

Iowa Electric Light and Power Company

March 8, 1982

DAEC-82-162

Mr. James G. Keppler  
Regional Administrator  
Region III  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
799 Roosevelt Road  
Glen Ellyn, IL 60137



Subject: Prompt Notification of a Reportable Occurrence

File: A-118a, TE-4

Dear Mr. Keppler:

This letter, telecopied to your office, is intended to satisfy the requirement for prompt notification of a Reportable Occurrence in accordance with Specification 6.11.2.a of the Duane Arnold Energy Center Technical Specifications.

Technical Specification paragraph(s) violated:

Description of Occurrence:

While performing operability testing on March 7, 1982, the "B" control building standby filter unit (SBFU) train would not start with an initiation signal present. The "A" SBFU had earlier been declared inoperable after a halogenated hydrocarbon test had indicated the charcoal absorber bank had a removal efficiency of 97%. The cause for that problem was believed to be moisture in the charcoal absorber bank. At the time the operability test of the "B" SBFU was begun the "A" SBFU was being operated in an attempt to dry the charcoal absorber bank. The "B" SBFU performed as designed. A SBFU train will not auto start while the redundant train is running. A 24 hour LCO was briefly entered until the "B" SBFU was manually started. The plant is currently in a 7 day LCO with the "A" SBFU declared inoperable but operating and the "B" SBFU operating.

The event was evaluated as a 14 day Reportable Occurrence due to one SBFU train being declared inoperable and the redundant train not being available for automatic initiation.

Very truly yours..

*Daniel L. Mineck*

Daniel L. Mineck  
Chief Engineer  
Duane-Arnold Energy Center

8203160206 820308  
PDR ADDCK 05000331  
S PDR

DLM/JYS/pl

cc: NRC Resident Inspector

IE 9/11  
29  
DH 8:45  
3/9/82

2. High level coolant sample was performed by only 1 person with no radio or telephone communication.
3. Checklist for stack sampling? The tech did not have a key to stack.
4. The stack sampling was performed by only one person who had his hands full. Fumbled quite abit.
5. Performed only one stack sample but iodine levels were in question. Should have taken more stack samples during general emergency.
6. Some dead areas are present in reactor building where radio communication cannot be established. --

Have a slight problem with communication of reactor status to OSC.  
Coolant level?

For LPSI closed value, sent crew of 3 with protective clothing and respirators with particulate filter.

For high level sample of coolant, people put on protective equipment and clothing. Monitored area regularly. Took sample quickly and performed a survey of area and then back in. Had no radio or other means of communication with him.

Stack sample gross activity at SE8 monitor in control room.

Sample is initiated from control room and a gross activity is determined. Arrived in guard house and realized that he did not have a stack key. Brought key to guard house. Kept up with dose rate well. Had difficulties with handling equipment by himself (could not get in building for a while). Displayed good ALARA principles. Quickly obtained sample with extension tool and made a hasty retreat. Mistake an activity given to tech by controller. Went back through guard house and presented sample to lab.

Workers for vent used protective clothing. Plastic cover suits, and Scott air packs with full face protection. Card reader would allow access to reactor building and had to check back (had a bad card).

For vent valve maintenance, have designated area for removal of outer protective clothing during return. Have difficulty with radio contact at vent valve area because of structure, could walk a short distance and communicate.

#### Problems:

1. Difficult to understand speaker in breaker room, but does have a phone.

9:30 HP accompanied workers to turbine building to check on system.

9:33 Performed survey at OSC includes smears.

9:34 Plant evacuation alarm.

9:37 OSC was not informed about reactor status after being informed 15 minutes to ok at 9:20

9:41 Everyone punched in OSC complete has automatic smear detector. Emergency RWP's checklist are completed for each job.

9:46 Evacuation announcement made for west part of reactor building.

9:48 Still have not clarified reactor condition.

9:56 Drywell sample  
Check can and continuously monitored  
Opened communications at sample point  
Technician was very familiar with procedures and quickly set up  
Then went to rad wast to wait to purge  
Used syringe for 15:1 dilution  
Reconnected and left at 10:05

10:14 Check core spray breaker monitored continuously and had telephone contact at area. HP tech left. By scenario, they had problems, replaced breaker and checked back reported it still would not start.

Difficult to understand speaker system from breaker room. Personnel used frisker upon returning.

Equipment of in-plant check surveys are handed out as RWP's are issued.

Radiation status levels are displayed with a grease pencil ARM reading/actual measured dose rate.