NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



ORIGINAL

In the Matter of:

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON, ET AL

(San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, : Units 2 and 3) :

: DOCKET NOS. 50-361-OL

60-362-OL

DATE: March 12, 1982 PAGES: 1 - 98

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1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3 5 In the Matter of: 6 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON, ET AL : Docket Nos. : 50-361-OL (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, : 50-362-OL Units 2 and 3) 8 9 Room 310 10 San Diego County Administration Building 11 1600 Pacific Highway San Diego, California 12 Friday, March 12, 1982 13 Oral argument in the above-entitled matter was 14 convened, pursuant to notice, at 9:00 a.m. 15 BEFORE 16 STEPHEN F. EILPERIN, Chairman 17 Administrative Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeals Board 18 DR. RECINALD GOTCHY, Member 19 Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeals Board 20 DR. REED W. JOHNSON, Member Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeals Board 21 22 23 24 25

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PROCEEDINGS

(9:01 a.m.)

JUDGE EILPERIN: On the record.

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. My name is
Stephen Eilperin. I am the Chairman of the NRC Appeal Board
in this case. With me today are the two other members of the
Board. To my right is Dr. Reed Johnson, and to my left is
Dr. Reginald Gotchy.

I would like to thank the San Diego County

Administration for letting us use this very handsome room
today for our oral argument. The argument this morning is
on Intervenors Carstens application for a stay of the
Licensing Board's January 11 partial initial decision, which
authorized the issuance of a low power operating license for
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Unit 2.

The low power license was in fact issued on February 16, but the plant has not yet gone critical, and will not do so for some six or seven weeks as we understand it.

When we get back to Washington, D.C., we will be issuing an order requiring the utility to advise us five business days before they plan to go critical, so that we can make sure that our decision on the stay motion issues before that event.

The terms of the argument today are governed by our

1 order of February 16. 45 minutes have been allotted for each 2 side, and the Intervenors may reserve a portion of their time 3 for rebuttal. 4 I will now request Counsel for the respective 5 parties to identify themselves formally for the record, and 6 we will start with Mr. Wharton. 7 MR. WHARTON: My name is Richard Wharton. I am 8 with the University of San Diego Environmental Law Clinic. 9 I am representing the Intervenors Carstens, Friends of the 10 Earth, et al. 11 JUDGE EILPERIN: Thank you, Mr. Wharton. Do you 12 wish to reserve any time for rebuttal argument? 13 MR. WHARTON: Yes. I would like to reserve 14 approximately ten minutes, depending on how the opening 15 argument goes, but I anticipate ten minutes for rebuttal. 16 JUDGE EILPERIN: Mr. Pigott? 17 MR. PIGOTT: My name is David R. Pigott, with the 18 law firm of Orrick, Herrington, & Sutcliffe, 600 Montgomery 19 Street, San Francisco, California, representing Applicants. 20 Also with me from that same firm is Mr. John Mendez. With 21 me from the Southern California Edison Company Law 22 Department, Mr. Charles R. Coker, associate general counsel, 23 and Mr. James Beoletto. JUDGE EILPERIN: Thank you, Mr. Pigott. Mr. 24 25 Chandler?

1 MR. CHANDLER: On behalf of the Staff, Mr. 2 Chairman, my name is Lawrence Chandler. With me is Mr. 3 Benjamin Vogler. We are with the Office of Executive Legal 4 Director of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, 5 D.C. 6 JUDGE EILPERIN: Thank you, Mr. Chandler. Have 7 you and Mr. Pigott reached an agreement as to how you want to 8 allot your time? 9 MR. CHANDLER: Yes, sir. We have. I believe the 10 Applicants anticipate using 25 minutes of the allotted time, 11 and the Staff will be using 20 minutes. 12 JUDGE EILPERIN: Thank you, Mr. Chandler. 13 MR. PIGOTT: I should also like to indicate the 14 presence of Mr. Bob Dietch, vice-president nuclear engineering 15 and operation, in charge of the San Onofre facility. 16 JUDGE EILPERIN: Thank you, Mr. Pigott. Mr. 17 Wharton, do you want to proceed? 18 MR. WHARTON: Yes. Mr. Chairman, may I proceed 19 from the desk, or would you prefer us at the podium? 20 JUDGE EILPERIN: I would prefer if you would stand 21 at the podium. 22 MR. WHARTON: Very well. 23 ORAL ARGUMENT BY MR. WHARTON ON BEHALF OF INTERVENORS CARSTENS 24 AND FRIENDS OF THE EARTH ET AL.

MR. WHARTON: Mr. Chairman, members of the Appeals

Board, I would first like to express my appreciation for you coming out to San Diego and scheduling this hearing on this day. As you are aware, it is a very critical issue.

Going into the argument itself, as the Board is well aware, 10 CFR 2.788 provides that any party may file an application for a stay of the effectiveness of a Licensing Board decision, and in determining whether to grant or deny such an application, the Board will consider four factors.

The first factor is whether the moving party has made a strong showing that it is likely to prevail on the merits. Two, whether the party will be irreparably injured unless a stay is granted. Three, whether the granting of a stay would harm other parties, and where the public interests lie.

It would appear clean, then, that the Board has the power to grant a stay. Why else would the regulations provide for the procedure for a stay and the hearing for it?

It would also appear from the wording of the 2.788 that the showing that the requesting party has to make is not extremely clear. For example, what constitutes irreparable injury to the party? For example, whether any harm, any harm at all, to the other parties, would justify rejecting a stay, and lastly, what is it they mean exactly by the public interest.

These were the questions that we had, and of course

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we went to the NRC cases to determine which cases show what kind of showing the Intervenors make in order to get a stay.

The problem was, we could not find one case in which the NRC has granted a stay. I am not saying that it hasn't occurred, but we have not been able to find one. That explains one of the reasons why we don't have voluminous case authority demonstrating what the Board has found appropriate in order to grant a stay.

The question then arose in our mind if the statutes allow you to grant a stay, and there have been no stays granted, why is this?

Appeal Board, if I recollect, has issued stays before. It did so in the Seabrook case, and the Board generally speaking applies the same standards for stay motions as does any court of appeals.

MR. WHARTON: I am reluctant to say I didn't find the Seabrook case. I am saying that it is not there. I just wasn't able to find it.

The cases that we did find indicate that the reasons appear in every case that we have reviewed why the applying part has not received the cases, because either they have not made a strong showing that is likely to prevail on the merits, or the operation of the plant was not imminent so as to threaten irreparable injuries to the parties and the

public by the operation of the plant itself.

In the present case, I believe the Intervenors in their petition for the stay, their brief in support of their exceptions, have made the strong showing of the likelihood to prevail on appeal, which we will argue further today.

Also in the particular case here, because the plant operation is imminent, and because the errors committed by the Board involve crucial seismic safety issues, we submit that because of these crucial seismic safety issues, the very fact that they exist places the Intervenors and the Public in jeopardy of suffering irreparable injury unless a stay is granted.

We would conceed that if we cannot convince the Board of the likelihood of our prevailing on appeal, that we probably cannot meet the other requirements. On the other hand, if the Board is convinced that there is a likelihood of the Intervenors prevailing on the merits, that such a finding by the Board would justify granting a stay, because as a matter of course, the other requirements would fall into line once that particular requirement is met.

JUDGE EILPERIN: You don't think you are obliged to prove that an earthquake is going to happen in order to prevail on a showing of irreparable injury, I take it.

MR. WHARTON: Mr. Chairman, that is the very point, that no one can prove that an earthquake is going to happen.

What we do know from the facts of the case so far is we do have geologic features extremely close to the plant. We do know there are capable faults within eight kilometers from the plant. We do know those faults are active. We do know that an earthquake can occur at any time. That is not really contested.

JUDGE EILPERIN: Okay, why don't you proceed with the merits of your argument.

MR. WHARTON: Very well.

JUDGE EILPERIN: Thank you.

MR. WHARTON: The first issue we would look to on the merits of the case itself has to do with the issue of the capability of the Cristianitos fault. Yesterday, we spent a lot of time looking for the Cristianitos fault. In fact, we saw it from the air and we saw it on the ground. We saw that the fault is within 1,000 yards of the plant. The Board itself, at page 20, states if the Cristianitos fault were shown to be a capable fault, it would certainly be significant and perhaps crucial to the safety of the San Onofre facility. But the Board decided at page 21, they have determined that prior opportunity to litigate the capability of the Cristianitos fault at the construction permit stage foreclosed the -- their word -- relitigation of that question in these proceedings.

The issue of the Cristianitos fault has never been

litigated. It seems incredible to me and other observers of this case that the fault which is closest to the plant has never been litigated as to whether or not it is capable, and in fact when the Intervenors tried to litigate that issue, the Board came up with a doctrine of foreclosure, where none of the elements of foreclosure applied, to throw the issue out so that it still has not been litigated to this date.

JUDGE EILPERIN: Let us assume for the moment that the Licensing Board was wrong --

MR. WHARTON: Yes.

JUDGE EILPERIN: -- in ruling that your client was foreclosed from litigating the issue of the capability of the Cristianitos fault. I thought the Licensing Board also had an alternative ground for its decision on that issue, namely that the testimony of Mr. Simons on the Cristianitos fault issue, the Licensing Board believed was not worth very much.

MR. WHARTON: I will address that issue.

JUDGE EILPERIN: Thank you.

MR. WHARTON: Looking to the testimony of Mr. Simons, first we would look to his qualifications as an expert witness.

JUDGE EILPERIN: Let me interrupt for one more second.

MR. WHARTON: Yes.

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11 1 JUDGE EILPERIN: Do you -- did you have any witness 2 other than Mr. Simons on the Cristianitos fault? 3 MR. WHARTON: Mr. Chairman, I believe one of the 4 best witnesses we had on the Cristianitos fault was Dr. Sean 5 Biehler for the Applicants, which we will argue. 6 JUDGE EILPERIN: But you were not foreclosed from 7 putting on any testimony in the case on the Cristianitos 8 fault? 9 MR. WHARTON: We had written testimony from Mr. 10 Mark Legg regarding the activity capability of the 11 Cristianitos fault. I believe that testimony was thrown out 12 also. We were not able to cross-examine and get into the 13 issue of the Cristianitos fault with the witnesses for the NRC 14 Staff. 15 When the Board ruled that the issue of the 16 Cristianitos was foreclosed, we did not bring the issue up 17 again, because we were told not to. 18 JUDGE JOHNSON: Did you have the opportunity to 19 cross-examine Dr. Biehler? 20 MR. WHARTON: Yes, we did. Yes, we did, and I 21 believe --22 JUDGE JOHNSON: And was Dr. Biehler's opinion that 23 the Cristianitos fault was active? 24 MR. WHARTON: There was one thing -- no. 25 JUDGE JOHNSON: You said he was your best witness,

and I just --

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2 MR. WHARTON: Dr. Biehler's opinion was that it was 3 not active. I believe the cross-examination of Dr. Perry Ehlig, which indicated that the Cristianitos fault is a 5 listric-normal fault, that is, that it trends, goes down and 6 towards the bottom trends towards the west, and the 7 testimony of Dr. Sean Biehler, using Dr. Sean Biehler's 8 chart, I believe is the significant evidence that was never --9 we have not been able to present that to the Board by way of 10 findings because it was no longer an issue.

Dr. Biehler in his chart -- and it is on page 10A of our appeals brief, the brief in support of exceptions --

JUDGE JOHNSON: I have --

MR. WHARTON: Yes.

JUDGE JOHNSON: May I interrupt you --

MR. WHARTON: Certainly.

JUDGE JOHNSON: -- one minute here. I have a sort of legal question. What reliance do you think this Board should put on your appeal brief, in that we are now deciding your stay application. It is my understanding that the other parties have not yet under the rules had an opportunity to reply to your appeal brief.

MR. WHARTON: That is correct.

JUDGE JOHNSON: So you in effect had two bites at this apple, and the other parties have only had one. Do you

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really believe that we should put any reliance on your appeal brief in our consideration of the stay application?

MR. WHARTON: I believe so. First, to answer the first point as far as what I am referring to, I am referring to right now only the chart of Dr. Biehler on page 10A of the appeal brief, which is part of the record.

JUDGE JOHNSON: Yes.

MR. WHARTON: As far as the appeal brief itself is concerned, as you say, we had two bites at the apple. At the same time, they have had two bites to see what our argument is going to be. I have not received their full argument in opposition to our appeal as of yet, in writing. I don't know what their full argument is. They know, as of February 26. what our full argument is, because it is all in our appeal brief. It is not like the Applicants and the Staff have not had a full opportunity to thoroughly review every argument we have raised. It is all in writing. They will have an opportunity to present oral argument about that, and they will have an opportunity to present further appeal briefs. I believe that certain points, because of limitation on the ten-page argument, is so short, there is not too much you can say in ten pages to justify an appeal. I am not saying that the appeal brief in totality should be accepted, but portions of it that are highly relevant should be.

JUDGE EILPERIN: Mr. Wharton?

