

MAY 24 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR: George F. Lanik, Acting Chief
Reactor Operations Analysis Branch
Division of Safety Programs
Office for Analysis and Evaluation
of Operational Data

FROM: Barry Kaufer, Reactor Systems Engineer
Reactor Systems Section GE & CE
Reactor Operations Analysis Branch
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SUBJECT: REVERSED SENSING LINES CONNECTIONS

Enclosed is our Technical Review on Reversed Sensing Lines Connections. In LER 50-353/90-002, Philadelphia Electric Company documented reversed connections of sensing lines to a containment hydrogen/oxygen analyzer. The root cause of this event was mislabeling of inlet/outlet ports, resulting in the reversed connections.

Our search on NUDOS and SCSS database revealed 19 additional events relating to this issue. All of these events were caused by inadequate design documents, deficient procedures, and insufficient verification methods. Considering the relatively small frequency of these occurrences and the limited safety significance, no further AEOD action is recommended.

Original signed by
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Enclosure: As stated

cc w/enclosure: H. Faulkner, IP
D. Queener, NOAC
J. Wheelock, INPO

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