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Docket No. 50-293

OELD AEOD IE-3

JAN 27 1982

Mr. A. Victor Morisi, Manager
Nuclear Operations Support Department
Boston Edison Company
M/C NUCLEAR
800 Boylston Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02199

Dear Mr. Morisi:

The staff is continuing its review of your submittals concerning modifications to the Pilgrim 1 Combustible Gas Control System (CGCS) and has identified the need for additional information. Therefore, please provide the information requested in the enclosure within 14 days of receipt of this letter.

This request for information contained in the enclosure has been previously discussed with your staff and was telecopied to them on January 18, 1982.

The reporting and/or recordkseping requirements contained in this letter affect fewer than ten respondents; therefore, OMB clearance is not required under P.L. 96-511.

Sincerely,

ORIGINAL TIGNED BY

Domenic B. Vassallo, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #2 Division of Licensing

Enclosure: Request for Additional Information

PDR

cc w/enclosure: See next page

OFFICE ORB#2:DL ORB#2:DL C-ORB#2:DL

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Mr. A. Victor Morisi Boston Edison Company

cc:

Mr. Richard D. Machon Pilgrim Station Manager Boston Edison Company RFD #1. Rocky Hill Road Plymouth, Massachusetts 02360

Henry Herrmann, Esquire Massachusetts Wildlife Federation 151 Tremont Street Boston, Massachusetts 02111

Plymouth Public Library North Street Plymouth, Massachusetts 02360

Resident Inspector c/o U. S. NRC P. O. Box 867 Plymouth, Massachusetts 02360

Ms. JoAnn Shatwell
Office of the Attorney General
Environmental Protection Division
1 Ashburton Place
19th Floor
Boston, Massachusetts 02108

Ronald C. Haynes Regional Administrator, Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406

PILGRIM COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL SYSTEM-CONTAINMENT ISOLATION CAPABILITY

The staff is concerned that the capability to isolate the containment at Pilgrim 1 may be compromised given certain single failures within the Combustible Gas Control System (CGCS). Recent modifications were made to the CGCS which consisted of the addition of sixteen solenoid valves (two normally closed series valves in each of eight CGCS flow paths). Each set of series valves in a given line is powered from the same electrical supply. It has not been adequately demonstrated that postulated single failures will not cause two in-series valves to open. In order to resolve these concerns it is necessary to provide the following information:

1. Demonstrate the adequacy of the CGCS design from a containment isolation viewpoint given a single failure which could cause a set of series valves (SV50881A & 82A, or 81B & 82B, or 83A & 84A, or 83B & 84B, or 85A and 86A, or 85B & 86B, or 87A & 88A, or 87B and 88B) to open. The response should include detailed design justification and a description of all precautions taken to prevent single failures from causing a set of two series valves from opening.