1 MR. WHARTON: Yes, sir. 2 JUDGE EILPERIN: I understood that, from what you 3 said, that you had the opportunity to cross-examine Mr. 4 Biehler and Mr. Ehlig --5 MR. WHARTON: That is correct. JUDGE EILPERIN: -- on the Cristianitos fault issue, 7 but not the NRC Staff witnesses? 8 MR. WHARTON: That is correct. 9 JUDGE EILPERIN: What was the reason for the 10 distinction? 11 MR. WHARTON: Because it was when the issue of the 12 Cristianitos fault was foreclosed, at the time of Mr. Simons' 13 testimony, we went through the Applicants' case. The 14 Applicants testified regarding the Cristianitos fault. They 15 raised it as an issue. Mr. Simons came in. At that point, 16 the Board ruled Mr. Simons testimony is stricken, and there is 17 no more issue of the Cristianitos fault, and after that is 18 when the Staff's witnesses came on and testified. 19 JUDGE EILPERIN: I see. Who for the NRC Staff 20 spoke to the issue of the Cristianitos fault in his written 21 direct testimony? 22 MR. WHARTON: That would be in the -- the Staff SER 23

has a lengthy discussion of the activity of the Cristianitos fault. I believe that would have been -- Mr. Cardone would have been the witness regarding the activity of the

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Cristianitos fault. Mr. Cardone didn't testify on the stand regarding the Cristianitos fault, although there is -- the evidence is in the record in the form of the SER, regarding the Cristianitos fault. It was an area we did not get into.

We could have gotten into it simply because it was in the SER, that is, submitted as written testimony. We did not get into it because it was foreclosed as an issue.

JUDGE JOHNSON: Well, I think what you are telling us is that the persuasive evidence that the Board should have used to allow the litigation was Dr. Simons' -- or Mr. Simons' testimony, and that -- I will characterize it as lines and circles, in other words -- and I would like to ask you a question about that testimony.

MR. WHARTON: Yes.

JUDGE JOHNSON: And I believe the major point was that if he plotted circles representing the likely location of various earthquakes in the vicinity, that some 20 of those circles intersected the line which represented the Cristianitos fault. I was unable to find anywhere where Mr. Simons had tested what the significance of 20 of those circles intersecting that one particular line was.

It appeared to me that almost any line you drew in that map area, of the same length of the Cristianitos fault, 37 kilometers, or miles, and you drew the same circles, that almost any line segments you drew of the right length, you

might get 20 or more circles that intersected it. couldn't see where Mr. Simons' testimony was probative of anything, or -- I mean, if he had shown that it were the only line in which 20 of those epicenters plotted as areas would have given anything like 20 intersections, and all the rest gave two or three, it would seem to me that would have been very persuasive evidence, but I was unable to see how his evidence was supposed to be solidly indicative of the fact that those epicenters should have been associated with that particular line. MR. WHARTON: Well, I think if we look at the chart

MR. WHARTON: Well, I think if we look at the chart itself, I somewhat resent what the Board calls a error drawing -- I mean a circle drawing exercise. As you know, the data is gathered from Cal Tech. Mr. Simons is an expert in -- he has a degree from MIT geophysics. He is an expert in data retrieval and use of computers for data retrieval, and drawing charts for Scripps Institute.

Now, the significance of drawing these lines is that this is where the earthquakes occur, as you know. The lines in his testimony indicates with 68 percent accuracy, you can place 20 earthquakes on the Cristianitos fault, given that the error bars is the standard of conservatism.

JUDGE JOHNSON: That is correct. Now, I say if I were trying to perform that exercise and trying to persuade someone that the Cristianitos fault was somehow the center of

earthquake activity, I would have drawn some comparable lines

37 kilometers long in that same map area, and shown that only
two earthquake circles intersected, or one earthquake or five
earthquake circles intersected these randomly drawn lines, but
the way that chart looked to me, it would appear that any line
I drew in that area 37 kilometers long, there would be a
likelihood of 20 or more of those circles would intersect it.

MR. WHARTON: Well, if there -- if we are talking about drawing about drawing any lines, but we are not talking about drawing any line. We are talking about the Christianitos fault, I mean that is the significance.

JUDGE JOHNSON: Sure, but what you are trying to prove is that that fault somehow represents a collection of earthquake epicenters.

MR. WHARTON: No.

JUDGE JOHNSON: I mean, that that line --

MR. WHARTON: No. The point is, is under the regulations, a fault is capable if it has experienced movement, I believe, 125,000 years, I forget the fact figure as to how long a period of time, but has experienced movement on that fault. Our point is, is that when you have an earthquake on a fault, by its nature that means there is movement on that fault, which means it is a capable fault under the regulations. Once a fault is determined capable under the regulations, then there are a series of things that

you have to do that have not been done here.

JUDGE JOHNSON: I am somewhat familiar with that, but what I am trying to say is that I don't see where those circles drawn in the way that Mr. Simons drew them, establishes movement on that fault. I think the same procedure could be carried out to show that there is a comparable amount of movement on any randomly drawn line in that particular area that he mapped.

MR. WHARTON: Well, I am not aware that what you are saying is in fact the way things are. What we are saying is given that in 1975, for example, two earthquakes occurred, given that Dr. Biehler's testimony, when you look at the error bars drawn around the epicenters -- the hypocenters of his earthquakes, and given that -- given Dr. Biehler's chart on page 10-A, and given the shallowest possible projection of the Cristianitos fault, given Dr. Biehler's own error circle, you will find that the shallowest projection of the Cristianitos fault is inside the error circles.

Again, we are talking about cumulative evidence that these earthquakes are not random. These earthquakes are occurring on the Cristianitos fault.

JUDGE EILPERIN: But let me ask you this, Mr. Wharton.

MR. WHARTON: Yes.

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JUDGE EILPERIN: There was evidence in the record let in from both the Applicant and the Staff dealing with the capability of the Cristianitos fault. Would it be your contention that had the Licensing Board considered Mr. Simons' testimony, that it would have been arbitrary for the Licensing Board to have found the Cristianitos fault not capable? In other words, if the Licensing Board had, instead of striking Mr. Simons' testimony, on the ground that it was not of probative value and you were foreclosed from litigating the issue of the Cristianitos fault, if instead of doing that it considered that testimony, obviously the Licensing Board in striking it indicated that it did not think it was of much probative value, I am hypothesizing a situation where it considered it, it considered the testimony of the Staff and the Applicant, would you say under those circumstances it would be arbitrary for the Board to conclude that the Cristianitos fault was not capable?

MR. WHARTON: No, it would not be. But they didn't do that, as you are well aware. They did not. No, it would not be arbitrary if they fully heard the issue all the way through the hearing, heard all the evidence, all cross-examination was allowed, and then decided that the Cristianitos was not active, based upon all the evidence, without seeing their findings, it is hard to say, but it wouldn't necessarily be arbitrary.

1 JUDGE EILPERIN: Now, why can't we do that? Is your 2 point we can't do that because you have not been allowed to 3 cross-examine the NRC Staff on the matter? 4 MR. WHARTON: That is correct. Well, that is not 5 the only reason. We have the issue of the capability of the Cristianitos fault. Our position is that it should have 7 been fully litigated. They foreclosed it halfway through 8 the hearing after allowing one side to present evidence and 9 the other side not to. Preclude us --10 JUDGE EILPERIN: I am trying to figure out what 11 fully litigated means, and what more you would have litigated. 12 MR. WHARTON: Yes. 13 14

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JUDGE EILPERIN: I understand from what you had said before, it was my impression that what you say you have been denied has been the right to cross-examine the NRC staff on the issue. You cross-examined Dr. Biehler and Dr. Ehlig on the issue, and Mr. Simons' testimony was there for the Licensing Board to read and for us to read. The Licensing Board just threw it out. I am just trying to find out what more would be on the record.

> MR. WHARTON: Yes, I was getting to that. JUDGE EILPERIN: Okay.

MR. WHARTON: That is, after Mr. Simons' testimony, the examination of the Staff's witnesses, and most importantly, the ability for us to present findings of fact

based upon the entire record -- we don't know what the entire record would be now, because it was cut off at a certain point -- to present findings of fact based upon the entire record, and the arguments to support those findings of fact based upon the entire record, and then have the Board come through, consider all of the evidence through the whole hearing, including cross-examination of the Staff, make findings to justify why they found the Cristianitos not to be capable. It was not done.

JUDGE EILPERIN: But you can argue that to us.

MR. WHARTON: Yes.

You can say that -- you can show what Dr. Simons -- Mr. Simons testimony was, and you can argue to us what we should find on the basis of that evidence, so I still don't see what beyond your being shut off from cross-examining the NRC Staff, what beyond that is really at issue. That is what I am trying to get at.

MR. WHARTON: Well, you are saying I can argue it to you, but I am arguing it to you on appeal. I cannot argue facts that are not on the record. I cannot argue --

JUDGE EILPERIN: I understand that.

MR. WHARTON: -- findings that we weren't able to submit.

JUDGE EILPERIN: I understand.

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MR. WHARTON: And I cannot argue where they are wrong in their decision.

JUDGE EILPERIN: All right, but all I am trying to get at is, as I understand it, all of the facts that you would put in on the issue are in the record, except for those facts which you would have adduced through cross-examination of the NRC Staff. Am I wrong in that assumption?

MR. WHARTON: Well, Dr. -- no. I do not -basically we have, it was Dr. Simons' testimony was thrown out. Mark Legg's, as to Cristianitos fault, and anything regarding the Staff, that is correct.

JUDGE EILPERIN: Do you want to proceed to your second issue?

MR. WHARTON: Yes. On the issue of the foreclosure -- correction.

On the issue of the ruling on the segmentation of the OZD, as we have stated in our petition for a stay, the Board in its ruling determined that the Offshore Zone of Deformation was segmented. The Licensing Board at the construction permit hearing, in which the Applicants were parties, and which the Staff were parties, stated on the record and in the decision at 6 AEC 942, The Applicants and Staff agreed to the stipulation which specifies that the adequacy of the design basis earthquake will be litigated in the framework of the model set forth in the USGS GI and the

quoted sections of the report in paragraph 59. The Board has reviewed the information in the record and the Staff's evaluation of that information, and finds the Staff model is the appropriate one.

The paragraph referred to and incorporated in the decision, the Newport-Inglewood zone of fault and folds, South Coast Offshore fault and the Rose Canyon fault zone cannot be disassociated. Instead, an extensive linear zone of deformation at least 240 kilometers long, extending from Santa Monica Mountains to at least Baja California, seems well-established by the present evidence. The Santa Monica, California zone of deformation must be considered potentially active and capable of an earthquake whose magnitude could be commensurate with the length of the zone.

That is very important language, because we are talking about an adjudication between the present parties, that the OZD is 240 kilometers long, that the earthquake that can occur is commensurate with the length of the entire zone, not the segment.

As we stated in the record, Mr. Pigott on four different occasions agreed, and said, the issue of the continuity, throughgoingness of the OZD is not at issue. We agree it is continuous.

JUDGE EILPERIN: Okay. Let me see if I am mistaken or not mistaken.

MR. WHARTON: Yes.

JUDGE EILPERIN: I read Mr. Devine's testimony of USGS, explaining what he took to be the meaning of that language at the construction permit stage. Do you have any disagreement with Mr. Devine's understanding of what that language meant?

MR. WHARTON: I am not sure which testimony you are referring to.

JUDGE EILPERIN: Okay. I think it was testimony which said that the zone -- that the three segments, if you will, could not be disassociated, but that did not mean that a rupture would necessarily be the entire length of the 240 kilometer zone of deformation.

MR. WHARTON: No, I do not disagree with that.

JUDGE EILPERIN: You don't disagree with it.

MR. WHARTON: No, I do not. We are not arguing that rupture of the entire 240-kilometer length. The Board, I believe, in this case, referred to Dr. Brune's testimony as trying to show that that is what we are trying to say. I believe that was set up as a straw man. We are not saying that at all. Dr. Brune's point in bringing up the rupture of the entire length of the OZD was to show the absolute most conservative point. That is, it is a benchmark, is the most conservative judgment you could make. He didn't say that that is the one you should base it on.

JUDGE EILPERIN: Are you saying that the -- let me ask the question another way. Is your point that the Staff or the Applicant put in testimony which assumed segmentation in the sense that the fault, the zone of deformation would be blocked off at the particular segments which have been identified during the testimony?

MR. WHARTON: That is my understanding of what the Board's ruling was.

JUDGE EILPERIN: Well, I am trying to understand whether or not the Staff or the Applicant put on a case which was inconsistent with the USGS model, if you will, of the Offshore Zone of Deformation.

MR. WHARTON: I don't think that they did. That is why I am so surprised at the ruling, because the evidence that was presented was not presented for that purpose, that was, to come up with an idea that it was segmented. The Applicants' witnesses did present witnesses regarding that the Newport-Inglewood Zone of Deformation was cut off at one point from the result of, I believe -- I forget the name of the high, but it was a structure that cut off the Newport-Inglewood Zone of Deformation.

I believe that we did make objection at that time, and that is when we had the assurances that what we are talking about here, we are just trying to show the nature of these segments, we are not denying that they are not

1 throughgoing.

JUDGE EILPERIN: Okay, so you are saying that the case as it went in, except perhaps for this one instance that you mentioned, did not assume that the Offshore Zone of Deformation was blocked off at any particular point, but that the Licensing Board erred in making that kind of a finding?

