

# New Hampshire Yankee

Ted C. Feigenbaum  
Senior Vice President and  
Chief Operating Officer

NYN- 90120

June 6, 1990

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, DC 20555

Attention: Document Control Desk

References: (a) Facility Operating License No. NPF-86, Docket No. 50-443  
(b) USNRC Letter dated May 8, 1990, "Inspection Report  
50-443/90-08," J.R. Johnson to E.A. Brown


Subject: Reply to a Notice of Violation

Gentlemen:

The New Hampshire Yankee response to Notice of Violation forwarded by Reference (b) is provided as Enclosure 1 to this letter.

Should you have any questions concerning our response, please contact Mr. James M. Peschel, Regulatory Compliance Manager, at (603) 474-9521, extension 3772.

Very truly yours,

  
Ted C. Feigenbaum

TCF/WJT:jt/  
Enclosure

cc: Mr. Thomas T. Martin  
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New Hampshire Yankee  
June 6, 1990

ENCLOSURE 1 TO NYN-90120  
REPLY TO A NOTICE OF VIOLATION

Reply to a Notice of Violation

Violation:

During an NRC inspection from March 5 - April 9, 1990, a violation of NRC requirements was identified in accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," 10CFR, Part 2, Appendix C. That violation is listed below:

Technical Specification 4.6.1.3(a) requires in part that, following each closing of the containment air lock, operability shall be demonstrated within 72 hours.

Contrary to the above, following the closing of the containment air lock on February 13, 1990, operability was not demonstrated until March 9, 1990, which exceeded the 72-hour requirement.

Response:

The activities associated with the event have been evaluated to determine the cause of the violation. It was determined that the on-shift Auxiliary Operator was not aware that a seal leak test was required following the opening of the equipment hatch air lock. The Control Room was notified that the Auxiliary Operator was going into the equipment hatch air lock, but the Operator in the Control Room misunderstood the information given and thought the personnel hatch air lock was being used.

As a result of the above-stated violation, the following corrective actions have been initiated to preclude this event from recurring:

1. Signs will be placed on the containment hatches to remind personnel that a retest is required after containment hatch use and to notify the Control Room. This action is expected to be completed by June 30, 1990.
2. A training session will be developed and will be included as part of the Licensed Operator Requalification Program and the Auxiliary Operator Continuing Training Program. This training will discuss the missed surveillance and the related corrective actions. It is expected that this training will be complete by October 30, 1990.
3. The Security Department has been instructed to notify the Control Room daily of any containment air lock outer door opening.

Full compliance with Technical Specification 4.6.1.3(a) was achieved upon successful completion of the seal leakage test on March 9, 1990.