


**VERMONT YANKEE  
NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION**



RD 5, Box 169, Ferry Road, Brattleboro, VT 05301

BVY 89-31

REPLY TO  
ENGINEERING OFFICE  
580 MAIN STREET  
BOLTON, MA 01740  
(508) 779-6711

March 28, 1989

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Attention: Document Control Desk

Reference: a) License No. DPR-28 (Docket No. 50-271)

Dear Sir:

Subject: Response to USNRC Request for Vermont Yankee  
Feedwater Check Valve V28B Flaws Evaluation

In accordance with the NRC staff's recent request, Vermont Yankee herewith provides, as Enclosure 1 to this letter, the subject evaluation. This evaluation addresses two flaws detected during the Cycle 13 outage in-service inspection of feedwater check valve V28B. These two flaws exceeded ASME Section XI acceptance criteria, as provided in IWB-3500, and accordingly this further evaluation was initiated.

As detailed in the enclosed evaluation, Vermont Yankee has concluded that the flaws are stable, static flaws in the stellite wear pads resulting from cracking coincident with casting defects. A detailed fracture mechanics evaluation was performed and compared against materials properties. Based on the results of our conservative analyses and comparisons with published industry data and related acceptance criteria, Vermont Yankee has determined that the reported worst case flaw is acceptable for service without repair during the next cycle of operation.

Although Vermont Yankee does not believe that rapid flaw growth is probable, at the request of the NRC staff, an evaluation of a 3" long through wall flaw was performed. The results show that the flaw is stable. Even conservatively assuming a gross failure of the feedwater check valve, the resulting break is bounded by the plant design basis accident analysis, thus no unreviewed safety question exists.

The enclosed evaluation demonstrates stable crack behavior in all cases up to and including a through wall flaw. However, as an added assurance of safe plant operation, Vermont Yankee will implement the enhanced leakage monitoring program specified in Appendix D of the enclosed evaluation. Further, Vermont Yankee will commit to repair or replace feedwater check valve V28B during the next scheduled refueling outage.

8904120412 890328  
PDR ADOCK 05000271  
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
A047  
1/1

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
March 28, 1989  
Page 2

We trust this submittal is sufficient and fully responsive to your needs; however, should you have any questions or require further information concerning this matter, please do not hesitate to contact us.

Very truly yours,

VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION

  
Warren P. Murphy  
Vice President and  
Manager of Operations

Enclosure - Evaluation (Figures and Appendices A-D)

/dm

cc: USNRC Regional Administrator, Region I  
USNRC Resident Inspector, VYNPS  
USNRC NRR Project Manager, VYNPS

50-271

Vermont Yankee

ACC. NBR. 8904120412

DOC DATE 3/28/90

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M. Fairtle  
June 6, 1990

EVALUATION OF FEEDWATER  
CHECK VALVE V28B FLAWS

7570R

## SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Feedwater Check Valve V28B was opened for verification of free piston movement as part of the Vermont Yankee In-Service Test Program. While the valve was open, a visual examination of the inside surfaces of the valve was performed as required by ASME Section XI. Visual cracking was observed in the Stellite No. 6 wear pads in the piston guide portion of the valve (see Figure 1). The cracking was located within the approximately 1 inch wide Stellite No. 6 wear pads. The wear pads were created by machining a shallow groove in the bore of the piston housing and weld depositing Stellite No. 6 alloy. The bore was then machined to provide a cylindrical bore for the piston.

Ultrasonic inspections were performed on the valve. The thickness of the valve in the region of the flaws is approximately 2 inch to 2.1 inch. In valve V28B two flaws were identified, one with a maximum flaw depth of .65 inch and the other was a 0.40 inch deep flaw on the other side of the valve. The deeper flaw was radiographed, confirming the fact that the flaw was contained entirely within the width of the Stellite No. 6 pad. The ultrasonic examiners reported that casting inclusions made it difficult to discern the crack tip from the inclusions (i.e., the flaw could be shallower than reported). The casting inclusions were also seen in the radiograph. Since the reported flaw depths were in excess of Section XI acceptance criteria, detailed flaw evaluations were required.

## Discussion of Findings

All of the flaws were contained entirely within the width of the Stellite No. 6 wear pads (see Figure 1). Since the majority of the flaws are very shallow, this implies a very slow or nonexistent growth mechanism. Stellite No. 6 is a brittle material, and Stellite No. 6 cracking is not an uncommon occurrence. Inspection of the Stellite No. 6 showed visible evidence of "between bead" cracking and slag inclusions. (The Stellite No. 6 serves no pressure retaining function.)

Possible flaw initiation mechanisms have been evaluated. The thermal expansion coefficients of carbon steel and Stellite No. 6 are similar, so differential thermal expansion stresses and consequently thermal fatigue crack

propagation will be low. It is highly likely that the majority of cracks remain in the Stellite No. 6 or extend slightly into the residual stress region resulting from the Stellite No. 6 weld deposit. (The Stellite No. 6 thickness is approximately 90 mils). Pressure cycling has been evaluated and shown to produce negligible flaw growth.

The two deeper flaws in Valve V208 may be linked up to casting inclusions, or may even be simply in front of nonconnected casting inclusions.

Vermont Yankee concludes that all the flaws are stable, static flaws resulting from Stellite No. 6 cracking coincident with casting defects. The indications are in a region of the valve body that will see high pressure induced stresses, and it is possible that the flaws developed during the original valve hydrotest at 3,250 psig. In any event the flaws are evaluated considering the full reported flaw depth.

#### Flaw Evaluations

The region of the valve body containing the flaw is more complex than a simple cylinder, and the valve body material (ASTM A216 WCB cast carbon steel) is not a low alloy pressure vessel steel, so the "cookbook" flaw evaluation techniques of ASME Section XI cannot be utilized. Instead, a detailed fracture mechanics evaluation was performed utilizing a bench-marked, industry-accepted computer code (pc-CRACK, developed by Structural Integrity Associates).