MR. WHARTON: Yes. Yes. There is no evidence to support that, and if there is any evidence to support it, maybe I missed it as the attorney, but that is only because there was agreement between the parties that it was not at issue. Yes, we did allow evidence to go in regarding this blocking off, but we objected to it. Then we were told, don't worry about it. We are not litigating segmentation. The decision comes down saying it is segmented, and it makes a significant difference.

JUDGE EILPERIN: What difference does it make?

For example, both the Applicants and the Staff as I

understand it did put on evidence and take the position that

the peak ground acceleration, given the USGS model, was

0.67 g.

MR. WHARTON: Right.

JUDGE EILPERIN: Now, is your point that the Licensing Board would have found a higher ground acceleration if they had concluded that the zones were in fact not segmented?

MR. WHARTON: Yes. The point is, is that you determine the ground accelerations you can expect from an event based upon the magnitude of the event. That is what the testimony in the hearing is all about. First you determine the maximum magnitude earthquake that can occur. Dr. Slemmons is the main witness regarding that particular methodology. In order to do that, you have to know the length of the zone or the fault that you are talking about.

JUDGE EILPERIN: But he concluded that the peak ground acceleration would be 0.67 g, not assuming that the zones would be blocked off.

MR. WHARTON: Dr. Slemmons' testimony goes to the magnitude earthquake that can occur, basically. He may have some testimony in there regarding peak ground acceleration, but that was not the thrust of his testimony. He was there to testify regarding maximum earthquake from length of fault and to different methods of determining maximum earthquake.

A point here is that if the OZD is 240 kilometers long, you have one magnitude earthquake based upon Slemmons' fractional method, say. If you go into -- let us just refer to the fractional method. 240 kilometers long, using Dr. Slemmons' fractional method, that is, the 22 percent, and given that he did change his testimony, we are talking about a earthquake, a mean plus one standard deviation earthquake of 7.7, and a mean earthquake of 7, using Dr. Slemmons'

method as he testified to, which we will get into later.

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JUDGE JOHNSON: Have you just misspoken? A mean earthquake of 6.7, is that what you meant to say?

MR. WHARTON: No, the mean earthquake with the OZD with a length connection to Coronado Banks, as he testified, or 247 kilometers, he testified the mean earthquake is 7.0, and the mean plus one standard deviation earthquake is 7.7. That is using the 22 percent method. Now, using the 22 percent method, and using the segments, we look at the South Coast Offshore Zone of Deformation, the one directly offshore from SONGS, taking 22 percent of 62 kilometer rupture length, you are going to reduce that magnitude substantially. Now, I don't think we should be looking at reducing it on paper. We should really have to look at what is a conservative figure, but given that if it is segmented, what the Board is leading us to is that it is segmented, therefore we only have to look to 22 percent, or some other methodology.

What the Board is saying is, it is not going to rupture past the segments, but only look at one segment at a time.

JUDGE JOHNSON: Well, I am not sure, Mr. Wharton,
that I understand exactly everything Mr. Slemmons was trying
to -- Dr. Slemmons was trying to do, and I intend to inquire
of the Staff, but it seems to me that he was using a different

1 method -- I mean, he was mixing his methodologies. 2 MR. WHARTON: That is right. 3 JUDGE JOHNSON: He did not apply the fractional 4 break to the segments. 5 MR. WHARTON: No, he didn't. 6 JUDGE JOHNSON: So when he talked about 7 magnitudes based on the segments, he used the full break 8 along the entire segment. 9 MR. WHARTON: That is correct. 10 JUDGE JOHNSON: Presumably if he had used his 11 fractional break for assessing magnitudes on the segments, 12 he would have gotten much smaller values, the order of 5. 13 Do you agree with that? 14 MR. WHARTON: Yes. 15 JUDGE JOHNSON: So, using short, segmental 16 lengths, it seems to me that he was taking -- I assume that 17 what he thought he was doing was taking a conservative 18 approach to determining the maximum that might be attributable 19 to such a segment, whereas when he considered the zone as a 20 full length feature, he then applied his fractional --21 MR. WHARTON: That is correct. 22 JUDGE JOHNSON: -- method to that. He never, as I 23 know, went to the end, which presumably he would consider a

conservative end, of taking a full length break, along the

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full length of the OZD.

JUDGE EILPERIN: Which, for completeness, it would have seemed that me might have done that if he were taking a full-length break along an entire 37-kilometer segment, so it is not -- I don't understand everything he was doing, but what do you believe the Board -- if the Board had -- the Board said it was segmented, but it also quoted Slemmons' testimony for the fractional break, in other words, the Board seemed to accommodate the idea that even though there was a segmented -- or the feature is segmented, the OZD is segmented, they didn't throw out Slemmons' testimony on a fractional break method for a 240-kilometer long feature.

In other words, it seemed to me the Board was -- I mean, it said it was segmented, but it was not denying the possibility that the entire feature could behave as a single fault, because it accepted Slemmons' fractional method.

MR. WHARTON: That seems to be inconsistent findings by the Board, and I agree with you, when they refer to Dr. Slemmons' testimony, they are referring to the way Dr. Slemmons did it, but at the same time, in the same decision, they are saying that it is segmented. I believe what the Board is attempting to do is add a, I believe, artificial standard of conservatism here by saying there is nothing to worry about because it is segmented, but we will listen to Dr. Slemmons anyway.

JUDGE JOHNSON: Well, are they not making a finding relative to contention one on the nature or the characteristics of the OZD? Wasn't contention one the one that asked for the characteristics of the OZD, including its length?

MR. WHARTON: Yes.

JUDGE JOHNSON: And if the testimony submitted in response to that particular contention led them to the finding that the OZD was in fact segmented, do you think it was error for them to make that finding?

MR. WHARTON: Yes. Absolutely.

JUDGE JOHNSON: Even when the contention says what is in litigation is the nature of this OZD?

MR. WHARTON: It was never contemplated by any of the parties, and again, stipulations between -- previous stipulations on the record that are part of the record and part of the decision, are binding on all the parties.

Agreements between the parties and what the parties agree to going into the hearing, what was stipulated to on the hearing, was admitted in the hearing by the attorneys, is binding on all of the parties.

For the Board to turn around and disregard the previous Board's ruling and decision, disregard the stipulation of the parties, to disregard the stipulation of the parties on the record that it was not at issue, and then decide an issue that it was segmented, is error.

JUDGE EILPERIN: Okay, so you are saying that the finding of segmentation and the phrase that the OZD cannot -- the parts, if you will, of the OZD, cannot be disassociated, are just irreconcilably irconsistent with one another.

MR. WHARTON: Yes. The point again is, is that one of the points the Intervenors did on cross-examination was that -- is that Dr. Slemmons' 22 percent method. This will take too long. I am not going to get into that. It is a little esoteric. I don't want to really talk about that.

JUDGE EILPERIN: What do you think you have to show for irreparable injury? Do you have to show anything more than you were denied cross_examination of the NRC Staff, and we might rule with you on the merits of that issue, or do you have to make some sort of showing that the information available does show some serious seismic risk?

MR. WHARTON: Yes. What I believe the showing should be is that the regulations set forth what is required of the Board to do before they can issue the license.

A summary would be, they have to determine the capability of all significant geologic features. In this case, they have not done that. They have not determined the capability, nor have they litigated the Cristianitos fault. You have a serious unanswered question, the answer to which is significant to the public health and safety.

JUDGE EILPERIN: Okay, but I thought you had said

earlier on in your argument that you would not have termed it arbitrary for the Licensing Board to have found on the basis of the evidence that was in the record that the Cristianitos fault was not capable.

MR. WHARTON: Mr. Chairman, they did not decide the issue.

JUDGE EILPERIN: I know they didn't decide the issue. That is why I asked you the question.

MR. WHARTON: Yes.

JUDGE EILPERIN: I wanted to know if it was your contention that had they decided the issue, it would have been -- the overwhelming weight of the evidence would have been that the Cristianitos in fact was a capable fault, or that the weight of the evidence, the preponderance of the evidence, whatever standard you want to use, I just wanted your estimation of which way the evidence of record tilted on that issue.

MR. WHARTON: Well, Mr. Chairman, when I answered the question as to whether or not it would be arbitrary, I am looking at my experience in stating whether the finding of a Board is arbitrary in a legal sense. I am not second-guessing all of the evidence. What happens in these hearings is the Board can hear it one way, and I can disagree with that and I would disagree with their finding that it was not capable, but that does not mean that it is arbitrary, and that

1 is the answer I was giving. The mere fact of that does not 2 mean that it is arbitrary. It is a disagreement on facts, and 3 I would strongly disagree with that. 4 JUDGE EILPERIN: All right. 5 MR. WHARTON: It was not litigated. We were not 6 able to get into all of the facts. That is the point. It is 7 not resolved. That is one area. The other area is we are 8 looking at the Offshore Zone of Deformation. We have the 9 testimony of Dr. Slemmons. That -- Dr. Slemmons dramatically 10 changed his testimony on the stand -- well, without even 11 changing his testimony he indicated first, using his fault 12 segment method, that the figures he gave were mean figures, 13 or mean earthquakes, that is all they were, and that they 14 could be exceeded 50 percent of the time.

When asked to get into what the mean plus one sigma would be, he added the 0.7, and I believe --

JUDGE JOHNSON: Would you explain what you mean by a mean earthquake?

MR. WHARTON: Yes.

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JUDGE JOHNSON: Doesn't it mean -- don't you really mean the mean of the data?

MR. WHARTON: It is the mean of the data, that is correct.

JUDGE JOHNSON: There is no such thing as a mean earthquake or a one plus sigma earthquake, is there? I have 1 never --

MR. WHARTON: No -- well, that was my terminology and it is a lawyer's terminology and not a scientist, and I apologize, because it isn't really accurate. What we are saying is, yes. Dr. Slemmons has a methodology. He gathers all of his data, and the figures he comes up with are the mean of that data, to account for the scatter in the data, the possible error --

JUDGE JOHNSON: Was it Dr. Slemmons' opinion that using his method in order to determine the magnitude of an event, that you add one sigma to it?

MR. WHARTON: I am sorry?

JUDGE JOHNSON: Was it Dr. Slemmons' opinion that to use his method properly you should take the mean value and add one standard deviation to it?

MR. WHARTON: I believe -- I will read Dr. Slemmons' testimony, and this is significant, because this is the decision that we are asking the Board to make, is, is Dr. Slemmons describes what his mean value is. He then describes what his mean plus one value is. Now, I believe it is up to the policy maker, the person who is making the decision, to decide what is conservative.

JUDGE JOHNSON: Well, hold on. It seems to me what we are doing now, though, is listening to and interpreting the testimony of a recognized expert in the field.

MR. WHARTON: Yes.

JUDGE JOHNSON: And he is applying a method, and we are not seismologists, albeit we are called upon to make decisions in the area. My question to you was what was the technique that this individual proposed, as an expert? Did he propose taking the mean value and adding one sigma to it, or did he propose to establish the magnitude by simply taking the mean value of his curve? That was the question I asked before.

MR. WHARTON: That is not clear. It is not clear because he didn't get to saying. He did make a decision at the end, saying that he thought $M_{\rm S}$ 7 was conservative. He did testify to that.

JUDGE JOHNSON: Ms 7.

MR. WHARTON: M_S 7, assigned as a safe shutdown earthquake --

JUDGE JOHNSON: Presumably then he felt that M_s 7.7 was very conservative.

MR. WHARTON: No. No. I don't think that is what we are saying. What I am saying is, is that he also testified that he is not making a policy decision as to what degree of risk the public is willing to accept. He testified to that. He is testifying as the seismologist. The decision as to what degree of risk the public is willing to accept is up to the Licensing Board and this Appeals Board.

Is that one of the things that you have to consider, the seismologist is not saying license the plant. He is making it a consideration. Okay, what he says here is he is asked a question regarding his assigning M_S 6.8 as the maximum magnitude earthquake on the OZD with a 40-kilometer length, and the Rose Canyon fault zone with a 37-kilometer length.

Asked a question: Going again to the maximum magnitude 6.8, you stated that was a mean value, is that correct? Witness Slemmons: Yes. (Question) And by mean value, that means that 50 percent of the earthquakes could be above that, 50 percent would be stopped? Answer: That is correct.

Below, given that data -- I am finishing his answer. If we did want to find the 84th percentile with this data, would we add 0.694 to the figure on the particular chart? He answers: Plus or minus. That is to account for the data, for the scatter in the data.

The question then comes up, too, and I believe

Dr. Brune in his testimony presents it very well. Dr. Brune

is an eminent seismologist. He states: Slemmons has used a

regressive curve developed by Slemmons to assign magnitudes

to ruptures of a given length. In the calculations given by

him in Appendix E, however, he uses the mean curve rather

than the curve for a mean plus one standard deviation. Thus

the magnitude values he cites for a given rupture length would

be expected to be exceeded 50 percent of the time. The mean 1 plus one standard deviation is 0.694 magnitude units higher than the mean for a strike-slip earthquake. For example, for an assumed rupture length of 62 kilometers for the South Coast Offshore Zone of Deformation, the mean estimated magnitude is 7.7, expected to be exceeded 50 percent -- I am sorry. 7.07, expected to be exceeded 50 percent of the time. The mean plus one standard deviation is 7.77, expected to be exceeded by about 16 percent of the data for faults with a rupture length of 62 kilometers, and the mean plus two standard deviations is 8.46.

