


OYSTER CREEK



NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

JCP&L GPU

Jersey Central Power & Light
Company is a Member of the
General Public Utilities System

(609) 693-1951 P.O. BOX 388 • FORKED RIVER • NEW JERSEY • 08731

December 14, 1981


Mr. Ronald Haynes, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region I
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

SUBJECT: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Docket No. 50-219
Licensee Event Report
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/81-64/3L

This letter forwards three copies of a Licensee Event Report to report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/81-64/3L in compliance with paragraph 6.9.2.b.1 of the Technical Specifications.

Very truly yours,


J. T. Carroll, Jr.
Acting Director Oyster Creek

JTC:dh
Enclosures

cc: Director (40 copies)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Director (3)
Office of Management Information
and Program Control
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

NRC Resident Inspector (1)
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Forked River, N. J.

OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

Licensee Event Report
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/81-64/3L

Report Date

December 14, 1981

Occurrence Date

December 3, 1981

Identification of Occurrence

The Containment Spray high drywell pressure switches IP-15A, IP-15B, IP-15C, and IP-15D tripped at a value greater than the limit given in the Technical Specifications Table 3.1.1 item E.1.

This event is considered to be a reportable occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.9.2.b.1.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

The plant was operating at steady state power.

Major Plant Parameters

Power:	Reactor	1859 MWt
	Generator	650 MWe
Flow:	Recirculation	15.4×10^4 gpm
	Feedwater	6.94×10^6 lb/hr

Description of Occurrence

On Thursday, December 3, at 4:00 P.M., while performing the "Containment Spray System Automatic Actuation Test", the IP-15A, IP-15B, IP-15C and IP-15D trip points were found to exceed the Technical Specification limits. Surveillance testing yielded the following data:

<u>Switch</u>	<u>Desired Setpoint (psig)</u>	<u>As Found (psig)</u>	<u>As Left (psig)</u>
IP-15A	<2	2.1	1.95
IP-15B	<2	2.02	1.99
IP-15C	<2	2.03	2.00
IP-15D	<2	2.03	1.94

Apparent Cause of Occurrence

The cause of the occurrence was attributed to instrument repeatability. The switches were last reset to trip at 1.98, 1.92, 1.94 and 1.95 respectively. The greatest setpoint change of the four is 0.12 psig, which is well within the 0.20 psig - 0.30 psig design range of repeatability.

Analysis of Occurrence

The Containment Spray System is made up of two independent cooling loops, each of which is capable of removing heat from the primary containment in the event of a loss of coolant accident. In order to initiate the Containment Spray System, a combination of a high drywell pressure signal plus a reactor low-low water level signal must be received.

Although the high drywell pressure switches would have tripped at a slightly higher pressure than the desired setpoint, their actuation would have only been delayed a fraction of a second (approximately 0.1 second from the start of the design basis loss of coolant accident). However, the reactor low-low water level setpoint is not reached until almost 4 seconds from the start of the design basis loss of coolant accident. Due to this fact, the delay in actuation of the pressure switches would not have affected the initiation of the Containment Spray System, and, therefore, the safety significance of the occurrence is considered minimal.

Corrective Action

Pressure switches IP-15B and IP-15D were reset to trip within the Technical Specifications limit of 2.0 psig (as shown in the "As Left" values in the Description of Occurrence). The drift problem of these snap-action switches is being investigated, along with possible setpoint changes to account for instrument repeatability. In addition, it has been recommended that these type of snap-action switches be replaced with an improved model and it is planned to replace them during a future refueling outage.

Failure Data

Manufacturer: ITT Barton
Model: 228A Indicating Pressure Switch
Range: 0-10 psig