In order to better represent the stress condition in the intersection region of the valve where the flaws are located, a two-dimensional finite element model was developed using ANSYS. The details and conservatism associated with this model are discussed in Appendix A of this report.

Since the region of the valve containing the flaw is not a standard geometry, several fracture mechanics cases bounding the actual case were performed. The table below summarizes the cases evaluated and the  $K_I$  for a flaw 0.65 inch deep. Flaw evaluation reports are contained in Appendix B.

The flaws were evaluated for two conditions: using a design pressure for the piping system of 1,900 psig; and, using an operating pressure for the system of 1,100 psig. The design condition could only occur when the downstream manual isolation valve is shut, subjecting the piping to the combined shut off heads of the condensate and feedwater pumps. This is classified as a test condition.

The following table lists the conditions that were evaluated and the  $K_I$  values at 1,100 psig and 1,900 psig:

<u>Flaw Evaluation Model</u>	<u><math>K_I</math> at a = 0.65 inches</u>	
	<u>1,900 psig</u>	<u>1,100 psig</u>
	(Units of ksi - $\sqrt{\text{in}}$ )	
Elliptical Flaw in Cylinder (a/l = 0.2)	10.1	5.8
Elliptical Flaw in Cylinder (a/l = 0.5)	6.7	3.9
Fully Circumferential Flaw in Cylinder	13.9	8.0
Infinite Longitudinal Flaw in Cylinder	17.4	10.1
Elliptical Flaw in Flat Plate Subject to Bending and Tension	11.2	6.5
	Limit	24.5
		12.2

The above listed  $K_I$  values must be compared against the  $K_{IC}$  values for the valve material. Since no impact testing was performed on the valve bodies at the time of manufacture, typical data from published reports have been used.

ASME Code Case N-463 provides a lower bound  $K_{IC}$  value for ferritic steel piping, such as A106, Grade B. NRC Contractor Report NUREG/CR-3009 and NRC Report NUREG-0577 show that A216 WCB has superior toughness properties compared to A106, Grade B; therefore, it is conservative to use the lower

bound value from Code Case N-463; the lower bound  $K_{Ic}$  is 36.7 ksi  $\sqrt{\text{in}}$ . Utilizing the appropriate factor of safety for the normal and test condition provides an acceptance criteria of  $K_{Ic}$  equals 24.5 ksi  $\sqrt{\text{in}}$  for the test condition and 12.2 ksi  $\sqrt{\text{in}}$  for the normal condition. As can be seen, both conditions satisfy their respective acceptance criteria by a significant margin.

As a worst case evaluation, we have considered the possibility that a flaw grows through wall. Figure 2 shows the hypothetical flaw sizes for the different evaluation models, as compared to the assumed initial flaw. The limiting mode of operation for this condition is RCIC injection. RCIC initially draws from the condensate storage tank. After the condensate storage tank is drawn down, suction is switched to the torus. For conservatism, we have assumed the RCIC injection water could be at 80°F, the minimum reported condensate storage tank temperature in winter. Figure 3 shows the calculated  $K_I$  values for the various flaw models compared to typical  $K_{Ic}$  data at 80°F extracted from NUREG/CR-3009. Significant margin exists. (Note that the center cracked plate flaw  $K_I$  is artificially high since the model does not allow a varying stress field. The peak stress had to be applied across the full thickness of the plate.)

#### CONCLUSION

Flaws were detected during in-service inspection in the feedwater check valve. The valve had two flaws exceeding ASME Section XI acceptance criteria. Fracture mechanics evaluations were performed and compared against conservative materials properties.

In all cases up to and including a through wall flaw, stable crack behavior is demonstrated and, therefore, gross failure will not occur. As added assurance of safe plant operation, an enhanced leakage monitoring program will be implemented. The specifics are discussed in Appendix D. In addition, repairs or replacement of V28B will be performed at the next scheduled refueling outage.



Finally, even if the feedwater check valve were to be conservatively assumed to experience a gross failure during operation, the resulting could be equivalent to a feedwater line break inside containment, which is within the plant accident analysis, so no unreviewed safety question exists.

FIGURES

7570R




FIGURE 1




FIGURE 1

Comparison of Flaw Shapes  
for  
Fracture Mechanics Evaluation  
of  
Feedwater Check Valve V28B

Figure 2





Figure 3



APPENDIX A  
STRESS ANALYSIS OF FEEDWATER  
CHECK VALVE V28B

E. J. Betti  
J. C. Fitzpatrick

## APPENDIX A

### Stress Analysis of Feedwater Check Valve V28B

#### A. APPLICABLE LOADINGS

##### 1. Pressure

- a. Design pressure 1,900 psig (G-191167). This valve is based on feedwater pump dynamic head plus condensate pump head (G-191139).
- b. Operating pressure in this region is limited to reactor operating pressure plus the pressure drop across the feedwater spargers. During full feedwater flow, 1,250 psig is assumed, 200 psig over RPV operating pressure. During low feedwater (<10% of rated) 1,100 psig feedwater operating pressure is assumed.

##### 2. Mechanical Loads

Mechanical loads are from the attached piping. The section of the check valve in question has a 20 inch OD with a 2 inch wall thickness. The attached piping is 16 inch SCH 120;  $t = 1.218$  inch. The section modulus of the valve is as a minimum 2.4 times larger than the attached pipe in the region of the flaws. From combined dead weight, thermal, and seismic piping moments at the valve (VYC-634), valve stress was calculated to be less than 1,200 psi in the side region of the valve in the area of the detected flaws. In this region, the valve profile is flat. Therefore, localized through wall bending is not a concern.

