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10 CFR 50.73

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY

NORTH ANNA POWER STATION

P. O. BOX 402

MINERAL, VIRGINIA 23117

June 4, 1990

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attention: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Serial No. N-90-007
NAPS/RCS:rc:
Docket Nos. 50-338

License Nos. NPF-4


Dear Sirs:

The Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits the following Licensee Event Report applicable to North Anna Unit 1.

Report No. ! FR 90-006-00

This Report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee.

Very Truly Yours,

for 
G.E. Kane
Station Manager

Enclosure:

cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
101 Marietta Street, N.W.
Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

Mr. M. S. Lesser
NRC Senior Resident Inspector
North Anna Power Station

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

ESTABLISHED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST 500 HRS FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) NORTH ANNA POWER STATION UNIT 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 3 8 1	PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 3
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TITLE (4)
CASING COOLING PUMP NOT PUT INTO ALERT AND MISSED SURVEILLANCE DUE TO PERSONNEL ERROR

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 5	0 4	9 0	9 0	0 0 6	0 0 0	0 6	0 4	9 0			0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9) 1	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11)					73.71(b)
POWER LEVEL (10) 1 0 0	20.402(b)		20.406(c)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(c)
	20.406(a)(1)(i)		50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
	20.406(a)(1)(ii)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)	
	20.406(a)(1)(iii)	X	50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
	20.406(a)(1)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
20.406(a)(1)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(ix)		

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)						TELEPHONE NUMBER					
NAME G. E. Kane, Station Manager						AREA CODE 7 0 3 8 9 4 - 2 1 0 1					

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)										
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)			EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)			MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO								

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (18)

On May 4, 1990 at approximately 1400 hours with both Unit 1 and 2 at approximately 100 percent power (Mode 1), it was discovered that Unit 1 "B" Casing Cooling Pump (1-RS-P-3B) was not tested at an increased frequency as required by the Inservice Testing (IST) Program due to personnel error. Placing 1-RS-P-3B into Alert Status was required by Technical Specification (TS) 4.0.5.a based on vibration data taken January 14, 1990 and is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B). Immediate actions taken were to place 1-RS-P-3B into Alert Status and review records to ensure no other pump was similarly omitted.

Throughout the event, 1-RS-P-3B remained capable of performing its design function of providing Net Positive Suction Head (NPSH) to the suction of the Outside Recirculation Spray (RS) Pumps. Also, vibration data taken on April 30, 1990 measured in the acceptable range. Therefore, the health and safety of the general public were not affected at any time during this event.

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION**

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 500 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555 AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) NORTH ANNA POWER STATION UNITS 1 & 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 3 8 9 0	LSR NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
		0 0	0 0 6	0 0	0 2	OF 0 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

1.0 Description of the Event

On May 4, 1990, at approximately 1400 hours, and with both Units 1 and 2 at approximately 100 percent power (Mode 1), it was discovered that Unit 1 "B" Casing Cooling Pump (1-RS-P-3B) (EIIS System Identifier BE, Component Identifier P) was not placed into Alert Status and tested at an increased frequency of once every six weeks instead of once every quarter. Alert Status is the increased attention to equipment because of an adverse trend in order to monitor for potential degradation. Increasing the test frequency was required by Technical Specification (TS) 4.0.5.a because vibration data taken on January 14, 1990 was in the Alert range according to criteria established in ANSI/ASME Operation and Maintenance Working Group Standard, Part 6: Inservice Testing of Pumps (OM-6). This event is required to be reported within 30 days according to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

1-RS-P-3B was not placed into Alert Status after the quarterly pump test performed on January 14, 1990 due to personnel error. The individual failed to recognize that the vibration data was in the Alert Range. The discovery was made when data from the next quarterly pump test performed on April 30, 1990 was entered into the Inservice Testing (IST) computerized pump data base on May 4, 1990. Vibration data taken during this test was in the Acceptable Range.

Immediate action was to place 1-RS-P-3B into Alert Status and review records to ensure no other pump was similarly omitted. None were found.

2.0 Significant Safety Consequences and Implications

The Casing Cooling Pumps provide cool, borated water to the suction of the Outside Recirculation Spray (RS) Pumps in order to lower the water temperature and increase the Net Positive Suction Head (NPSH) available. Therefore, the Casing Cooling Pumps are integral to the depressurization of the Containment in the event of a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) or Main Steam Line Break (MSLB) in Containment.

In this event, 1-RS-P-3B was in Alert Status for above normal vibration. No corrective action for this amount of vibration was required by the ASME Code. Therefore, 1-RS-P-3B remained capable of performing its design function. The health and safety of the public was not affected at any time during this event.

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		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

3.0 Cause of the Event

Personnel error was the cause of the event. The individual failed to recognize that the vibration data was in the Alert Range.

A contributing factor to the event was that the IST computerized pump data base had ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI, IWP Program (ASME XI) vibration acceptance ranges for its automatic warning feature setpoints. For 1-RS-P-3B, the Alert Status setpoints per OM-6 are lower than those per ASME XI. Therefore, the computer did not alarm when the January 14, 1990 data was entered.

4.0 Immediate Corrective Action

The 1-RS-P-3B was placed into Alert Status and testing frequency was increased.

5.0 Additional Corrective Action

Records were reviewed to ensure no other pumps were similarly omitted from being placed into Alert Status. None were found.

6.0 Actions to Prevent Recurrence

The IST individual responsible for placing pumps into Alert Status was counseled by management on lack of attention to detail. Also, the IST group was coached on the importance of attention to detail.

Inservice Inspection (ISI) Administrative Procedure 2.0, which governs the inservice testing of pumps, is in the process of being changed. It will require that the test data, including vibration data, of each completed procedure be reviewed once by the IST Engineer and then independently verified by the IST Pump Engineer.

The IST computer pump data base is being updated to incorporate the vibration acceptance ranges established by OM-6 for its automatic warning feature setpoints.

7.0 Similar Events

Licensee Event Report (LER) N1-88-09 documents a missed IST surveillance on a blowdown isolation trip valve inside containment due to personnel error resulting in a violation of TS 4.0.5 on February 11, 1988.

LER N1-88-15-00 documents missed IST surveillance on the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pumps due to personnel error resulting in a violation of TS 4.0.5 on March 22, 1988.