

Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E. Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Salem Generating Station

March 3, 1982

Mr. R. C. Haynes
Regional Administrator
USNRC
Region 1
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 82-10/03X-1

Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 1, Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.d, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 82-10/03X-1. This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours,

H. J. Midura

General Manager - Salem Operations

FD:al

CC: Distribution

Report Number:

82-10/03X-1

Report Date:

03-03-82

Occurrence Date: 02-01-82

Facility:

Salem Generating Station, Unit 1

Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

## IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Temporary Spent Fuel Cooling Crosstie - Leak.

This report was initiated by Incident Report 82-027.

### CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 6 - Rx Power 0% - Unit Load 0 MWe

# DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

At 0915 hours, February 1, 1982, a temporary hose connection from No. 1 Unit Spent Fuel Pool to No. 2 Unit Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger developed a leak on the 84' Elevation, No. 1 Auxiliary Building, at the hose connection. At 0927 hours the leak was isolated. At 0935 hours the Spent Fuel Pit level was verified to be greater than 23 feet above the top of the fuel assemblies. The volume of the spill was estimated at 23,000 gallons. At 1600 hours an unusual event was declared and the Emergency Procedure EPI-1 was complied with.

#### DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

The temporary hose leaked at the hose connection due to improper installation of the clamp.

# ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The low level radioactive water was contained by the Unit 1 Auxiliary Building, and recovered by the Plant Radioactive Liquid Waste System. Sixteen workmen had their shoes, socks, and lower trousers contaminated. The workmen were decontaminated, and returned to work. They received no measurable radiation exposure from the incident. The contaminated floor area was properly decontaminated.

# CORRECTIVE ACTION:

At 1230 hours, the cooling flow for No. 1 Spent Fuel Pool was returned to the No. 1 Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger. The temporary hose to No. 2 Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger was disconnected. Later, it was reconnected utilizing double hose clamps and calculated torque specifications.

Safety evaluation S-1-N300-MSE-116 established that fuel integrity and plant safety was insured for any instance of pool drainage, loss of cooling, reactivity addition, or radiological consequences.

# FAILURE DATA:

Not Applicable

Prepared By F. Dickey // J. Whalium

General Manager Salem Operations

SORC Meeting No. 82-24