The question here, as Dr. Brune again testifies, I am not testifying as to what is safe. I am testifying to these are the standards here. Dr. Slemmons testified, these are the standards we are presenting to you.

Now, what we are asking the Board to look at is, in order -- what we are saying is, in order for you --JUDGE EILPERIN: Excuse me one moment.

MR. WHARTON: Yes, sir.

JUDGE EILPERIN: You have used up your 45 minutes. Why don't you try and finish up within five minutes.

MR. WHARTON: Five minutes.

JUDGE EILPERIN: And we will still give you some time for rebuttal.

MR. WHARTON: Fine. I think we discussed Dr.

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1 Slemmons' testimony, just in reviewing and finalizing his 2 testimony. Dr. Slemmons did change his testimony, and 3 decided that his -- the method he was using in the written testimony was really not appropriate. He then said, I would 5 now delete that particular sentence, and not use that 6 particular adjustment. He was there referring to a 7.5 7 percent of the rupture length adjustment. He goes on to say 8 that instead he would add 0.694 to the magnitude obtained 9 from the 22 percent rupture length, and then, all we have to 10 do with that information is, for example, in the case of 275 11 kilometer length, that would yield a maximum magnitude of 12 approximately 7.7, given one standard deviation. So, doing 13 the OZD with a 200-kilometer length, the mean is 6.9, mean 14 plus one is 7.6. 15

The OZD with a length connection to Coronado Banks, 247 kilometers, the mean is 7, the mean plus one is 7.7.

The OZD with a length extending to Agua Blanca fault, 300 kilometers, the mean is 7.1, the mean plus one is 7.8.

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What we have, then, is the testimony if we look at the mean plus one standard, we have a range of 7.4 to 7.9, as the maximum magnitude earthquake, given. Now, the Board has to decide which is the appropriate standard. Given that particular information, then we go to Dr. Boore. Dr. Boore is the only independent, truly independent seismologist to testify regarding peak ground acceleration, from maximum

1 magnitude.

JUDGE JOHNSON: Do you include in that characterization -- and you added something that I cut off -- how about Dr. Devine? Mr. Devine?

MR. WHARTON: Dr. Devine did not testify -- that is what I was getting to -- did not testify as to maximum ground acceleration from correlation with the maximum magnitude, 7.5 and above.

JUDGE JOHNSON: Did he have any comments to make regarding the significance of magnitude? Do you recall?

MR. WHARTON: I don't recall Dr. Devine's testimony regarding that.

JUDGE JOHNSON: Perhaps at transcript page 5323, where he sort of indicated that it was not essential, the magnitude -- assignment of magnitude was not essential to the ultimate determination of ground motion?

MR. WHARTON: I do not claim to be a scientist.

There was an awful lot of assigning of maximum magnitudes.

I don't know why it was done if it is not necessary to do that.

JUDGE JOHNSON: Well, the USGS letter that appears in the SER, do you recall what it had to say regarding the association of ground motion with earthquakes through the assignment of magnitude?

MR. WHARTON: No, I do not. There is such a volume

of evidence in this record I can't remember all of it. I am afraid I do not remember that. If you could refer it, I might be able to respond to the --

JUDGE JOHNSON: Go ahead.

JUDGE EILPERIN: Why don't you try and conclude your argument, Mr. Wharton?

MR. WHARTON: Very well. The point we are making is, is that the methodology adopted, developed by Boore and Joyner, is state-of-the-art methodology, the latest methodology using the latest data. The Board makes much of that there is not -- of a statement by -- in the Boore's paper that there is not optimal data within -- if I could find the -- for distances less than 40 kilometers from earthquakes with M greater than 6.6, the predictions are not constrained by data, and the results should be treated with caution.

The Board makes much of that statement, but that statement applies to any method for determining peak ground acceleration. The testimony that runs through the entire hearing is that there is a lack of data regarding the ground acceleration from close-in earthquakes with high magnitudes. This report is no different than any other report in the record. In fact, this report is the latest report, and the only one that was submitted to full peer review, and published by the Bulletin of the Seismological Society of America.

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Using Dr. Boore's methodology, going to a 7.5 earthquake, we have peak ground acceleration of 1.1 g, far in excess of the design of the plant itself.

Going even to a 7 earthquake, we still have peak accelerations of 0.82 g, I believe it is. This again is using the mean plus one standard, and this is a decision we are again asking the Board to make.

The public health and safety, I believe, of San Diego, is worth more than a mean standard, or a 50-50 chance. I think we are entitled, the people of San Diego and the Intervenors are entitled to at least a 16 percent chance.

We are asking the Board, then, to stay this decision, because the evidence reveals at the present time critical errors made by the Licensing Board which are essential to the safety of the plant, which those -- given those errors, what has to be assumed under the regulations, that the earthquake can exceed the design basis of the plant, and that that particular earthquake could happen at any particular time, because one cannot say when it is going to happen. All we do know is that one is going to happen, but we don't know when.

JUDGE EILPERIN: Thank you very much, Mr. Wharton.

Mr. Pigott, are you next up? You and Mr. Chandler can each have five more minutes, since we did have Mr. Wharton run over a bit.

ORAL ARGUMENT OF DAVID R. PIGOTT ON BEHALF OF APPLICANTS,

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY, ET AL

MR. PIGOTT: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In order to properly respond to Mr. Wharton's arguments, I think it is necessary to first drop back a bit and get ourselves in the context of what we are actually doing here. We are at a very early stage of the appeal process. I wanted to set a little bit of context, remind us exactly where we are here.

We have completed over 6,000 pages of transcript of actual hearings on the seismic issues, and the low power issues. We have over 70 exhibits on seismic and low power. We have a Board decision that has carefully considered the record, and the proposed findings of all the parties, and we have a low power license issued by the Director of NRR, based on the findings he has been required to make under Section 50.57.

What we are looking at now is a very limited motion, a motion for a stay pending the full appeal procedure. Mr. Wharton correctly states the four elements. He has, of course, the burden of proving each of the four elements, and in order to perhaps move to what some would consider the most serious of the elements, the showing of prevailing on the merits, let me first address the other three, more legalistic perhaps, elements.

First of all, the irreparable harm, which in fact
for a stay motion may be the most crucial of the issues to be
addressed. Applicants would submit that the Intervenors have
made no showing of irreparable harm. First of all, the cases
do state what the standard of irreparable harm is. I would
cite the case of The State of New York vs. NRC, 550 F. 2nd 745,
a 1977 case, which states that irreparable harm must be
something that is actual and imminent, and not something remote

JUDGE EILPERIN: Is your position that the

Intervenors have to show that there is an earthquake that is

imminent before they can prove irreparable injury?

MR. PIGOTT: That would be an impossible standard.

I think that --

JUDGE EILPERIN: But is it yours?

and speculative.

MR. PIGOTT: No, I wouldn't impose an impossible standard on Mr. Wharton. No, I think that they must make some kind of a showing, though, that the error is so egregious in this instance, and the risk would be so high that it would amount to irreparable harm.

There is no showing of that in this case.

JUDGE EILPERIN: Well, the Commission suspended the license in Diablo Canyon, low power license in Diablo Canyon because of seismic issues. What kind of standard for irreparable injury would you derive from that action of the

1 Nuclear Regulatory Commission?

according to design.

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MR. PIGOTT: Well, there was potential consequences,
I think, from a seismic event, but the issue was not seismic
for the withdrawal. The issue there was failure to construct

JUDGE EILPERIN: Well, but the design dealt with seismic issues.

MR. PIGOTT: But I don't think there is -- it
was an implementation of the design basis. It was not -there is no finding, for instance, in the Diablo case, that
the -- I believe it was 0.72 that they are dealing with in
that case.-- is an inadequate design basis. Had the
Commission and the Staff determined that the Diablo plant was
constructed, appropriately constructed for a 0.72 design
basis, or seismic design basis, they wouldn't have reached
the problems that they are in, but their problem is that they
apparently did not build according to the level that they
were supposed to build to.

Here we are talking about whether or not the design that has been arrived at is adequate, and that is a much different issue.

JUDGE EILPERIN: So the question, the standard would be whether there is serious question whether or not the plant is design to withstand the maximum probable earthquake, the design basis earthquake?

MR. PIGOTT: At this stage, I would have to say so. and if you want to question the design, as I think the Intervenors do, I think your standard would have to be some showing that 'he actual seismic design landed upon, the 0.67 g. is so egregiously in error that it constitutes an unacceptable risk to proceed with the low power, and the testing, and ultimately to full power pending appeal, and in the context of this case, I would think that is the showing that has to be made. The simple fact that there may be -- or the simple allegation that there may be error in the determination I don't think rises to the level of irreparable harm. I think there has to be something very serious, and if you can't show imminency, and I would have to agree that you cannot show imminency of an earthquake, you would certainly have to show that the damage, that there is a good possibility that the damage would be so egregious that it is unacceptable for the public health and safety. I would submit that no showing along those lines has been made, or even attempted.

JUDGE EILPERIN: Mr. Wharton said he did attempt it but for one thing he was foreclosed by the Licensing Board from pursuing the issue of the Cristianitos fault. What is your response to that?

MR. PIGOTT: Well, the Cristianitos fault, first of all he has no showing with respect to the capability of the

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Cristianitos fault, and therefore I would say he does not -he has not made any kind of a showing that a serious mistake
has been made by the Board. He quibbles with the foreclosure
which we will be very pleased to deal with on the brief, but
when one gets into the actual merits, as we are supposed to be
at this stage, there is nothing shown that was not
considered by this Board.

JUDGE EILPERIN: Well, why don't you first get into the merits of whether or not the Licensing Board was correct when it ruled that that issue was foreclosed from its consideration.

MR. PIGOTT: Okay. I would submit that the Board has been correct in its handling. The Cristianitos fault is certainly nothing new to anybody who has been involved in the San Onofre proceeding, all the way back to the early 1960's. There was a site visit yesterday. You saw it. It looms out of the ground not too distant from the plant. To even conceive that that has not been investigated, and investigated thoroughly over the last 20-plus years just is incredible. It has obviously been investigated. Now, it has never been a precise issue in a hearing, and there is good reason for that.

The way you get to an issue is that you show some basis to contest a Staff or an Applicant position. It has been investigated at the construction permit stage. It has been investigated at the Unit 1 stage, and although seismicity and

general geology has been opened at all those proceedings, there has never been articulated any basis to controvert the activity or the inactivity of the Cristianitos fault.

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JUDGE EILPERIN: Are you saying that that issue did not fall within any of the contentions that were in issue at the operating license stage? Wasn't the basis of the Licensing Board's decision?

MR. FIGOTT: Well, I was going to specifically note that the Intervenors attempted to raise the issue of the Cristianitos fault in this proceeding, and I would cite you to a document entitled "Revised contentions submitted by Intervenors FOE et al," dated May 5, 1981. There they proposed a subcontention H, and I will read it, again quoting, "Applicants have failed to perform the required investigations to determine whether the Cristianitos fault meets the definition of capable fault as set forth in 10 CFR Part 100, et cetera," end of quote. We responded and countered that no basis had been shown for an issue, and I would cite document "Applicants' response to revised contentions of Intervenors FOE etal submitted May 5," and which was date May 12, 1981. The Board ultimately rejected that particular proposed issue in its revised prehearing conference order of May 28, 1981, for lack of specificity.

So, within a month of the time we went to hearing on this case, the Intervenors did not have sufficient evidence to

raise an issue with respect to the capability of the Cristianitos fault.

JUDGE JOHNSON: Mr. Pigott, how would you say the Licensing Board in the construction permit hearing dealt with the Cristianitos fault for SONGS 2 and 3? Were they obliged to make a finding with regard to its capability, in your opinion, under Part 100?

MR. PIGOTT: A specific finding? No more than they were required to make a specific finding to each and every fault that may be within a five-mile radius or pick the area of criticality. They, I think, were required to make specific findings with respect to the matters in contest, and the Cristianitos was not a matter in contest. They did, however, accept the SER, and the SER had gone through a complete review, and had been the basis of Intervenors formulating their issues, and leading through to the ultimate hearing and decision.

JUDGE JOHNSON: Well, a Licensing Board at the construction permit stage is obliged, is it not, to make certain site suitability findings whether they are contested or not? It was my understanding.

MR. PIGOTT: Well, to the extent they made those necessary findings in the appropriate -- they must be somewhat general form. I am confident that they were, and that they would have been based on the Staff's review, and the documents

officially filed in the docket. What I am getting to is it
was -- the finding would not have been made in the same manner
as the findings on a contested geologic feature, and because
it was not a contested geologic feature, I would not expect to
see the same degree of specificity in the findings, although
I would agree that certainly the Board looked at site
ruitability and did whatever review it felt necessary to
assure itself that it was a safe and suitable site.

Now, I don't have the whole of that particular record in mind that I can go back with any more particularity, doctor.

possible threshold that a contention at this stage might have to meet if there had been a finding at the earlier stage.

Now, if -- I am fully appreciative that it was not litigated at the construction permit stage.