##### 3. Water Hammer and Valve Impact

Both water hammer or piston impact-induced stress were considered small. This system has not been subject to water hammer events. Also, with the exclusion of a double-ended pipe break upstream of the check valves, the Feedwater System is not subject to rapid pressure decreases which could result in rapid valve closure. Finally, the piston structure is much lighter than the valve body. Therefore, in the event of rapid valve closure, the piston, not the valve, would absorb the majority of impact energy.

##### 4. Thermal Transient-Induced Stress

Full power and partial power transients do not result in severe temperature transients in the region of the 28B check valve. The largest potential thermal gradient that this valve could experience would be during a zero power hot standby condition when feedwater is in the low flow control mode (<10% of rated flow).

The B feedwater line is also used for RCIC, clean-up water return, and CRD return. The following is a summary of the system capacities:

- o RCIC - 416 gpm capacity at 80°F
- o CUW - 130 gpm at 430°F
- o CRD - 60 gpm at 115°F
- o FDW - 7,700 gpm at 375°F



APPENDIX A  
(Continued)

The region of the valve in question is subject to membrane and through wall bending due to pressure. Hot-to-cold transients tend to decrease the through wall bending while cold-to-hot transients would add to pressure stress. Therefore, the following cold-to-hot transient was selected for investigation:

Feedwater at 10% flow, 100°F with CUW water at 100% flow, 430°F. (Combined temperature of 152°F). Interruption of feedwater flow, continue 100% CUW flow at 430°F. The pressure is assumed to be at 1,100 psig.

B. STRESS MODEL FOR ANALYSIS

From field walk down of the feedwater check valve and in situ dimensions, it was apparent both membrane and local bending were important in the flaw region. The two dimensional constant strain model shown in Figure A1 was used for both stress and thermal analysis. The ANSYS finite element code was used to perform calculations and plots. This simplified, two dimensional model provides approximations of local membrane and bending stress in the flaw region.

C. STRESS PROFILE FOR FRACTURE MECHANICS ANALYSIS

The first case evaluated with the model was the effect of 1,900 psig internal pressure, the design pressure of the valve. This condition resulted in compressive forces on the inside face in the flaw region. A section stress profile for a 1,000 psig case is shown in Figure A2. The 1,900 psig stress profile was interpreted from these results.

From the finite element model results, an enveloping stress profile for fracture mechanics study was developed. The compressive stress profile on the inner face was changed to a constant 7,500 psi tensile stress to approximately mid-thickness. Toward the outside wall, a linearly increasing stress profile from the model was used. Changing the compressive portion of the stress profile to tensile provides a conservative "design" envelop for fracture mechanics evaluation.



To assure that the "design" stress profile is conservative, the maximum stress profile under thermal transient conditions was also studied (see Figure A3). The transient stress was combined with mechanical stress from piping and pressure stress and plotted on Figure A4 for comparison with the "design" stress profile. Figure A4 demonstrates that the "design" profile was an appropriate choice for fracture mechanics evaluation.

FEEDWATER CHECK VALVE 2-D MODEL (HORIZONTAL PLANE)

EDC 3/27/89

ANSYS 4.3A2  
MAR 27 1989  
17:21: 2  
ELEMENTS

ZV -1  
DIST=16.5  
XF -5  
YF -1




V28B

FEEDWATER CHECK VALVE, VY

FIGURE 12

Axial Stress through Section @ FLUID  
1000 psig INTERNAL PRESSURE




ANSYS 4.3A2  
MAR 27 1989  
17: 17: 56  
POST1  
STEP-1  
ITER-1  
TIME-30  
SECTION PLOT  
NOD1=35  
NOD2=31  
SY  
STRESS GLOBAL  
  
ZV =1  
DIST=0.6666  
XF =-0.5  
YF =-0.5  
ZF =-0.5

FEEDWATER CHECK VALVE, VY


ANSYS 4.3A2  
MAR 30 1989  
14:50:29  
POST26

ZV -1  
DIST=0.6666  
XF -0.5  
YF -0.5  
ZF -0.5



ANSYS 4.3A2  
 MAR 30 1989  
 15: 24: 45  
 POST1  
 STEP-1  
 ITER-90  
 SECTION PLOT  
 NOD1-35  
 NOD2-31  
 SY  
 STRESS GLOBAL  
 ZV -1  
 DIST-0.6666  
 XF -0.5  
 YF -0.5  
 ZF -0.5

FIGURE A3b: AXIAL STRESS THROUGH SECTION @ FLAW  
 EVENT: INTRODUCTION OF LOW FEEDWATER FLOW  
1.25 MINUTES AFTER STEP CHANGE




FEEDWATER CHECK VALVE, VY

SUBJECT \_\_\_\_\_

PREPARED BY ED Rott DATE 3/28/89 REVIEWED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ WORK ORDER NO. \_\_\_\_\_

FIGURE A4: AXIAL THROUGH WALL STRESS @ FLAW



COMPRESSION


	①	②	③	④	⑤
Pressure @ 1900 psig	-12650	-1406	7739	16184	22760
Mechanical	1200	1200	1200	1200	1200
TRANSIENT	-11600	-3700	1400	5600	6700
Pressure @ 1100 psig	-7324	-514	4480	9370	13178
TOTAL	-17724	-3314	7080	16170	21078

APPENDIX B  
FLAW EVALUATION RESULTS

J. C. Fitzpatrick  
J. R. Hoffman


- A - Plot of Stress Profiles
- B - Comparison of Flaw Profiles
- C - Least Square Curve Fit Profile
- D - Elliptical Flaw in Cylinder -  $a/l = 0.2$
- E - Elliptical Flaw in Cylinder -  $a/l = 0.5$
- F - Full Circumferential Flaw in Cylinder
- G - Infinite Longitudinal Flaw in Cylinder
- H - Elliptical Flaw in Flat Plate
- I - Center Cracked Plate
- J - Extrapolation of Elliptical Flaw to a Thru-Wall Flaw
- K - Fatigue Crack Growth for Semi-Elliptical Flaw 1.5 Inches Deep  
at Three Times Applied Stress





