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May 29, 1990

the southern electric system

W. G. Hairston, III
Senior Vice President
Nuclear Operations

ELV-01707
0401

Docket No. 50-425


U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Gentlemen:

VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT
PERSONNEL ERROR LEADS TO UNIT OPERATION
PER TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.0.3

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Georgia Power Company hereby submits the enclosed report related to an event which occurred on May 1, 1990.

Sincerely,


W. G. Hairston, III

WGH,III/NJS/gm

Enclosure: LER 50-425/1990-006

xc: Georgia Power Company
Mr. C. K. McCoy
Mr. G. Bockhold, Jr.
Mr. R. M. Odom
Mr. P. D. Rushton
NORMS

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Mr. S. D. Ebner, Regional Administrator
Mr. T. A. Reed, Licensing Project Manager, NRR
Mr. R. F. Aiello, Senior Resident Inspector, Vogtle

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT - UNIT 2										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 4 2 5 1				PAGE (3) 0 4	
TITLE (4) PERSONNEL ERROR LEADS TO UNIT OPERATION PER TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.0.3															
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)					
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES				DOCKET NUMBER(S)		
0 5	0 1	9 0	9 0	0 0	6	0 0	0 5	2 9	9 0					0 5 0 0 0	
OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5. (Check one or more of the following) (11)													
1		20.402(b)				20.406(c)				50.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(b)	
POWER LEVEL (10)		20.406(a)(1)(i)				50.38(e)(1)				50.73(a)(2)(v)				73.71(c)	
1 0 0		20.406(a)(1)(ii)				50.38(e)(2)				50.73(a)(2)(vi)				OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)	
		20.406(a)(1)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(i)				50.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)					
		20.406(a)(1)(iv)				50.73(a)(2)(ii)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)					
		20.406(a)(1)(v)				50.73(a)(2)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(ix)					
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)															
NAME R. M. ODOM, NUCLEAR SAFETY AND COMPLIANCE										TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 4 0 4 8 2 6 - 3 2 0 1					
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)															
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC					
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)										EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR	
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)										<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO					

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On 5-1-90, a Chemistry foreman advised the Unit Shift Supervisor (USS) that work was required on the Containment Atmosphere Gaseous Monitor 2RE-2562C. The USS authorized the work but specified that 2RE-2562C and the Containment Atmosphere Particulate Monitor, 2RE-2562A, could not both be taken out of service simultaneously. Both monitors being out of service in conjunction with other RCS Leakage Detection Systems would constitute a condition prohibited by the Technical Specifications (TS).

The foreman instructed a technician to proceed with the work and at 1303 CDT, the Data Processing Module (DPM) was taken to purge, which effectively rendered both 2RE-2562C and 2RE-2562A inoperable. The USS was alerted to this condition at 1422 CDT. Since the TS action statement does not clearly address these two monitors being out of service simultaneously with another leakage detection system which was already out of service, the USS conservatively entered TS 3.0.3, which requires unit shutdown to commence after one hour. At 1513 CDT, 2RE-2562A was returned to service and TS 3.0.3 was exited.

The cause of this event was a cognitive personnel error by the Chemistry foreman. He failed to recognize that the work being performed would render both channels inoperable and he failed to notify the USS that both channels would be inoperable. The foreman has been counseled.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-630), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) VEGP - UNIT 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0500042590	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		90	006	000	2	OF	04

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 386A's) (17)

A. REQUIREMENT FOR REPORT

This report is required per 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i) because the unit operated under the requirements of Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3. Entry into TS 3.0.3 was a conservative measure because the action statement wording for TS 3.4.6.1 was unclear as to whether or not a TS 3.0.3 entry was required.

B. UNIT STATUS AT TIME OF EVENT

At the time of this event, Unit 2 was operating in Mode 1 (power operation) at 100% of rated thermal power. The Containment Condensate Leakage Detection System (CCLDS) was out of service for troubleshooting and repair of a level indicator. There was no other inoperable equipment which contributed to the occurrence of this event.

C. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On 5-1-90, the Chemistry superintendent was reviewing the status of radiation monitors using the computer in the Chemistry Lab. He noticed that the reading from Containment Atmosphere Gaseous Monitor 2RE-2562C was such that a background update was advisable and directed personnel to check the background value. A Chemistry foreman advised the Unit Shift Supervisor (USS) that work on 2RE-2562C was required. The USS authorized the work but specified that 2RE-2562C and the Containment Atmosphere Particulate Monitor, 2RE-2562A, could not both be taken out of service simultaneously. Both monitors being out of service in conjunction with the CCLDS would constitute a condition prohibited by TS 3.4.6.1, which reads as follows:

"The following Reactor Coolant System Leakage Detection Systems shall be OPERABLE:

- The Containment Atmosphere Gaseous or Particulate Radioactivity Monitoring System,
- The Containment Normal Sumps Level and Reactor Cavity Sump Level, and
- Either the containment air cooler condensate flow rate or a Containment Atmosphere Gaseous or Particulate Radioactivity Monitoring System not taken credit for in 3.4.6.1a."