MR. PIGOTT: Well, what I think is significant in answer -- or at this point, is that at the operating license prehearing, within a month of when we went to hearing, and bearing in mind that we have a period of time from December of 1977 through May of 1981 that discovery was open, because we fell into that period of time when TMI was the focal point, the discovery was open for that full period of time, and Intervenors availed themselves of discovery. Now coming up to within a month of hearing, Intervenors are attempting to

raise an issue with respect to the capability of the fault, and they still don't have anything. They don't have a basis for it.

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JUDGE EILPERIN: That wasn't the basis on which the Board excluded the issue, however.

MR. PIGOTT: The Board excluded -- well, the Board excluded the issue on the basis that there was no specificity. In other words, there were no facts to support an opening up. What they did do, and what Applicants believe was appropriate, is that they formulated, in effect, an update issue. I direct you to issue number one, and the question was whether data --I am paraphrasing -- whether data gathered from earthquakes that occurred subsequent to the construction permit showed the seismic design basis to be inadequate, and that was really an open door type of issue. If there was anything that happened after the construction permit that Intervenors felt bore on the seismic design basis, they were free to go after it, and that was the issue, for instance, under which Dr. Biehler's testimony comes in. He talks about the seismic events that occurred between the construction permit stage and the time we come to the operating license stage, in order to afford the Board a basis for determining that the site is still safe and still suitable.

JUDGE EILPERIN: Well, Mr. Simons' testimony also sought to deal with post-construction permit events, did it

not?

MR. PIGOTT: Yes, it did. What we have to -- I think what we have to remember when we get right to Mr. Simons! testimony, is that it was heard. There was preliminary argument that it be offered subject to a motion of proof, and subject to motions to strike, and in fact that was what occurred, and the transcript -- well, there was from pages 4778 through 4359, a good deal of transcript with respect to the cross-examination of precisely the testimony that we see appended to the Intervenor's brief.

JUDGE EILPERIN: What about Mr. Wharton's point that he wasn't able to pursue cross-examination with the NRC Staff?

MR. PIGOTT: I am not aware that he was precluded.

If he was precluded, he was precluded only with respect to pre-1973 events. I know of no ruling, and obviously it is a long transcript, but I cannot think of anyplace where Mr.

Wharton was ever precluded from cross-examining with respect to seismic events happening post-construction permit. Prior to construction permit, yes, that was beyond the scope of the issue, and they may have been excluded, but again, I don't have one presently in mind.

JUDGE EILPERIN: But don't you have to relate the post-CP events to events before that time? Aren't they just too interrelated to make that sort of a distinction?

MR. PIGOTT: Not really. The distinction was very

1 easily made by Applicants and Staff in looking at -- when you 2 get to a point where you have a suitable site, and you are 3 then looking at whether or not there are additional events 4 that may bear on the suitability of that site, you can 5 segregate them by earthquake and date and location and examine 6 them, and then the question becomes, is there anything from 7 these earthquakes that causes us to go back and reflect on the 8 way we made our decision previously, and that is the way it 9 was approached, and there was nothing found in the earthquakes 10 that were examined by Applicant and Staff that would indicate 11 there was any relationship to the Cristianitos fault. The 12 circle-drawing exercise, and that is all it was, there isn't 13 a person in this room who couldn't have done that exercise, 14 proved absolutely nothing. It proved that there had been 15 microseismic or small earthquake events at various locations. 16 That didn't prove anything with respect to capability of a 17 fault. 18

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JUDGE EILPERIN: Okay, you don't think that Mr.

Wharton should have taken the Board's ruling on foreclosure
as foreclosing him from cross-examining Staff witnesses as to
post-CP events dealing with the capability of the Cristianitos
fault?

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MR. PIGOTT: Absolutely not, and I would be very surprised if there was any portion of the transcript that reflects that he was cut off from examining with respect to

post-construction permit events. I mean, that was the issue.

JUDGE EILPERIN: But he should have taken it to mean that he was cut off from relating to pre-construction permit events?

MR. PIGOTT: Oh, no. If he could have shown there was anything that would breathe life back into the Cristianitos, if he had met that threshold, he could go anywhere with it, but he never got there.

The record is now without Mr. Simons' testimony. I think in looking at this, the stay, and the stay context, irreparable harm, et cetera, this Board can take note of the fact that the earthquakes listed in Mr. Simons' proposed testimony in fact were the subject of considerable testimony.

Dr. Biehler didn't just locate where they might have come to the surface. He build a special crustal -- or developed a special crustal model in order to develop the focal mechanisms, the sense of motion with respect to those earthquakes, and to determine whether or not there was any possibility that they could be linked to the Cristianitos. That was reviewed by Staff. In fact, I don't have the cite to Mr. Biehler's precise page reference, but in order for the earthquakes in question to have been associated with the Cristianitos, the whole of that Capistrano Embayment would have had to be moving in an uphill direction. It just belies the rules of physics to associate the events that were in fact

examined with the Cristianitos fault. There were three -
in preparing for this, I went through and found that Dr.

Biehler had addressed seven different earthquakes, a swarm of five, and two independent earthquakes, in his testimony, and Mr. Wharton refers to eight events and nine events, either in his motion or his brief, going back to Mr. Simons' testimony, which was what I assumed his source.

The only two events that were not covered were two very microseismic events. One was a 2.2 event in 1977, and another was a 0.0 event in 1977, and those are the only two that we can by a process of elimination show that he may possibly be referring to.

TUDGE EILPERIN: Have you had an opportunity to look at the chart that Mr. Wharton had in his brief?

MR. PIGOTT: Not in any depth. If I looked at it now, I may recall it, but frankly, I am not prepared to respond to his brief at this time.

JUDGE EILPERIN: So you don't know whether that chart is accurately or inaccurately drawn.

MR. PIGOTT: Can I see which one you are looking at?

Just seeing it brings back a flood of memories. I

would not want to comment on that one at this time. It was a

complicated discussion at that point.

JUDGE JOHNSON: When you say at that point, is this the cross-examination of Dr. Biehler that you are referring to

1 in the transcript?

MR. PIGOTT: I believe so. I believe that comes up in the cross-examination.

MR. WHARTON: Yes, it does. He gives his error bar figures.

MR. PIGOTT: It is also necessary, though, in looking at that, to bear in mind the earlier testimony of Dr. Ehlig with respect to the fault, because Dr. Ehlig set the -- as it were -- the broad framework of the geology of the area from which the Board could proceed with some intelligence, to look at more detailed aspects of the area. So it is -- you have to take the whole thing before it really has a full meaning.

JUDGE JOHNSON: I have a question of you, Mr.

Pigott, with regard to something in your brief at page four,
and I think it probably goes to the next issue, the last
paragraph, you say the Board's ruling with respect to the
segments, and I am now referring to segments on the OZD, you
are apparently referring to those segments.

MR. PIGOTT: Yes.

JUDGE JOHNSON: Was one of several necessary steps in reaching the final determination of $M_{\rm S}$ 7 as the appropriate maximum magnitude, and I wonder what you meant by that particular statement, in the sense that it appears that you are saying that segmentation is required if you are going

to have a determination of Mg 7.

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MR. PIGOTT: Well, I think before answering that, and I don't want to avoid that question, let me come back to it. But in approaching this whole area of the segment issue, we have to be careful of what we are talking about when we mean segmentation. Mr. Wharton referred back to a couple of conversations on the record that we had, and I think if you actually read the words, you will see that the record you will see, I talk about that we are not purely segmented. If we had undertaken a case of segmentation, it would have been given the capability of the Newport-Inglewood Zone of Deformation, and the maximum event on that zone, what would be the appropriate design basis. Then you would have to move down to the middle section, the South Coast Offshore fault, and take a look at it independently, and determine what its maximum effect could be on the plant, and likewise for the Rose Canyon fault. You would get far different answers than the answers we see in the record now.

So when that is what we say we were not quarreling with the previous model that was used only for establishing whether or not there was an adequate design basis.

Segmentation when looked at at that -- in that light, is a far different thing than talking about a zone composed of three segments which are not disassociated, but because of their geologic characteristics have different earthquake

generating capabilities, and that is what Applicants were showing, that is what the Board understood, and that is really what the Board's decision says, that this is a zone, it is in segments. The segments are not disassociated, but they do have different geologic characteristics, and those different geologic characteristics, and those different geologic characteristics bear on their earthquake-generating capability, and that does not do violence either to the issue or to the pre-existing USGS model, so we get into a characterization or definition argument when one simply says they segmented the zone, and you have got to go beyond that.

Now, when I make the statement on page four of the brief that it was a necessary step, necessary -- perhaps I could put another word in and say that it was an appropriate step, that it was appropriate under the terms of the issue, to look at the geologic characteristics of the overall zone in order to assess its earthquake-generating capability and come to that ultimate decision that the magnitude 7 is the appropriate maximum magnitude.

JUDGE EILPERIN: Mr. Pigott, on your view of the principles of res judicata, collateral and foreclosure, would you be foreclosed from quarreling at the operating license stage with the USGS model that formed the basis for the construction permit hearing, and if not, why not?

MR. PIGOTT: Well, I would have to -- I unfortunately would have to ask for more questions. What

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particular portion of the model? We never accepted the geology that would get to that model as being absolutely correct.

JUDGE EILPERIN: I understand that. All I am saying is, you were there and had an opportunity to litigate the issue, and I was wondering under your view of foreclosure where Mr. Wharton's client who was not there is foreclosed at operating license stage --

MR. PIGOTT: Absolutely not.

JUDGE EILPERIN: -- from raising the Cristianitos fault issue. I was wondering if you consider yourself foreclosed from quarreling with the USGS model at the operating license stage.

MR. PIGOTT: Absolutely not.

JUDGE EILPERIN: You are not foreclosed?

MR. PIGOTT: No, I am not foreclosed. We would not be foreclosed, and I would cite as authority for that one of the most horrible moments in my legal career, which was when the Licensing Board at the construction permit struck the Applicants' testimony with respect to the geology of the OZD. We tried to put in evidence on the geology to show that the model was conservative, and it was struck as not being within the issue, so I would --

JUDGE EILPERIN: But Mr. Wharton wasn't even there to have his testimony ruled out.

MR. PIGOTT: Well, now we are getting into a legal question as to how res judicata should be applied in an administrative proceeding, and I would argue that the precise identity of parties need not be followed with respect to res judicata in this kind of a proceeding, that certainly as the Board points out, res judicata is a concept to be applied according to the situation that it is trying to be used in, and in this situation, the idea that every person who is not a party to a construction permit stage has a right to come in and in effect relitigate everything that may have happened or may have -- there may have been an opportunity to have happen at an earlier stage, just doesn't seem reasonable to me, and that is something that I would expect we would be approaching in our briefs on the overall appeal.

However, I would say that at this stage, foreclosure can be set aside in favor of looking at the merits, and following the guidelines of 2.788(e), and when we get back to the merits, I think we find that there just aren't any.

argument together how you are not foreclosed but Mr. Wharton is foreclosed. It just seems that there is an identity of parties in your case. There isn't an identity of parties in his case, and that yours should be an a fortiori case in terms of foreclosure if it is the principals that --

MR. PIGOTT: Well, I guess what we are skipping over

is that even when Mr. Wharton comes in at the operating
license stage, if he had been able to show some factual
basis for relooking at the geology, we would have had no
defense, but there is no such basis, and so after all the -after everything is filed, and we get to hearing, then we
get these characterizations.

JUDGE EILPERIN: But you are not putting a changed circumstances burden on yourself to bring up a quarrel with the USGS model.

MR. PIGOTT: That is correct, but there is -- the Cristianitos is a lot different from the offshore zone of deformation geology. I mean, they were handled in different matters, in different means. I would say we definitely -- I can only go back and say that the reason I would not consider it to be foreclosed on litigating the geology of the OZD under the CP stage is because when we tried to do it, we were told it wasn't a part and it was thrown out. Now, one could hardly say that we have a determination at that stage with respect to the geology of the OZD. They said they weren't deciding it.

JUDGE EILPERIN: But in any event, your position is that you were consistent in the operating license stage with the USGS model of the OZD in any event.

MR. PIGOTT: Yes. Absolutely.

I believe I must point out with respect to the

agreements that Mr. Wharton alleges between Counsel, I would simply take you back to the prehearing conference back in April of 1981. I would cite you to pages approximately 310 through 320 of that transcript, specifically at 312, 313, as a part of the prehearing discussion, I am discussing a proposed issue number four, which in fact with very few word changes was the issue that was ultimately adopted at the hearing, and I there state, specifically state that there are no qualifiers on the scope of the geology to be examined with respect to this issue.

JUDGE EILPERIN: Excuse me. You have about two more minutes.

MR. PIGOTT: Okay. Again, at page 317, we talked about being free to address the geology as we see it under this issue, and the Staff reflects the same understanding at pages 315 and 316. It is also found in the written references, the one I cited earlier filed by Applicants on May 12, 1981.

Let me skip very quickly and I shan't attempt to explain our view of the world as seen by Dr. Slemmons. I would only point out that Dr. Slemmons was but a part of the basis that the Board relied on in coming to its determination of magnitude 7. There is also the testimony of Dr. Stuart Smith. There is the testimony of Dr. Ehlig. There is the testimony of Dr. Allen. There is the testimony of Mr. Heath.