Comparison of Stress Profiles Used for Evaluation of Feedwater Check Valve V28B

Comparison of Flow Shapes  
for  
Fracture Mechanics Evaluation  
of  
Feedwater Check Valve V28B



tm

(C)

pc-CRACK  
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SAN JOSE, CA (408)978-8200  
VERSION 1.2

LEAST SQUARE CURVE FIT OF STRESS PROFILE

VERMONT YANKEE FEEDWATER CHECK VALVE V28B

TERM	COEFFICIENT
C0	8.0867E+00
C1	-5.335E+00
C2	5.8800E+00
C3	4.0177E-01

COEFFICIENT OF DETERMINATION R<sup>2</sup>= 0.9845  
CORRELATION COEFFICIENT= 0.9692

X VALUE	Y VALUE	Y CALC	DIFF
0.0000E+00	7.5000E+00	8.0867E+00	-5.867E-01
1.2500E-01	7.5000E+00	7.5124E+00	-1.240E-02
2.5000E-01	7.5000E+00	7.1266E+00	3.7340E-01
3.7500E-01	7.5000E+00	6.9340E+00	5.6604E-01
5.0000E-01	7.5000E+00	6.9392E+00	5.6080E-01
6.2500E-01	7.5000E+00	7.1470E+00	3.5298E-01
7.5000E-01	7.5000E+00	7.5621E+00	-6.213E-02
8.7500E-01	7.5000E+00	8.1892E+00	-6.892E-01
1.0000E+00	7.5000E+00	9.0331E+00	-1.533E+00
1.2500E+00	1.1515E+01	1.1390E+01	1.2535E-01
1.5000E+00	1.5530E+01	1.4670E+01	8.6043E-01
1.7500E+00	1.9545E+01	1.8910E+01	6.3452E-01
2.0000E+00	2.3560E+01	2.4150E+01	-5.900E-01

END OF pc-CRACK

(D)

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VERSION 1.2

LINEAR ELASTIC FRACTURE MECHANICS EVALUATION

VERMONT YANKEE FEEDWATER CHECK VALVE V28B

CRACK MODEL: ELLIPTICAL LONGITUDINAL CRACK IN CYLINDER (T/R=0.1, A/L=0.2)

WALL THICKNESS= 2.0000

CASE ID	STRESS COEFFICIENTS			
	C0	C1	C2	C3
THRUWALL	23.5000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
FWNRC	8.0867	-5.3350	5.8800	0.4018

CRACK DEPTH	STRESS INTENSITY FACTOR	
	CASE THRUWALL	CASE FWNRC
0.0320	6.475	2.198
0.0640	9.216	3.089
0.0960	11.360	3.761
0.1280	13.200	4.321
0.1600	14.851	4.811
0.1920	16.370	5.251
0.2240	17.789	5.655
0.2560	19.132	6.033
0.2880	20.413	6.390
0.3200	21.645	6.732
0.3520	22.836	7.062
0.3840	23.991	7.384
0.4160	25.133	7.705
0.4480	26.268	8.027
0.4800	27.383	8.348
0.5120	28.479	8.670
0.5440	29.561	8.993
0.5760	30.629	9.320
0.6080	31.686	9.651
0.6400	32.736	9.990
0.6720	33.777	10.336
0.7040	34.811	10.690
0.7360	35.836	11.053
0.7680	36.856	11.426
0.8000	37.870	11.810
0.8320	38.874	12.202
0.8640	39.874	12.607
0.8960	40.869	13.024
0.9280	41.861	13.456

0.9600	42.849	13.901
0.9920	43.835	14.362
1.0240	44.866	14.857
1.0560	45.913	15.375
1.0880	46.960	15.912
1.1200	48.008	16.470
1.1520	49.056	17.048
1.1840	50.104	17.649
1.2160	51.151	18.269
1.2480	52.195	18.911
1.2800	53.240	19.576
1.3120	54.286	20.266
1.3440	55.333	20.982
1.3760	56.382	21.724
1.4080	57.434	22.494
1.4400	58.493	23.297
1.4720	59.554	24.130
1.5040	60.618	24.992
1.5360	61.683	25.885
1.5680	62.750	26.810
1.6000	63.820	27.768

END OF pc-CRACK

E

tm

pc-CRACK

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SAN JOSE, CA (408)978-8200  
VERSION 1.2

LINEAR ELASTIC FRACTURE MECHANICS EVALUATION

VERMONT YANKEE FEEDWATER CHECK VALVE V28B

CRACK MODEL: ELLIPTICAL LONGITUDINAL CRACK IN CYLINDER (T/R=0.1, A/L=0.5)

WALL THICKNESS= 2.0000

CASE ID	STRESS COEFFICIENTS			
	C0	C1	C2	C3
THRUWALL	23.5000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
FWNRC	8.0867	-5.3350	5.8800	0.4018

CRACK DEPTH	STRESS INTENSITY FACTOR	
	CASE THRUWALL	CASE FWNRC
0.0320	4.726	1.602
0.0640	6.695	2.238
0.0960	8.214	2.710
0.1280	9.501	3.095
0.1600	10.641	3.427
0.1920	11.678	3.720
0.2240	12.634	3.985
0.2560	13.528	4.229
0.2880	14.371	4.457
0.3200	15.173	4.672
0.3520	15.939	4.879
0.3840	16.674	5.078
0.4160	17.385	5.273
0.4480	18.075	5.466
0.4800	18.744	5.657
0.5120	19.395	5.848
0.5440	20.030	6.041
0.5760	20.649	6.235
0.6080	21.253	6.433
0.6400	21.843	6.632
0.6720	22.420	6.837
0.7040	22.987	7.047
0.7360	23.544	7.263
0.7680	24.091	7.486
0.8000	24.629	7.717
0.8320	25.164	7.958
0.8640	25.691	8.208
0.8960	26.211	8.468
0.9280	26.724	8.738

