had elapsed since a fire watch was performed.

Security was performing the required fire watches by calling the refuel floor and questioning personnel in the area about whether or not they had seen any fires. This method was utilized to perform the fire watch because the refuel floor area and the access to the refuel floor had become contaminated. The spread of contamination was caused by ventilation air flow through the refuel floor plugs.

During the reactor vessel reassembly, 2 Radiation Protection Technicians (RPT's) were assigned to the refuel floor to control and monitor activities and one was assigned to the desk (located at the refuel floor access point on the Reactor Building 832' elevation) to control the Radiation Work Permit and assign digital dosimetry. No one was present on the refuel floor during this event due to shift crew turnovers which were taking place.

At 2246 hours, the last person to leave the refuel floor was logged out and the security guard (Rover #4) posted at the refuel floor access point questioned this person as to whether or not any fires were noted. This was the last time a fire watch was performed and documented for May 25, 1990.

At 2248 hours the security guard (Rover #4) was contacted by the fire watch security guard. Rover #4 notified the fire watch security guard that the watch tours were satisfactorily completed.

At 2300 hours, both Operating and Maintenance department turnovers took place.

B. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT (Continued)

At approximately 2310 hours, the security guard posted at the refuel floor access point had notified his supervisor that everyone had left the refuel floor. The security guard was then instructed by his supervisor to perform his Reactor Building tour and call the refuel floor when it came time to document the fire watch.

At the end of the security guard's tour, he called the refuel floor to verify no fires were taking place. No answer was received because no one was present on the refuel floor due to shift turnovers.

At 2333 hours the security guard (Rover #4) was again contacted by the fire watch security guard. Rover #4 again notified the fire watch security guard that the watch tours were completed.

At approximately 2340 hours on May 25, 1990 the security guard called the security supervisor to notify him that no one was on the refuel floor to facilitate completing the fire watch. At this time the security supervisor called the Radiation Protection (RP) supervisor.

In an investigation interview with the RP supervisor, he had indicated that Security had questioned him as to where the RPT's were and that no mention was made to the RP supervisor as to the concern for performing the hourly fire watch. The RP supervisor did not ask security why they were asking for the RPT's locations. Additional interviews were held with security. The security supervisor who contacted the RP supervisor mentioned he had indicated to the RP supervisor that no one was positioned at the desk on the Reactor Building 832 elevation for access to the refuel floor. During the interview the Security supervisor had mentioned that the RP supervisor responded by saying that he had people on their way up there (Reactor Building 832 elevation, at access point to the refuel floor). The Security supervisor said he had told the RP supervisor that he needed to perform the fire watch. The conclusion of the interviews indicated a miscommunication between the RP supervisor and the Security supervisor.

At 0013 hours on May 26, 1990, an entry was made onto the refuel floor and the fire watch re-established using personnel working in the area on the Unit 2 Reactor vessel reassembly.

C. APPARENT CAUSE OF EVENT

Poor communication practices lead to the failure of the radiation protection supervisor to realize the need to insure security had access to the refuel floor. It was not until after the event that security was informed that they could do a visual floor inspection from the doorway of the refuel floor when no one was present on the floor.

Poor communication practices also lead the fire watch security guard into believing the fire watch was completed at 2333 hours and the fire watch security guard logged the fire watch complete at this time.

On May 22, 1990, at 1800 hours, inadequate radiation work practices lead to the loss of contamination control by the refuel floor doorway which prevented security from being able to perform a doorway inspection of the refuel floor for fires.

C. APPARENT CAUSE OF EVENT (Continued)

Shift turnover for all personnel on the refuel floor occurred at the same time resulting in no one being present on the refuel floor to allow security to perform the fire watch by calling the refuel floor for verification that no fires were occurring.

D. SAFETY ANALYSIS OF EVENT

The design of the Refuel Floor fire detection system does not allow for the system to remain operable during high background radiation conditions which result during reactor vessel assembly and disassembly. This requires a fire watch to be established during these conditions as required by LaSalle Technical Specifications.

The fire detection system is normally bypassed for areas in which welding, grinding or other activity in progress that actuates the system. In these situations a fire watch is established to provide for adequate detection and warning of fires which may result. The probability of a fire occurring during this event was minimal because no work was in progress at the time due to turnovers taking place and no work was in progress prior to this event that would have required an increase in the capability to detect fires.

E. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

A fire watch was re-established as soon as personnel entered the refuel floor to continue vessel reassembly work activities. Security personnel were instructed to continue performing the fire watch by calling the refuel floor and questioning personnel on the floor as to whether or not there were any fires. If no personnel were available on the floor, security was informed that they could perform the fire watch by opening the refuel floor door and perform a visual check of the floor from the doorway. This was done to minimize dose and any potential for contamination. The hourly fire watch was re-established at 0013 hours on May 26, 1990. This was 1 hour and 27 minutes after the previous fire watch.

The Security Administrator issued a security memorandum to instruct security personnel to notify the Shift Engineer immediately when a fire watch is unable to be performed.

A tailgate for both Security and Radiation Protection personnel on this event with emphasis placed on the importance of good communication practices will be conducted. The tailgates will also include a discussion for Security to take compensatory measures during turnover periods. The completion of this corrective action will be tracked by Action Item Record (AIR) number 373-200-90-04401.

A review of the feasibility to set up a Refuel Floor camera, with a monitor located at the Refuel Floor access point on the Reactor Building 832' elevation to allow security to monitor for fires and minimize dose and the potential for contamination will be performed. The completion of this corrective action will be tracked by AIR number 373-200-90-04402.

E. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (Continued)

A LaSalle Administrative Procedure will be developed, or a revision to the existing procedures, to provide guidance as to who can perform a fire watch and what constitutes a fire watch. This procedure or revision will include guidance on transferring the fire watch responsibility between one work group to another. The completion of this corrective action will be tracked by AIR number 373-200-90-04403.

A revision to security post orders to provide guidance to immediately notify the Shift Engineer when a fire watch cannot be performed will be issued. The completion of this corrective action will be tracked by AIR number 373-200-90-04404.

A review of procedures for the reactor vessel disassembly and reassembly to provide instruction to insure that the refuel floor plugs are properly sealed will be conducted. This will force ventilation flow toward the reactor well to prevent the potential for spreading contamination during the movement of reactor vessel components. The completion of this corrective action will be tracked by AIR number 373-200-90-04405.

F. PREVIOUS EVENTS

None

G. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA

None