There are at least a half a dozen witnesses testifying that -competent witnesses testifying that magnitude 7 is the
appropriate maximum magnitude. In order to prevail on the
merits, not only does all that evidence have to be
disregarded. Dr. Slemmons has to be convinced that he is
wrong, and that he has to change his mind. I think the record
is replete with statements that Dr. Slemmons keeps saying, but
I wouldn't do it that way.

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With respect to the balance of the --

JUDGE JOHNSON: I have got to interject a question here, and I am -- maybe my chairman will allow you another extra minute. On page seven of your brief, you are discussing the testimony of Dr. Boore of USGS, who Mr. Wharton has mentioned earlier, and you are relating Dr. Boore's change in the peak plus one standard deviation acceleration for an M 7 event at eight kilometers, and you are saying that he left out the data beyond 50 kilometers, he would come up with a value of 0.57, and I am asking whether that is something Dr. Boore would himself do, or is that something that or the Applicant suggests that he do? In other words, I asked Mr. Wharton about what Mr. Slemmons would do and now I am asking you what Dr. Boore would do. Is this idea of leaving out the data past 50 kilometers an approach that Dr. Boore would subscribe to, or is this something that he was asked to do because he was on the stand?

MR. PIGOTT: Let me back up First of all, there were two adjustments, and with respect to both adjustments, I detected -- I don't believe the record reflects any opposition to the use of these adjustments for applying Dr. Boore's work to the San Onofre proceeding. First of all, there was the difference between his using a single highest horizontal reading, and the industry -- normal industry procedure of using an average of the two horizontals. That resulted in a reduction of 13 percent, and there was no quarrel between himself and Dr. Campbell, who also testified on that adjustment.

Secondly, with respect to the exclusion of data over 50, over 50 kilometers, much of that data was also low magnitude events, and I believe that by the time we had reached Dr. Boore, it had been pretty well accepted, or at least set forth that one of the important things to look at in these regression analyses was that you had an appropriate data set, and one of the things to look at was to try and get data that was very close in. The Intervenors argued to a great extent that we couldn't get data close enough. On the other hand, it was pretty much accepted that data a long way away was not of much value.

Now, Dr. Boore in his publication warns the reader that his work is not to be used with respect to large magnitude earthquakes in the near field, which is what we are

would volunteer, because remember he was brought in on a subpoena without a lot of preparation for the specific san Onofre situation, but I would say he had no reluctance, in fact he had preprepared with him, and we might have discussed it prior to then, but there is no great reluctance in coming up with these figures, after having excluded data from beyond 50 kilometers.

JUDGE JOHNSON: Okay, thank you. You better finish up your summary.

JUDGE EILPERIN: I think Dr. Gotchy has a question first.

and I am not a seismologist or a geologist, when all of the argument is done with regard to peak ground acceleration and what the appropriate response spectrum is and what the appropriate magnitude is, the thing that concerned me is the record, I feel particularly with regard to the request for a stay, in my mind does not -- with the exception of the testimony by Dr. Idriss -- does not really get to the question of the probability of exceeding their design basis earthquake that the plant was built for.

In other words, in deciding if there is going to be irreparable harm in my mind, I have to have some reasonable assurance that given if there is an earthquake, what the

probability of exceeding that earthquake and doing damage to the plant and placing the public at risk is.

If I read Dr. Idriss's testimony correctly, he talks about where the design basis earthquake spectrum in the frequencies of concern for a large structure like san Onofre 2, the probabilities of exceeding that thing are on the order of one in 100,000 to one in a millon. How would you propose that I consider this kind of testimony in reaching my decision on whether or not there is a possibility of irreparable harm to the public, in the event that stay were not granted?

MR. PIGOTT: Well, I would have to say that at this time I cannot remember anyone other than Dr. Idriss addressing the probability of exceedence. In assessing that probability, I would wonder if the Board is in any different situation than it would be with any safety-related issue. Whether it is a seismic event that may cause the alleged irreparable harm, or malfunction of some component within the reactor itself, we are talking about safety, and that would be -- I would say the same kind of a probability kind of an approach, and perhaps I can only answer it by throwing the question back into the context of the merits, and that being that you really don't get to that question unless you think, really think that there is a significant chance that a very severe mistake has been made by the Board, and that they have left open a

risk that just cannot be accepted, and in this instance, I believe you do have to balance that, how strong is the showing, and I would contend that the most charitable characteristic would be that there may be a scintilla of evidence, if one is to agree that Dr. Slemmons doesn't know how to use his own data.

But other than that, there is no hard evidence which you could point to where the Board would say oh, yes, if we had seen that, it would have been different, or that they have made some egregious misinterpretation of a witness's testimony. That isn't there, and in the absence of that, I really wonder whether you get to that question. That question has loomed, in any event, ever since the decision came down, and that decision is decided, I guess as a matter of policy, by allowing the low power license to become immediately effective.

guestion we should be looking at here in the absence of a tremendous showing on the substantive issues that the Board made a terribly egregious error, and that has not been shown, and given the lack of such a showing, I would think you would have to go along with the idea that the Board is entitled to a presumption of being correct on its findings, that the Commission in establishing the immediate effectiveness rule for low power licenses, and for that matter its own

1 determination prior to the time we get a full power license, 2 has recognized whatever risk may be there, and has decided 3 that it is inappropriate, and I really can't answer much more 4 than that. 5

JUDGE EILPERIN: Thank you, Mr. Pigott.

We will take about a five-minute break, and then we will hear from Mr. Chandler. Off the record.

(Brief recess)

JUDGE EILPERIN: On the record. Mr. Chandler, you have about 25 minutes. You can proceed.

ORAL ARGUMENT OF LAWRENCE CHANDLER ON BEHALF OF THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION STAFF

MR. CHANDLER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Members of the Board, you have heard the arguments by both the Intervenors and the Applicants. I would like to start off first by touching on the fourth factor to be considered, the public interest factor.

I think it is sufficient to note that unless the Intervenors have sustained their burden of persuasion with respect to the other factors, it would be our view that the public interest favors maintaining the validity, if you will, upholding the decision by the Licensing Board authorizing the issuance of an operating license for San Onofre Unit 2.

Going back now to the first factor, the likelihood of prevailing on the merits, I think I would like to reiterate

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our position with respect to the lack of probative value of
the alternate grounds assigned by the Licensing Board for
excluding from evidentiary consideration the testimony of
Mr. Simons.

JUDGE EILPERIN: I didn't see in your brief any reference to the foreclosure argument that the Licensing Board found persuasive. Have you abandoned that on appeal now?

MR. CHANDLER: I wouldn't say that we are abandoning that approach on appeal, Mr. Chairman, at all. However, we believe that the approach selected by the Intervenor in support of his application for stay wholly ignored the independent grounds offered by the Board, namely the lack of probative value. We don't really dispute the reasoning of the Board in finding that consideration of Mr. Simons' testimony was foreclosed.

JUDGE EILPERIN: If you haven't abandoned it, why didn't you argue it?

MR. CHANDLER: We didn't perceive any need to separately argue that point. We think, and indeed we would prefer the argument that the Board raised with respect to probative value. I think perhaps if I were writing the initial decision, I would not have written it quite as it was written by the Board in this proceeding, and perhaps it is broader than I would have liked, but I don't intend to

suggest, and we did not intend to suggest that we are wholly abandoning foreclosure, rather that we -- I guess strongly prefer would be the best way to state it, the question of its probative value.

JUDGE EILPERIN: Do you see any relationship between the validity of the foreclosure argument and the Commission's moving towards promulgating a rule dealing with what subjects should be foreclosed at the operating license stage which could have been litigated at the construction permit stage?

MR. CHANDLER: I don't necessarily think we should infer from the Board's decision such a connection. I certainly think it is a commendable goal. I think it has long been recognized that there are certain matters which are appropriately litigated in a construction permit proceeding, and those which are more appropriately deferred until an operating license stage, and at the same time those which at the operating license stage are foreclosed because they should have been litigated earlier on. I think fundamental questions of site suitability such as the one that is before the Board now, for example, on the question of the Cristianitos fault is the kind of an issue which is best resolved at a construction permit stage, subject, of course, under any application of principles of foreclosure, to changed circumstances or overriding public policy. I would

1 not dispute those as --

JUDGE EILPERIN: Well, there is no doubt that it is best decided at the construction permit stage. I just wonder why it is that the Commission thinks it has to promulgate a rule to exclude particular subjects at the operating license stage if in fact the failure to raise issues such as these at the construction permit stage are in fact excluded by general legal principles of foreclosure.

MR. CHANDLER: I cannot really speculate on what the Commission has in mind. I represent the Staff of the Commission, but not the Commission itself.

JUDGE JOHNSON: Well, with regard to the construction permit and the Cristianitos fault, didn't the Licensing Board there have a statutory obligation to determine whether or not the Cristianitos was capable?

MR. CHANDLER: I don't believe they did.

JUDGE JOHNSON: Under Part 100 they don't have that?

I mean, certainly Cristianitos was recognized. It was
mentioned in that opinion.

MR. CHANDLER: I don't believe that the Board had the obligation in its initial decision to very specifically articulate a basis for at least the implicit finding that the Cristianitos fault was not of concern with respect to the siting of this facility. I think it is clear that Licensing Boards are not required to undertake a wholly de novo review

72 of the application, although they are obligated to review it 1 for purposes of making their findings. They are not charged, 2 3 if you will, with duplicating the review that is performed 4 traditionally by the Staff, by the ACRS, if you will. 5 The decision, moreover, that the Licensing Board 6 rendered in the construction permit proceeding, as Mr. Pigott 7 earlier noted, one would expect to be much more expansive, if 8 you will, with respect to matters of controversy, although 9 the Board did touch on all the other matters it was obligated 10 to make findings on. 11 JUDGE JOHNSON: Well, is not the Board obligated 12 under Part 100 to make site suitability findings? 13 MR. CHANDLER: Yes, it is, and it was obligated at 14 the construction permit stage. One has to bear in mind that Part 100 Appendix A was not really applicable in this time 15 16 frame. The facility was reviewed under the proposed -- then 17 proposed Appendix A, the construction period. Was obligated, 18 if one now looks to the Part 100, to assure that the 19 maximum vibratory ground motion was appropriately selected. 20 JUDGE JOHNSON: Okay, thank you. 21 JUDGE EILPERIN: What about Mr. Wharton's argument 22 that he was effectively denied the right to cross-examine the 23 NRC Staff on the capability of the Cristianitos fault?

MR. CHANDLER: That is one point which I had

intended to get to in a moment, Mr. Chairman. Let me respond

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73 now. I simply do not recall an instance in which Mr. Wharton was so precluded by a ruling by the Licensing Board. One has to recognize, however, the distinction between the data which is really being considered here, in the context, for example, of Mr. Simons' testimony. Mr. Simons' testimony had wholly intertwined data of the pre-1973 and post-1973 origin. The Staff Safety Evaluation Report has specific evaluations of post-1973 events, particularly the 1975 and 1977 events in the general vicinity, if you will, of the Cristianitos fault. Certainly those were fair game. JUDGE EILPERIN: Which were -- the post CP events? MR. CHANDLER: Yes. Yes, the 1975 and 1977 events, and I have no recollection of any ruling by the Board precluding on grounds of foreclosure any examination into those areas, but again, it is a rather voluminuous record, and I don't profess to have ready knowledge of all the ruling that the Board has made, but I have no recollection of such a ruling. JUDGE JOHNSON: Well, he mentioned the testimony of Mr. Cardone? MR. CHANDLER: Cardone, yes.

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JUDGE JOHNSON: That was not allowed.

MR. CHANDLER: I do not -- as I said a moment ago, I have no recollection of any ruling by the Board precluding cross-examination of Mr. Cardone with respect to the post-CP events that are discussed and evaluated in the Staff Safety Evaluation Report. Indeed, it reflects an evaluation among others of the testimony of Dr. Biehler.

JUDGE JOHNSON: No, my understanding of what Mr. Wharton said, and obviously the person to ask about what he said is coming up next, but if the Cardone testimony on the capability of the Cristianitos was not allowed, then he didn't have -- I mean, it was not even -- I thought he said that this testimony was not even allowed to be submitted.

MR. CHANDLER: Well, my recollection is that it is in evidence in this proceeding.

JUDGE JOHNSON: Okay, thank you.

MR. CHANDLER: Returning for a moment to Mr. Simons' testimony, the Board I think very appropriately found that Mr. Simons was not qualified as an expert in the field in which he was tendered. He possesses a bachelor of science degree in geology and geophysics, but he does not practice in a real sense in either of those areas. He states in the record, and he was subject to full examination by all parties, and by the Board in this proceeding, that he is responsible for the processing software and researching seismicity patterns in northern Baja California and San Diego.

He calls upon a computer to give him data, which he then causes to be placed on a map. That appears to be the

75 1 extent of his professional activities at this point in time, and in that sense, and to the extent that his testimony does 2 3 that, perhaps he is qualified, although there were a number of questions that were raised on cross-examination of Mr. Simons 4 5 by I believe it was Applicants' Counsel regarding the data and 6 possible errors in the data caused by transposition of the 7 data from the computer printout onto his maps, is one 8 example. 9 There was a question about the data base that he 10

used, several questions, particularly with respect to the change in data gathering, if you will, in the 1975 time frame.