0.9600	27.232	9.019
0.9920	27.733	9.311
1.0240	28.232	9.616
1.0560	28.726	9.935
1.0880	29.216	10.268
1.1200	29.701	10.614
1.1520	30.182	10.976
1.1840	30.658	11.352
1.2160	31.133	11.744
1.2480	31.606	12.152
1.2800	32.076	12.577
1.3120	32.542	13.018
1.3440	33.005	13.478
1.3760	33.466	13.955
1.4080	33.922	14.452
1.4400	34.371	14.968
1.4720	34.818	15.504
1.5040	35.263	16.060
1.5360	35.704	16.638
1.5680	36.144	17.236
1.6000	36.581	17.857

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LINEAR ELASTIC FRACTURE MECHANICS EVALUATION

VERMONT YANKEE FEEDWATER CHECK VALVE V28B

CRACK MODEL: CIRCUMFERENTIAL CRACK IN CYLINDER (T/R=0.2)

ALL THICKNESS= 2.0000

CASE ID	STRESS COEFFICIENTS			
	C0	C1	C2	C3
FWNRC	8.0867	-5.3354	5.8800	0.4018

CRACK DEPTH	CASE FWNRC	STRESS INTENSITY FACTOR
0.0320	2.799	
0.0640	3.930	
0.0960	4.781	
0.1280	5.487	
0.1600	6.100	
0.1920	6.649	
0.2240	7.181	
0.2560	7.692	
0.2880	8.178	
0.3200	8.646	
0.3520	9.100	
0.3840	9.545	
0.4160	10.017	
0.4480	10.523	
0.4800	11.032	
0.5120	11.545	
0.5440	12.064	
0.5760	12.590	
0.6080	13.138	
0.6400	13.736	←
0.6720	14.349	
0.7040	14.978	
0.7360	15.624	
0.7680	16.288	
0.8000	16.972	
0.8320	17.705	
0.8640	18.460	
0.8960	19.239	
0.9280	20.042	
0.9600	20.871	



0.9920	21.727
1.0240	22.686
1.0560	23.704
1.0880	24.758
1.1200	25.850
1.1520	26.981
1.1840	28.153
1.2160	29.406
1.2480	30.747
1.2800	32.137
1.3120	33.578
1.3440	35.073
1.3760	36.623
1.4080	38.251
1.4400	40.002
1.4720	41.816
1.5040	43.695
1.5360	45.642
1.5680	47.659
1.6000	49.747

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VERMONT YANKEE FEEDWATER CHECK VALVE V28B

CRACK MODEL: LONGITUDINAL CRACK IN CYLINDER (T/R=0.2)

WALL THICKNESS= 2.0000

CASE ID	STRESS COEFFICIENTS			
	C0	C1	C2	C3
FWNRC	8.0867	-5.3354	5.8800	0.4018

CRACK DEPTH	CASE FWNRC	STRESS INTENSITY FACTOR
0.0320	2.693	
0.0640	3.848	
0.0960	4.763	
0.1280	5.561	
0.1600	6.288	
0.1920	6.970	
0.2240	7.651	
0.2560	8.324	
0.2880	8.986	
0.3200	9.642	
0.3520	10.295	
0.3840	10.948	
0.4160	11.630	
0.4480	12.346	
0.4800	13.073	
0.5120	13.810	
0.5440	14.560	
0.5760	15.325	
0.6080	16.141	
0.6400	17.087	←
0.6720	18.060	
0.7040	19.058	
0.7360	20.085	
0.7680	21.141	
0.8000	22.227	
0.8320	23.523	
0.8640	24.860	
0.8960	26.239	
0.9280	27.662	
0.9600	29.131	

0.9920	30.647
1.0240	32.401
1.0560	34.278
1.0880	36.217
1.1200	38.223
1.1520	40.295
1.1840	42.438
1.2160	44.778
1.2480	47.329
1.2800	49.971
1.3120	52.708
1.3440	55.543
1.3760	58.480
1.4080	61.637
1.4400	65.258
1.4720	69.006
1.5040	72.884
1.5360	76.896
1.5680	81.048
1.6000	85.343

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LINEAR ELASTIC FRACTURE MECHANICS EVALUATION

VERMONT YANKEE FEEDWATER CHECK VALVE V28B

CRACK MODEL: ELLIPTICAL SURFACE CRACK PLATE UNDER MEMBRANE & BENDING STRESSES

WALL THICKNESS= 2.0000  
YIELD STRESS= 30.8000  
CRACK ASPECT RATIO(A/L)= 0.2500

STRESS COEFFICIENTS

CASE ID	C0	C1
FWNRC	8.0867	0.0000

CRACK DEPTH	-----STRESS INTENSITY FACTOR-----
CASE FWNRC	
0.0200	1.854
0.0400	2.623
0.0600	3.214
0.0800	3.713
0.1000	4.154
0.1200	4.552
0.1400	4.919
0.1600	5.261
0.1800	5.583
0.2000	5.887
0.2200	6.197
0.2400	6.496
0.2600	6.785
0.2800	7.067
0.3000	7.341
0.3200	7.609
0.3400	7.871
0.3600	8.127
0.3800	8.379
0.4000	8.627
0.4200	8.844
0.4400	9.056
0.4600	9.264
0.4800	9.467
0.5000	9.667
0.5200	9.862

