DUKE POWER COMPANY
POWER BUILDING
422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28242

WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
STEAM PRODUCTION

TELEPHONE: AREA 704
373-4083

March 5, 1982

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Re: Oconee Nuclear Station
Docket No. 50-269

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report RO-269/82-01. This report is submitted pursuant to Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specification 6.6.2.1.b(2) which concerns operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation, and describes an incident which is considered to be of no significance with respect to its effect on the health and safety of the public.

Very truly yours,

William O. Parker, Jr.

JFK/php
Attachment

cc: Director
Office of Management & Program Analysis
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Records Center
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
1820 Water Place
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

Mr. W. T. Orders
NRC Resident Inspector
Oconee Nuclear Station

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DUKE POWER COMPANY
OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION UNIT 1

Report Number: RO-269/82-01

Report Date: March 5, 1982

Occurrence Date: February 3, 1982

Facility: Oconee Unit 1, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Occurrence: 1B Motor Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump inoperable.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: 50% FP

Description of Occurrence: On February 3, 1982, the 1B Motor Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump was declared inoperable due to a bearing vibration which exceeded the acceptable limit. This problem was identified during the periodic vibration testing of the pump.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The cause of this incident was misalignment between the pump and the motor, causing the excessive vibration.

Analysis of Occurrence: During this incident the Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump and the other Motor Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump were both operable. These pumps have sufficient capacity to supply feedwater to the steam generators for decay heat removal in the event of a reactor trip and a loss of main feedwater. Thus, the health and safety of the public were not affected by this incident.

Corrective Action: The pump and motor were uncoupled and aligned to within the specified tolerances. The vibration test on the bearings was repeated after the alignment with satisfactory results, and the 1B Motor Driven Feedwater Pump was declared operable.