

NORTHEAST UTILITIES



THE CONNECTICUT LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY
THE HARTFORD ELECTRIC LIGHT COMPANY
WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS ELECTRIC COMPANY
WILYORK WATER POWER COMPANY
NORTHEAST UTILITIES SERVICE COMPANY
NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

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February 18, 1982

Docket No. 50-423
AEC-MP3-267
B10421



Mr. Ronald C. Haynes
Region I
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 10406

Reference: (1) W. G. Council letter to B. H. Grier, Reporting
of Potential Significant Deficiencies in Design
and Construction, dated June 14, 1980.

Gentlemen:

Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3,
Second Interim Report in the Reporting of a
Potential Significant Deficiency in Design;
Minimum Charging Pump Flow

As required by Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Paragraph 55(e), Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO) reported a potential significant deficiency in the design of Millstone Unit No. 3 in Reference (1). We stated that Westinghouse Electric Corporation reported to NNECO that following a secondary system high energy line rupture the centrifugal charging pumps may not be capable of delivering their minimum required flow to the reactor coolant system at pressurizer safety valve set point pressure. Thus, without minimum flow pump damage might occur due to overheating.


After detailed evaluations by Northeast Utilities Service Company (NUSCO) and Westinghouse, we have concluded that for the case of a steam line or feedwater line break, concurrent with a loss of offsite power, adequate charging pump flow will be provided by the safety grade PORV's used on Millstone Unit No. 3. The Westinghouse calculation of these transients is overly conservative in that they assume the Main Coolant Pumps to continue to run despite the loss of off-site power.

As a result of our detailed evaluation of this potential significant deficiency, additional concerns have been raised. We are presently confirming whether or not the pressure transient would occur if off-site power is available and the auxiliary feedwater system functions as designed. Also, we are verifying whether or not the adverse environmental conditions present as a result of a high energy line break within primary containment would have an effect on the accuracy of the pressurizer pressure transmitters which provide the opening signal to the PORV's, and if so, does this have a detrimental effect on the overall transient.

We anticipate, because of our continuing evaluation, that our final report on this potential significant deficiency will not be complete until approximately two more months. We therefore plan to submit our final report to you by April 15, 1982.

We trust the above interim report adequately conveys the status of our efforts on this potentially significant deficiency in design. Your Mr. E. J. Brunner was notified by our Mr. J. M. Powers that this report would be late and transmitted to you on or before February 17, 1982 as opposed to February 1, 1982.

Very truly yours,



W. G. Council
Senior Vice President

cc: Mr. James H. Sniezek, Director
Division of Resident and Regional
Reactor Inspection
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555