0.5400	10.055
0.5600	10.244
0.5800	10.429
0.6000	10.612
0.6200	10.849
0.6400	11.084
0.6600	11.319
0.6800	11.553
0.7000	11.787
0.7200	12.019
0.7400	12.252
0.7600	12.484
0.7800	12.715
0.8000	12.947
0.8200	13.199
0.8400	13.452
0.8600	13.705
0.8800	13.959
0.9000	14.212
0.9200	14.467
0.9400	14.721
0.9600	14.976
0.9800	15.232
1.0000	15.487

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VERMONT YANKEE FEEDWATER CHECK VALVE V28B

CRACK MODEL: CENTER CRACK PLATE UNDER REMOTE TENSION STRESS

HALF PLATE WIDTH= 10.0000

STRESS COEFFICIENTS

CASE ID	C0	C1
FWNRC	8.0867	
THRUWALL	23.5000	


CRACK DEPTH	CASE FWNRC	CASE THRUWALL	STRESS INTENSITY FACTOR
0.0400	2.867	8.331	
0.0800	4.054	11.782	
0.1200	4.966	14.430	
0.1600	5.734	16.664	
0.2000	6.412	18.632	
0.2400	7.024	20.413	
0.2800	7.588	22.051	
0.3200	8.113	23.577	
0.3600	8.607	25.011	
0.4000	9.074	26.368	
0.4400	9.519	27.661	
0.4800	9.944	28.897	
0.5200	10.352	30.084	
0.5600	10.746	31.228	
0.6000	11.126	32.333	
0.6400	11.495	33.403	
0.6800	11.852	34.442	
0.7200	12.200	35.452	
0.7600	12.538	36.437	
0.8000	12.869	37.397	
0.8400	13.192	38.336	
0.8800	13.508	39.254	
0.9200	13.817	40.153	
0.9600	14.121	41.035	
1.0000	14.419	41.901	
1.0400	14.712	42.752	
1.0800	14.999	43.588	



1.1200	15.283	44.412
1.1600	15.562	45.223
1.2000	15.837	46.022
1.2400	16.108	46.810
1.2800	16.376	47.588
1.3200	16.640	48.356
1.3600	16.901	49.115
1.4000	17.159	49.865
1.4400	17.415	50.607
1.4800	17.667	51.342
1.5200	17.918	52.069
1.5600	18.165	52.789
1.6000	18.411	53.502
1.6400	18.654	54.210
1.6800	18.896	54.911
1.7200	19.135	55.607
1.7600	19.373	56.298
1.8000	19.609	56.984
1.8400	19.843	57.665
1.8800	20.076	58.342
1.9200	20.308	59.014
1.9600	20.538	59.683
2.0000	20.767	60.348

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Stress Intensity - KSI-SQRT INCHES



4



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FATIGUE CRACK GROWTH ANALYSIS

VERMONT YANKEE FEEDWATER CHECK VALVE V28B

INITIAL CRACK SIZE= 1.5000  
WALL THICKNESS= 2.0000  
MAX CRACK SIZE FOR FCG= 1.6000

FATIGUE CRACK GROWTH LAW(S)  
ASME SECTION XI BILINEAR LAWS FOR WATER ENVIRONMENT

R = Kmin / Kmax  
IF R < 0.25 THEN R' = 0.25  
IF R > 0.65 THEN R' = 0.65  
ELSE R' = R  
QL = 26.9 \* R' - 5.725  
QU = 3.75 \* R' + 0.06  
KTRAN = (D \* QU / QL)^0.25  
dK = Kmax - Kmin

IF dK < KTRAN THEN  
da/dN = CL \* QL \* dK^5.95  
IF dK > KTRAN THEN  
da/dN = CU \* QU \* dK^1.95

HERE:  
CL = 1.020000E-12  
CU = 1.010001E-07  
D = 9.902034E+04  
UNITS FOR THE CURRENTLY ASSUMED UNITS OF:  
FORCE: kips LENGTH: inches

CASE ID	STRESS COEFFICIENTS			
	C0	C1	C2	C3
FWNRC	8.0867	-5.3354	5.8800	0.4018

NUMBER OF CYCLE BLOCKS= 18  
PRINT INCREMENT OF CYCLE BLOCK= 1.0

SUBBLOCK	NUMBER OF CYCLES	CALCULATION INCREMENT	PRINT INCREMENT	FCG LAW ID
1	1.0	1.0	1.0	SECT XI LAW

		Kmax		Kmin	
SUBBLOCK	CASE ID	SCALE FACTOR	CASE ID	SCALE FACTOR	
1	FWNRC	3.0000	FWNRC	0.0000	

CRACK MODEL: ELLIPTICAL LONGITUDINAL CRACK IN CYLINDER (T/R=0.1, A/L=0.5)

CRACK DEPTH	CASE FWNRC	-----STRESS INTENSITY FACTOR-----
0.0320	1.602	
0.0640	2.238	
0.0960	2.710	
0.1280	3.095	
0.1600	3.427	
0.1920	3.720	
0.2240	3.985	
0.2560	4.229	
0.2880	4.457	
0.3200	4.672	
0.3520	4.878	
0.3840	5.078	
0.4160	5.273	
0.4480	5.466	
0.4800	5.657	
0.5120	5.848	
0.5440	6.041	
0.5760	6.235	
0.6080	6.432	
0.6400	6.632	
0.6720	6.837	
0.7040	7.047	
0.7360	7.263	
0.7680	7.486	
0.8000	7.717	
0.8320	7.958	
0.8640	8.208	
0.8960	8.468	
0.9280	8.738	
0.9600	9.018	
0.9920	9.310	
1.0240	9.616	
1.0560	9.935	
1.0880	10.267	
1.1200	10.614	
1.1520	10.975	
1.1840	11.352	
1.2160	11.744	
1.2480	12.151	
1.2800	12.576	
1.3120	13.018	
1.3440	13.477	
1.3760	13.955	
1.4080	14.451	