The TS action statement provides for the case where only two of the required Leakage Detection Systems are operable; it does not specifically address the case where less than two Leakage Detection Systems are operable. Since the CCLDS (i.e., the containment air cooler condensate flowrate) was already out of service, either 2RE-2562A or 2RE-2562C had to remain in service in order to comply with the Limiting Condition for Operation as provided in the TS action statement.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) VEGP - UNIT 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 4 2 5 9 0	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR — 0	SEQUENTIAL 0 6	REVISION — 0 0	0 3	CF 0 4

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 306A's) (17)

The Chemistry foreman instructed a technician to proceed with a background determination on the gaseous channel, per procedure 34317-C, "Operation of DRMS Containment Atmosphere Process Monitor 1(2)RE-2562". The technician set up the gaseous channel setpoint parameters for background determination, while the existing setpoint parameters were left unchanged in the particulate channel. At 1303 CDT, the monitor skid containing both the particulate channel and the gaseous channel was then taken to purge, for background determination. This condition diverts sample flow from the containment atmosphere to outside air, such that neither the particulate channel (2RE-2562A) nor the gaseous channel (2RE-2562C) are monitoring containment atmosphere. The procedure requires that the Shift Supervisor be notified that both channels will be out of service for approximately two hours. The Chemistry foreman failed to notify the USS that both channels would be out of service.

While this work was being performed, a spurious high radiation alarm was generated in the control room at 1422 CDT. Investigating this alarm, the control room operators found that both 2RE-2562A and 2RE-2562C were out of service. Since the TS action statement does not clearly address the case where less than two RCS Leakage Detection Systems are operable, the USS conservatively entered the TS 3.0.3 action statement, which requires unit shutdown to commence after one hour. At 1513 CDT, 2RE-2562A was returned to service and the TS 3.0.3 action statement was exited. At 1515 CDT, 2RE-2562C was returned to service.

D. CAUSE OF EVENT

The cause of this event was a cognitive personnel error on the part of the Georgia Power Company Chemistry foreman. He failed to recognize that the background determination would render both channels inoperable and he failed to notify the USS (as required by procedure 34317-C) that both channels would be inoperable. There were no unusual characteristics of the work location which contributed to the occurrence of this error.

The cause of the spurious high radiation alarm could not be determined. Although the technician was working on the monitor at the time of the high alarm, her actions should not have generated an alarm.

E. ANALYSIS OF EVENT

The Containment Normal Sumps level and the Reactor Cavity Sump level indicated no unusual rise during the period of time involved. Additionally, the Containment Area Radiation Monitors showed no abnormal activity during this time. Based on these considerations, there was no adverse effect on plant safety or public health and safety as a result of this event.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-630), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20556, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) VEGP - UNIT 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 4 2 5 9 0 - 0 0 6 - 0 0 0 4 OF 0 4	LER NUMBER (8)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

F. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

1. The chemistry foreman has been counseled regarding the importance of complying with TS requirements.
2. A memo has been sent to appropriate chemistry department personnel describing this event and the correct course of action to be taken in the future.
3. Since this event was discovered as a result of a spurious high alarm, a search of operating records is being performed to determine if previous similar events may have occurred. This review will be completed by 6-29-90 and any positive results will be reported in a supplemental LER.
4. A review has been initiated to make appropriate clarifications to the TS wording. This review will be completed by 8-1-90.

G. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

1. Failed Components:

None

2. Previous Similar Events:

LER 50-424/1989-011, dated May 29, 1989.

The initial conditions for this 1989 event were different from the 5-1-90 event. Therefore, the corrective actions were not applicable to the prevention of the 5-1-90 event.

LER 50-425/1989-012, dated April 21, 1989.

In this case, an Instrument and Controls technician inadvertently placed 2RE-2562A and 2RE-2562C in purge instead of activating the paper drive on 2RE-2562A by operating the wrong switch.

3. Energy Industry Identification System Code:

Radiation Monitoring System - IL

Reactor Coolant System - AB

Containment Building - 1/H