JUDGE EILPERIN: His testimony is there for everyone to read in the record. Does it really matter one way or the other whether it was formally stricken or not formally stricken?

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MR. CHANDLER: In the sense that the Board certainly could have said yes, we admit the testimony, and we will give it whatever weight we consider appropriate, no, there really is no real distinction.

I think it clear, however, that under the standards of the Commission's rules that only reliable evidence is to be admitted in NRC proceedings, and I think it clear from the Board's findings, which we believe is amply supported by the record, that Mr. Simons' testimony simply cannot be considered reliable testimony. I would go on to

point out that it is not even relied upon to any extent by the only other witness I believe offered by Intervenors with respect to this question, Mr. Legg. Only passing reference is made. Indeed, Mr. Legg sees fit to rely primarily, and I think Mr. Wharton acknowledged earlier during his argument, on the testimony of Applicants' witness, Dr. Biehler.

In short, then, we believe that the Board's determination to exclude from evidentiary consideration the testimony of Mr. Simons, particularly on the grounds of lack of probative value, is well founded.

Intervenors then move on to express their surprise with respect to the Board's findings on the Offshore Zone of Deformation. I think perhaps we may have almost a semantic problem, but we believe the Board's decision is wholly consistent with the concept of a zone of deformation extending at least 240 kilometers with several features which should not be disassociated.

response to Mr. Wharton's brief clearly reveal that very early on, certainly at the beginning of the hearing, the parties recognized or should have recognized that all of the characteristics of the OZD were open for consideration. The length of the OZD was a specific concern. The geological and seismological characteristics were of concern. This is very clear from even a casual reading of contention 4, which

77 is the particular contention in issue here. So we simply

cannot understand why Intervenors now should profess such surprise at the decision that the Licensing Board reached.

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Indeed, Mr. Pigott earlier alluded to a number of pages that he -- of the transcript of the April 29, 1981 conference. I think if one additionally makes reference to transcript page 328 of that date, one finds that Intervenors in fact fundamentally agreed with the statement of contention 4. This agreement follows statements by Applicants' Counsel with respect to their understanding of what is embraced by this contention, and a consistent interpretation of Staff Counsel, my own understanding of what that contention was to embrace. The only dispute we had at that time with respect to the wording of the contention related to the simple inclusion of the letter "h" before OZD. The Applicant wishing to have it referred to as a hypothesized zone of deformation, and the Staff then arguing no, we really shouldn't be relitigating whether this is a zone of deformation or not a zone of deformation. That matter was disposed of.

JUDGE EILPERIN: Doesn't at least one of Dr. Slemmons' methods of calculating magnitude assume that the OZD is in fact blocked off into particular segments?

MR. CHANDLER: I don't think he goes so far as to say it is blocked off, but I think Dr. Slemmons' testimony recognizes that an approach to evaluating a maximum earthquake

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is to consider segments of the OZD, and he uses, for example, the Newport-Inglewood Zone of Deformation, the South Coast Offshore Zone of Deformation, and the Rose Canyon fault zone as discrete areas which he then analyzes, that is true.

JUDGE EILPERIN: As purely discrete areas.

MR. CHANDLER: That is right, but I don't think he in his testimony at any point states that one should or should not view the OZD as segmented in the sense of being blocked off and disassociated, if you will, one segment from the other.

about the probative value of Dr. Slemmons' testimony. You probably heard me discuss with Mr. Wharton the sort of range of values that he came up with, and I think at that time it was pointed out that he didn't look at the smallest possibilities, and that would have been applying his fractional method to the segment, nor did he reach the maximum magnitude, and that would have been applying the 100 percent break to the full length of the OZD.

MR. CHANDLER: That is correct.

JUDGE JOHNSON: So, considering what he might have done, he reached values from somewhere approximately five to values that might have been as high as eight, which more or less covers the waterfront.

I had a hard time finding which -- what of Dr.

Slemmons' testimony I should latch onto in terms of its real value. Would you like to give me any guidance?

MR. CHANDLER: I think that one has to truly look at Dr. Slemmons' testimony in its entirety, because Dr. Slemmons applied seven (sic), I believe, different approaches in an effort to assess the maximum magnitude, if you will, for an earthquake on the OZD, and I think none can be read in isolation. I think that was a point that Dr. Slemmons made very clear in his evaluation, and during his testimony on the stand.

Now, he reaches a different range, which is wholly appropriate, and he justifies, then, his reliance on the conservatism, or if you will, his finding of the conservatism of a magnitude 7 as well, but I don't think one properly should take a segment out of Dr. Slemmons' testimony and consider that his approach, because I think he is --

JUDGE EILPERIN: Slemmons can't be dissassociated, not just the OZD.

MR. CHANDLER: That is correct. Thank you.

JUDGE EILPERIN: What about -- I had a problem with his indirect method by fault segment lengths. Just looking at that gives particularized assumed rupture lengths. Does that or does it not assume that those segments are in fact blocked off at the end of those lengths?

MR. CHANDLER: I cannot state what Dr. Slemmons

would respond to your question, how he would respond to your question. I don't think he intends to say it is blocked off but he does view each segment independently. That is to say that it would not rupture beyond that discrete segment, but I am troubled by the use of the word "blocked off." I don't know that that should be inferred from his testimony at that point.

JUDGE EILPERIN: Well, I guess I am troubled by defined lengths and then analyzing defined length. I just don't know what that means if it doesn't mean that it is in fact blocked off.

MR. CHANDLER: I believe that Dr. Slemmons in that part of his evaluation is using the Applicants' data. I think it reflects his evaluation. After all, the Staff, being charged with this review, has not essentially generated new approaches or methods or data for this review. What the Safety Evaluation Report reflects and what Dr. Slemmons' testimony reflects, is his evaluation of the analysis done by the Applicants, and I assume that Dr. Slemmons at that point is relying on the Applicants' characterization of each of these elements, if you will, and I prefer to use that term, of the Offshore Zone of Deformation.

JUDGE JOHNSON: Now do you interpret the -- what I presume is testimony of Mr. Devine appearing at the bottom of page G-4 of the SER, the last line of which is, "continued

efforts to define a specific magnitude have, in our judgment, rapidly diminishing returns." Previous to that he had been discussing the various methods.

MR. CHANDLER: I think what that reflects is somewhat of a disagreement in approach, if you will, between the US Geological Survey and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. If one recalls the construction permit proceeding, the design basis earthquake, if you will, was not established on the basis of a magnitude of an earthquake.

Indeed, that is why in this proceeding, contention 4 was written the way it was written, in terms of magnitude. Rather, at the construction permit stage, the approach, and the Geological Survey was fundamentally responsible for that approach, was to use the intensity description.

JUDGE JOHNSON: Well, that is not what you suggest he is saying here, is it, that you use intensity?

MR. CHANDLER: I don't know what you say I am saying? No. He is reflecting his criticism, if you will, the Geological Survey's concerns with respect to relying more strongly on magnitude rather than other approaches. I don't think he suggests a different approach, but I think what he has tried to do at that point is reflect concerns that the survey has, relying on magnitude, the Staff does not share those concerns. The Staff was insistent at the operating license stage that the magnitude of an earthquake along the

offshore zone be determined.

JUDGE JOHNSON: Is this position of the Staff in every place that you are aware of? Are you aware of any efforts by the Staff to associate ground motion with geologic features without going through the intermediate step of a magnitude?

MR. CHANDLER: I think the recent Appeal Board decision, I believe it is ALAB 667, in the Seabrook proceeding, indicates that a reliance there too was placed on intensities, modified Mercalli intensities, and less emphasis was placed on the magnitude. I believe, however, that the Staff is of the opinion that magnitudes are the appropriate nomenclature, if you will, or method.

JUDGE JOHNSON: Do you recall a cite or a quote of Staff testimony in that particular decision where the Staff indicated that it would -- if there were enough data, and that it might be possible to go direct from ground motion data to ground motion data characteristics of a particular site, if you knew the characteristics, the tectonic characteristics of the region?

MR. CHANDLER: That decision, I believe, was issued less than a week ago, Dr. Johnson. I haven't really had a chance to review it, and I am not that familiar with the testimony in that proceeding that I could --

JUDGE JOHNSON: Some of the things you are saying

here seems to be at odds with what the Staff witnesses said at that particular case, and I can't get into that, so I will withdraw the first question.

MR. CHANDLER: I don't believe it is at odds. It may be my problem in speaking in seismologists language.

JUDGE EILPERIN: Okay. You have about five more minutes. Could you give us your views of what kind of standard is to be applied in determining whether or not irreparable injury has been shown? Everyone seems to agree that the Intervenors don't have to prove that there is an earthquake right around the corner. What kind of risk do you think is the applicable standard for irreparable injury in this kind of context?

MR. CHANDLER: Well, I agree with the statements of both Intervenors' Counsel and Applicants' Counsel, that one cannot find a standard in NRC decisions that is very clear on this point. I think one can derive an appropriate standard, however, from a decision by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board in the Matter of Metropolitan Edison Company, et al, Three Mile Island Nuclear Station Unit 2. It is ALAB 486, at 8 NRC 9, at page 46, a 1978 decision in the context of reversing the Licensing Board on a question of the probability of a crash of a large aircraft into the facility due to its proximity to Harrisburg International Airport.

The Appeal Board had the occasion to consider

whether the License should remain in place pending the reopened proceeding which it itself was going to preside over. I think they stated the question in these terms, and this is a paraphrase, I believe. Will continued operation of the plant over the period required to complete the normal appeal process be consistent with the requirement that there be reasonable assurance that the public health and safety will not be endangered?

In other words, is there some flaw so fundamental to the findings of reasonable assurance that the public health and safety will not be endangered, the fundamental findings of 10 CFR 50.57, that that funding can no longer be maintained?

JUDGE JOHNSON: Well, would you use that to make a distinction between this case, perhaps where we have a presumption of properly -- of proper design and construction for a particular magnitude earthquake and particular ground motion spectrum, and the Diablo Canyon case, where the -- because of questions which have been raised regarding the construction practice and the design practice, that there can be no presumption of earthquake resistance capability in that plant?

MR. CHANDLER: I wouldn't necessarily carry it to the point of a presumption, but I think what one has to read in the suspension of that license, is that the Commission at

this point lacks the reasonable assurance which is necessary to sustain the operating license for that facility, and those circumstances simply do not exist in this proceeding.

I think if one reads the very voluminous testimony in this proceeding, testimony by many different witnesses on behalf of the Applicants and the Staff, independent of the testimony of Dr. Slemmons, independent of the testimony of Drs. Luco and Dr. Boore, confirming the adequacy and conservatism in the assignment of a magnitude 7 as the appropriate earthquake, and affirming the conservatism in the assignment of 0.67 g as the maximum vibratory ground motion, that one must find that reasonable assurance still exists.

There is in the record independent of these challenged portions, if you will, ample evidence to support the Board's findings on these matters.

I would just like to turn very briefly, if I may -JUDGE EILPERIN: Just, you can have about one more
minute.

MR. CHANDLER: Thank you.

With respect to the third factor, harm to other parties, just to, if you will, update the Appeal Board from our formal reply dated February 11 to the Application for Stay, the California Coastal Commission did on February 16 issue an amendment to the Applicants' permit which had been sought to more specifically recognize the exclusionary control

As I did point out in our reply, there are a sufficient number of senior reactor operators now licensed, and with respect to the independent quality assurance verification program, that program has produced interim results which have been reviewed and found acceptable by the Staff for purposes of low power operation for this facility. The program is continuing with respect to matters pertaining to full power operation at this time.

I believe, in short, members of the Board, that the Intervenors simply have not sustained their burden of persuasion with respect to any of the four factors, and for that reason a stay should not issue. Thank you.

JUDGE EILPERIN: Thank you, Mr. Chandler. Mr. Wharton, you can have ten minutes for rebuttal.

REBUTTAL ORAL ARGUMENT OF RICHARD WHARTON ON BEHALF OF INTERVENORS CARSTENS, FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, ET AL

MR. WHARTON: If I may, some rebuttal on what I think are more significant issues, without going into too much detail. Regarding the significance of the Board's finding that the OZD was segmented, there was a question that was asked before, and I wasn't really able to get to the record. I don't think I responded as well as I could have. Going to the partial initial decision, the Board's -- the significance the Board attached to it is made clear, and as follows -- this

is on page 30 of the PID.

Various geologic characteristics of the OZD,

particularly its length, are relevant to its potential for

a high magnitude earthquake. As a general proposition, long

throughgoing faults are capable of generating large earth
quakes, while short, segmented faults tend to produce smaller

earthquakes.

They go on. In the present case, Intervenors sought to prove that the OZD is a single, throughgoing fault about 400 kilometers long. The Applicants and Staff maintain that the OZD is only about 240 kilometers long, and that it is segmented into three discrete sections.

The first part of that particular sentence states that the Board understands the significance of that the OZD is throughgoing.

The second part of the sentence just simply misstates the Intevenors' position, and misstates the Applicant and the Staff's position. The Intervenors are not maintaining throughgoing fault. It may be a semantic question. We are saying it is an OZD -- that a rupture on the OZD, the earthquake is commensurate with the length of the OZD, as found by the USGS. We are not arguing whether it is a throughgoing fault. The Applicants and the Staff to my knowledge did not maintain going into the hearing, nor did they maintain at the hearing that it was segmented into three

discrete sections, so I think it is clear there where the Board's error is.