1.4400	14.967
1.4720	15.503
1.5040	16.060
1.5360	16.637
1.5680	17.236
1.6000	17.856

TOTAL CYCLE	SUPBLOCK CYCLE	KMAX	KMIN	DELTAK	R	DADN	DA	A	A/T
BLOCK 1 1.0	1.0	47.97	0.00	47.97	0.00	1.9E-04	0.0002	1.5002	0.75
BLOCK 2 2.0	1.0	47.98	0.00	47.98	0.00	1.9E-04	0.0002	1.5004	0.75
BLOCK 3 3.0	1.0	47.99	0.00	47.99	0.00	1.9E-04	0.0002	1.5006	0.75
BLOCK 4 4.0	1.0	48.00	0.00	48.00	0.00	1.9E-04	0.0002	1.5008	0.75
BLOCK 5 5.0	1.0	48.01	0.00	48.01	0.00	1.9E-04	0.0002	1.5010	0.75
BLOCK 6 6.0	1.0	48.02	0.00	48.02	0.00	1.9E-04	0.0002	1.5011	0.75
BLOCK 7 7.0	1.0	48.03	0.00	48.03	0.00	1.9E-04	0.0002	1.5013	0.75
BLOCK 8 8.0	1.0	48.04	0.00	48.04	0.00	1.9E-04	0.0002	1.5015	0.75
BLOCK 9 9.0	1.0	48.05	0.00	48.05	0.00	1.9E-04	0.0002	1.5017	0.75
BLOCK 10 10.0	1.0	48.06	0.00	48.06	0.00	1.9E-04	0.0002	1.5019	0.75

BLOCK 11										
11.0	1.0	48.07	0.00	48.07	0.00	1.9E-04	0.0002	1.5021	0.75	
BLOCK 12										
12.0	1.0	48.08	0.00	48.08	0.00	1.9E-04	0.0002	1.5023	0.75	
BLOCK 13										
13.0	1.0	48.09	0.00	48.09	0.00	1.9E-04	0.0002	1.5025	0.75	
BLOCK 14										
14.0	1.0	48.10	0.00	48.10	0.00	1.9E-04	0.0002	1.5027	0.75	
BLOCK 15										
15.0	1.0	48.11	0.00	48.11	0.00	1.9E-04	0.0002	1.5029	0.75	
BLOCK 16										
16.0	1.0	48.12	0.00	48.12	0.00	1.9E-04	0.0002	1.5031	0.75	
BLOCK 17										
17.0	1.0	48.13	0.00	48.13	0.00	1.9E-04	0.0002	1.5033	0.75	
BLOCK 18										
18.0	1.0	48.14	0.00	48.14	0.00	1.9E-04	0.0002	1.5035	0.75	

END OF pc-CRACK

APPENDIX C  
FRACTURE TOUGHNESS DATA FOR  
A216 WCB CAST MATERIAL

NUREG/CR-3009  
SAND78-2347

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# Fracture Toughness of PWR Components Supports

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Prepared by G. A. Knorovski, R. D. Krieg, G. C. Allen, Jr.


Sandia National Laboratories

Prepared for  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory  
Commission

Table 3.2

Classification of Wrought Grades into Groups

Plain carbon: A-7, A-53, A-106, A-201, A-212, A-283, A-284  
A-285, A-306, A-307, A-501, A-515



Carbon-manganese: A-36, A-105, A-516, A-537

High-strength low-alloy: A-441, A-572, A-588, A-618

Low alloy (not quenched & tempered): A-302, A-322, A-353, A-387

Quenched & tempered: A-193, A-194, A-325, A-354, A-461, A-490,  
A-508, A-514, A-517, A-533, A-537, A-540,  
A-543, A-563, A-574.

Table 4.4  
Computation of NDT Results

Material	NDT	$\sigma$	$\overline{\text{NDT}} + 1.3\sigma$	$\overline{\text{NDT}} + 2\sigma$
<b>Cast Steels</b>				
A-27, A-216 (heat treated condition)	1" >1"	- 6°F 35	12°F 17	10°F 57
A-352				18°F 69 ←
				max. -20
<b>Wrought Steels</b>				
all "mild" steels*		27	31	67
all "mild" steels except A-201		40	28	77
				89 ←
C-Mn* (as-hot rolled)		22	13	39
(normalized)		-28	18	- 5
				48
				8
HSLA* (as-hot rolled)		25**	12**	41**
(normalized)		-50**	18**	-27**
				49**
				-14**
<b>low alloy non Q&amp;T</b>				
A-302		8	28	45
A-353				64
A-387				max. -320
				65**
<b>Quenched &amp; Tempered</b>				
A-508 C12				max. 40°F
A-514				max. -10°F
A-517				max. -20°F
A-533B C11				max. 20°F
A-537 C12				max. -60°F
A-543				max. -60°F

\* See table 3.2 for ASTM specs included in this category

\*\* See discussion in Appendix B

#### 4.4.3 Fracture Toughness

Minimum values for fracture toughness of the material groups are indicated in Table 4.5. These are usually dynamic values or static values obtained at lower temperatures equivalenced via the Barsom temperature shift (see section 4.2). Data at the reference temperature, 75°F, was not always obtainable. If data was not obtainable,



## APPENDIX B - MATERIAL DATA

### B.1 Data Obtained

The sources of material data for the various groups are listed in Tables B.1 through B.7. Included in these tables are data sources which were not used in the body of the report. The actual data (NDT and K-type) have been plotted in Figs. B.1 through B.25. Tabulation of  $\overline{\text{NDT}}$  data and standard deviations (where possible) are indicated in Table 4.4.

NDT data for several grades of steel were not located. Assignment into susceptibility groups for these materials were based on the minimum requirements of the appropriate standards under which the materials were procured (see Appendix C), as compared to materials for which data were obtained.

### B.2 Cast Steels

Four grades of cast steels were listed in the utility submittals (not counting a stainless steel casting for Yankee, considered not to have a problem with respect to fracture toughness or lamellar tearing). Two of the grades, A-27 Gr 70-40 and A-216 Gr WCB are carbon manganese-silicon types; one, A-148 (Gr 80-40 and Gr 80-50) is not chemically specified (which indicates it may be either C-Mn or low-alloy depending upon the heat treatment and/or section size) and the last, A-352 Gr LC3, is a high (3-4%) nickel content heat-treated alloy requiring CVN testing. (Note: all % are by weight)

The A-352 Gr LC3 grade in either the double normalized and tempered, or quenched and tempered condition is expected to show excellent fracture toughness with NDT's in the range of  $-100^{\circ}\text{F}$  for

1" section size (Fig. B.1). Some utility data (Ref. B-1) indicated thick section NDT's in the -100 to -60°F range with a maximum value (one example) of -20°F.

A-27 Gr 70-40 and A-216 Gr WCB are both C-Mn-Si type alloys varying only slightly in chemical composition allowables, and primarily in minimum yield strength (40 vs 36 ksi, respectively). Of the two, the A-27 Gr 70-40 allows less carbon (.25% vs .30%) but more manganese (1.2% vs 1.0%). A-216 Gr WCB is virtually identical to A-27 Gr 70-40 in this respect. A histogram of NDT values for A-27 Gr 70-40 heats mainly in the normalized and tempered condition (five were normalized and four were quenched and tempered) plus five heats of A-216 Gr WCB is shown in Fig. B.2. This is taken from a compilation made by the Steel Founder's Society of America (Ref. B-2). The statistics of these data imply that 95% of all heats have NDT's below 20°F. However, these data are taken from 1" thick test castings, and a section size effect may be expected. A second source of data (Ref. B-3) for these materials indicated that NDT was 35°F with a standard deviation ( $\sigma$ ) of 17°F for 12 specimens of varying thickness (from 2-1/2" to 5") poured from two heats in the normalized and tempered condition. This still indicates that 95% have their NDT below 70°F, but not with as much margin as the 1 in. thickness case. Finally, these two specifications allow the possibility of producing heats in the annealed condition, if the mechanical properties can be met. This would be expected to further degrade their fracture toughness properties since a coarser microstructure would result. This implies the only way to meet strength requirements would be by increasing carbon content.


Finally, A-148 Gr 80-40 and Gr 80-50 (40 and 50 ksi yield strength, respectively) are more difficult to evaluate, since chemical specifications and data are lacking. The added strength requirements over A27 Gr 70-40 could be met in a number of ways; via heat treatment, via additional carbon content, or via alloy content. Since additional carbon is usually the least expensive route, the implication is that these sub-grades of A-148 would have less desirable NDT values than the previously discussed A-27 and A-216. However, A-148 was specified by only one plant and was part of a wire rope system, which is probably not as critical a location as the other cast grades, which were typically in the sliding pedestal category of plants. In Fig. B.1 some NDT data (Ref. B-4) is available for normalized and tempered A-148 Gr 80-50 which indicate excellent NDT's around -10F; however, these heats contained approximately 2% Ni. Thus these data would be indicative of the best practices in meeting the mechanical property requirements.


$K_{Ic}$  data were located for two heats of A-216 Gr WCC (Refs B-5, B-6). These are shown in Figs. B.3. Applying a temperature shift of about 150°F, equivalent  $K_{Ic}$  values at 75°F are roughly 40 ksi  $\sqrt{in}$ . These specimens were taken from immense (20"x20"x48") castings, and probably represent the worst possible section size effect.

### B.3 Weld Consumables

The weld metals are also in the cast steel category. It is difficult to evaluate weld metal properties separately from the base materials being joined, since dilution effects can occur which significantly change the chemical composition of the fused metal. Further-

FIG. B.2 NDT FOR CAST GRADES  
 (NDT) FOR A-27 IS -7°F  
 " " 13°F





- FRACTURE TOUGHNESS VERSUS TEST TEMPERATURE

FIGURE B.3(a) A-216  $K_{IC}$  DATA

APPENDIX D  
ENHANCED LEAKAGE MONITORING PROGRAM  
FOR FEEDWATER CHECK VALVE V28B

7570R

## APPENDIX D

### ENHANCED LEAKAGE MONITORING PROGRAM FOR FEEDWATER CHECK VALVE V28B

To augment Vermont Yankee's existing Primary Containment Leakage Monitoring System, a Local Leak Detection System has been installed on the FDW-28B valve. This additional system is a Techmark Leak Detection System to provide constant leakage monitoring during the next operating cycle. The system consists of three moisture sensitive tape (MST) transducers mounted on the mirror insulation below the valve (V28B). To install the transducers, a  $\frac{1}{2}$ " hole was drilled through the insulation for the transducer sensor tube to be inserted. The sensor tube provides a path for moisture from under the insulation to contact the MST. The transducers have the ability to detect leakage as low as 0.1 gpm. The transducers provide a multiplex signal to an indicator/control unit (TUM 700) mounted in the Reactor Building. The control unit interrogates all sensors once per second and provides a digital display of sensor location(s) for alarm or trouble conditions. The unit also provides remote alarm indication in the main control room.

The Local Leak Detection System will be utilized by operations personnel to initiate further administrative actions/controls which have been developed as part of this enhanced plan. These administrative controls identify, in part, operator action upon receipt of an alarm on the MST unit, compensatory action if the unit experiences trouble as well as establishing additional leakage rate criteria below that contained in Technical Specifications.

As stated above, the Local Leak Detection System is intended to augment the existing systems and provide additional assurance that any leakage from the FDW-28B valve will not go undetected. This system will provide operators with an "early warning system" to initiate additional measures of this augmented program.