Now, going to Dr. Devine's testimony, that too was a question that was raised, and that adds some, I believe, some assistance in understanding the error in the Board's findings here. Mr. Devine is, as you know, assistant director for engineering geology. He testified -- this is at transcript page 5333, that we argued -- this is the USGS he is referring to -- that three discrete zones should not represent individual fault zones, and earthquake magnitudes dependent on each of those individual segments, but instead should consider them all in one segment for the purpose of estimating earthquake size, and that is the point here. Any decision that is made by the Licensing Board here should have focussed their attention on the entire length, and how long the length was.

JUDGE JOHNSON: Wasn't that simply a description of what went in the past, that particular part of Devine's testimony?

MR. WHARTON: Yes, he is explaining what the USGS position was at the construction licensing hearing, and the basis for the stipulation that was entered into.

JUDGE JOHNSON: Is that still the USGS position?

MR. WHARTON: As far as I know, it is.

I don't know that there has been a change in that particular

position, but the point is, is that is what the position was for the purpose of the stipulation that was entered into.

That is what we are claiming is res judicata on this particular issue, and for the Board to change that, it is error.

JUDGE EILPERIN: Mr. Wharton, on the irreparable injury question, do you think you have to have, or the record has to have affirmative evidence that San Onofre cannot withstand an earthquake that should be the appropriate design basis earthquake, and if so, where have you adduced that kind of evidence?

MR. WHARTON: Yes. We have the evidence -- again,
Dr. Slemmons is the main witness on magnitude earthquake. Dr.
Slemmons' testimony, if you accept as the one standard
deviation as being the conservative properly -- appropriately
conservative standard, that is that the chance of exceeding
this earthquake is only 16 percent as opposed to 50 percent,
if you look at Dr. Slemmons' testimony, you are looking at
his predictions, given one standard deviation of from 7.4 to
7.9, well above the SSE of 7.0.

Given that that is the appropriate standard of conservatism for a nuclear power plant, that is, not just 50-50, but 16 percent, then you look at the best testimony regarding ground acceleration from an earthquake magnitude earthquake, that is Dr. Boore. Dr. Boore's testimony clearly

90 1 states that for 7.5, the mean plus one standard deviation, the 2 ground acceleration is 1.1 g. That evidence is not 3 controverted. The Applicants tried to controvert Dr. Boore's 4 testimony by indicating in that -- well, Dr. Boore agreed with 5 Dr. Campbell that they should reduce it. Dr. Boore did not 6 agree it should be reduced. He said, okay, for comparison 7 purposes, this is how it would be using Campbell's method. 8 Then they tried to characterize --9 JUDGE JOHNSON: Wait a minute. Does this mean that 10 Mr. Pigott misrepresented the record that I was quoting back 11 to him from his brief, where Dr. Boore said that if you 12 exclude the data beyond 50 kilometers, he came up with a mean 13 plus one standard deviation peak ground acceleration of 0.57 14 g? This was represented to be Dr. Boore's testimony. 15 MR. WHARTON: I was going to get into Dr. Boore's 16 testimony. I am not saying that it is a misrepresentation by 17 Mr. Pigott. I think it is in the realm of lawyers' argument, 18 but I think that it is attendant upon the Board to look at the 19 record on this particular issue, and look at exactly what 20 Dr. Boore said. 21 Now, if I can go to the transcript, Dr. Boore at 22 page 6606, that is the area where this is being discussed. 23 JUDGE EILPERIN: After you do that, I would like you 24 to also cover the point of whether or not you think you were

foreclosed from questioning the NRC Staff as to post-CP events

91 1 on the Cristianitos fault. 2 MR. WHARTON: Yes. I will. I am prepared to do 3 that. 4 Mr. Pigott asked on page 6606, back to the earlier 5 question, Dr. Boore, as to whether or not you can calculate 6 the PGA including equation number five. Could I ask you to 7 look at this particular calculation and see if it satisfies 8 your requirements? Answer: I will be glad to, fine, okay. 9 Now, you want it for a magnitude 7 at eight 10 kilometers, is that correct? That is correct. 11 It will take me more than a minute. 12 Take your time, we will just wait. 13 Right. I have some numbers here. I didn't have to 14 double-check them but they look reasonable. 15 Okay, subject to being recalculated in a better atmosphere, what numbers did you come up with? 16 17 Okay, I came up with mean PGA at eight kilometers 18 with a magnitude seven would be 0.37 g, and the mean plus one 19 standard deviation would be 0.68 g. Now, what he was given here, was this was the data 20 without the data from 50 kilometers. Dr. Boore didn't say 21 22 he should do this. Mr. Pigott gave it to him and said, would you calculate this, and he calculated it. It goes on later, 23

explaining, and then he is asked, we get into whether or not

he wants to do it, whether he thinks it is appropriate. He

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states, question by Mr. Pigott: Okay, if it is assumed one is to -- one were directing his attention to a close in site, let us not be silly here. We are talking about an eight-kilometer distance in this proceeding. Is the data beyond 50 kilometers of real significance in that kind of investigation?

Answer: If we had a lot of data in close, then of course it wouldn't be significant, because we would just use the data we had in close to see what was going to happen in close. Since we don't, we postulate a model for what the attenuation curve might look like, and then we try to determine the parameters in that model. Some of these parameters have to do with attenuation coefficients, that B factor you were referring to earlier, and the H factor as well.

In that case, the distance data do provide values for those parameters which we can then use in the extrapolation to close-in data points, so given the lack of data that we have at this point, we felt it was important to use the data from greater distances, particularly because that enabled us to look at some of the larger magnitudes for which we have very little data in close.

Question: With respect, though, to the scatter that you come up with, would it not be correct that the use of very distant data beyond 50 kilometers would have an untoward

effect on the calculated scatter for application to close distances?

Answer: Well, we have looked at that, or we have tried to, by repeating the analysis for data just within 50 kilometers. The way we look at the standard deviation, the standard deviation is made up in two parts. One is due to the regression we have against distance, and then one of them is the second regression against magnitude. The first regression when we -- these are in log units now -- when we did the analysis in the paper, we came up with a standard deviation of 0.22, and we did the analysis without data points beyond 50 kilometers, and came up with 0.21, which is a very small difference in the standard deviation, so on that basis, we don't feel that the standard deviation is biassed greatly by the addition of data points at greater distances.

Dr. Boore here is essentially standing by his report as is, the exercise of taking away the data from the 50 kilometers was only a calculation exercise. He stands by his report as is, and states that it does not bias the report.

JUDGE EILPERIN: You have about one more minute.
Could you turn to the foreclosure argument?

MR. WHARTON: Yes, to the question regarding --

The question regarding were we foreclosed. Well,

I think the best way to look at that is to consider yourself
an attorney before the Board who is ruling, and said that they

94 1 ruled at the hearing stage, that the Board determined -- this is at page 21 of the PID, the quote -- the Board determined 2 3 that the prior opportunity to litigate the capability of the 4 Cristianitos fault at the construction permit stage foreclosed 5 the relitigation of that question in this operating license 6 proceeding, absent a sufficient showing of changed 7 circumstances, a showing that was not made. 8 That was the ruling that the Board made, with Dr. 9 Simons. I am an attorney licensed to practice. When a Board 10 chairman tells me an issue is foreclosed, I don't go into the 11 issue any more. 12 JUDGE EILPERIN: But wouldn't the post-CP events be 13 changed circumstances? 14 MR. WHARTON: Yes. 15 JUDGE EILPERIN: So why couldn't you have cross-16 examined on them? 17 MR. WHARTON: Because he already determined at that 18 time that we did not make a showing of changed circumstances. 19 He foreclosed it. What he ruled then was, we don't see any

MR. WHARTON: Because he already determined at that time that we did not make a showing of changed circumstances. He foreclosed it. What he ruled then was, we don't see any changed circumstances, we are foreclosing the issue right now. That was what the record indicates. That is what the Board ruled, that is what is in the initial decision.

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JUDGE EILPERIN: And you don't think you could have cross-examined that the Applicant or the Staff was in error in concluding that the post-CP events were not in fact changed

circumstances? Could you have cross-examined on that?

MR. WHARTON: I think it would have been improper. As an attorney, I was there. We argued the issue very heatedly. And I objected very, very strenuously on the record regarding it, and I brought up changed circumstances. I brought up the fact that they admitted testimony into the record from Sean -- from Dr. Biehler. The Board then said, well, why didn't you object when Dr. Biehler's testimony came in? I said, I didn't want to object to that, because I want the issue to be in here. The long and short of it was, we tried. They definitely foreclosed the issue, and when a Board chairman tells me the issue is foreclosed, I am not going to bring the issue up again.

JUDGE JOHNSON: But did you cross-examine Dr. Biehler?

MR. WHARTON: Yes, we did. The issue was not foreclosed at that time. The issue was not foreclosed until after they reviewed Mr. Simons' testimony and struck the testimony and then foreclosed the issue.

JUDGE JOHNSON: Okay, but who appearing for the Staff did you not cross-examine on the Cristianitos fault issue?

MR. WHARTON: Well, the Staff, I believe, if my recollection serves me properly, had Mr. Cardone was the geologist, I believe, who testified for the Staff. I don't

1 | know if Dr. Reiter have any -- did anyone else have evidence?

I don't remember who else had evidence regarding that. Dr.

3 | Cardone did. It is in the SER. There is extensive

4 testimony in the SER that was submitted into evidence

5 regarding the Cristianitos fault.

JUDGE JOHNSON: Yeah, but I am talking about direct evidence in -- submitted -- there are lots of things in the SER that weren't dealt with, but I am talking about evidence that was submitted as prefiled evidence in the hearing, whether there was any evidence of that --

MR. WHARTON: Well, the way this proceeding went, the geology section in the SER was presented as written testimony.

JUDGE JOHNSON: The entire --

MR. WHARTON: Yes. Not the entire SER. The geology section was submitted as written testimony, and it was identified by Mr. Chandler as to who was responsible for that part of the SER, and the section in the SER regarding the Cristianitos was in as written, formal written testimony which we could not cross-examine about.

JUDGE JOHNSON: And was Mr. Cardone brought to the stand to --

MR. WHARTON: Yes, he was.

JUDGE JOHNSON: And did he -- was he examined by Staff Counsel on his testimony on the Cristianitos fault?

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MR. WHARTON: I don't believe there were any questions asked of him about the Cristianitos fault directly.

JUDGE JOHNSON: So in actual fact, the data -- or the information on the Cristianitos fault that appeared in that SER supplement was not discussed at the hearing subsequent to the ruling on Dr. Simons -- or Mr. Simons' testimony.

MR. WHARTON: That is correct, yes.

JUDGE EILPERIN: Could you conclude your rebuttal, please?

MR. WHARTON: Yes. On the area -- on the issue of the Cristianitos fault, if I may, as form of argument, during the hearings, after Dr. Biehler testified, Dr. Ehlig had testified, I came back home, and after hearing the testimony from Dr. Ehlig talking about the listric normal fault that curved towards the west where the Cristianitos fault hypocenters were, of the 1975 earthquake, and after seeing Dr. Biehler's -- hearing Dr. Biehler's testimony, seeing Dr. Biehler's chart, where he has the shallowest possible projection of the Cristianitos fault being not curved, flattening at depth, but just simply at an angle, and after drawing the error bars around the hypocenters, I came back home fairly excited, and I said Joyce, doing this proceeding -this is my wife -- I said doing this proceeding is an awful lot like trying to shoot a Rhinoceros with a BB gun. I mean,

98 there are so many things against you and the odds are so high and you are up against a lot of opponents, but I think I know how to do it, because if I hit it in the eye, I know where the eye is. The eye is the Cristianitos fault. I came back two days later, and I said Joyce, they closed the eye. They threw out the issue of the Cristianitos fault. It is ended. That is how I felt about that, and I think if you look at the record, I believe it is somewhat akin to what happened. The issue was wide open. It was very vulnerable on the issue of the capability of the Cristianitos fault. From Dr. Biehler's testimony, his hypocenter, as his error bars show, those earthquakes should be assumed of a curve in the Cristianitos fault. Mr. Simons' testimony indicates epicenters in the Cristianitos fault. For no really valid legal reason it was kicked out. I believe that is error, and the Board should remand it. JUDGE EILPERIN: Thank you, Mr. Wharton. That concludes the oral argument today. Thank you. gentlemen. The case is submitted, and as I said earlier, we will be issuing a decision sometime before the plant comes critical. Thank you.

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(Thereupon, at 11:29 a.m., Friday, March 12, 1982, oral argument in the above-entitled matter was concluded and the case submitted)

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

This is to cer	tify that the attached proceedings before the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeals Board	
	of: Southern California Edison, et al, San Onofre Nuclear Generation Station, Units 2 and 3 Date of Proceeding: Friday, March 12, 1982
	Docket Number: 50-361-0L, 50-362-0L
	Place of Proceeding: San Diego, California

were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the Commission.

George D. Girton

Official Reporter (Typed)

Offices Reporter (Signature)