

February 3, 1982

Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region I
Attention: Mr. R. W. Starostecki, Director
Division of Resident and Project Inspection
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Re: Nine Mile Point Unit 2
Docket No. 50-410



Dear Mr. Starostecki:

Enclosed is an interim 30-day report in accordance with 10CFR50.55(e) for the deficiency regarding Limatorque motor operators. This condition was reported to your staff on January 8, 1982 as a potentially reportable deficiency. A final report will be submitted by June 30, 1982.

Very truly yours,

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION

Gerald K. Rhode
Vice President
System Project Management

PM:ja
Enclosure
cc: Resident Inspector

Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation
Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station - Unit 2
Docket No. 50-410

Interim Report for a Potentially Reportable
Deficiency Under 10CFR50.55(e)
Regarding Limitorque Motor Operators

Description of the Deficiency

Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation initiated an exploratory test program to assess the capabilities of Limitorque motor operators to withstand dynamic loads postulated inside the BWR containment. The Limitorque motor operators, Models SMB-0-25 and SMB-000-5 were tested. The following occurrences were noted during the tests:

1. Operator SMB-0-25 experienced excessive limit switch chatter and this condition eventually resulted in a loss of operability during a vibration aging test performed in accordance with IEEE Standard 382-1980. The limit switch was determined to be defective by the manufacturer. A new limit switch was installed, and the test was repeated. The new limit switch also experienced excessive contact chatter throughout this test.

Testing, in accordance with IEEE 382-1980, is not required to meet the criterion and bases stated in the PSAR or construction permit.

2. Operator SMB-000-5 experienced a loss of operability during an early stage of the dynamic load test. Examination of the operator revealed that all the screws holding various subassemblies of the limit switch were loose and one of the four limit switch rotors was broken. It was concluded that the breakage of the rotor was caused by the loose limit switch contact assembly.

These occurrences were discussed with the manufacturer. The manufacturer indicated a possibility of the screws becoming loose during shipment and recommended that all the screws be checked for tightness and also that the limit switch contact be inspected and adjusted, if necessary, for proper contact pressure.

Two new operators were tested. A pretest inspection of the operators at the test laboratory revealed that several limit switch assembly screws in one operator were loose. Also, several limit switch contact subassemblies in both operators required adjustments for proper contact pressure. Prior to the start of the tests all the screws were tightened and the limit switch contact subassemblies adjusted, in accordance with the manufacturer's newly developed procedures. The test results were satisfactory.

During a subsequent inspection of nine randomly selected Limitorque motor operators at the Nine Mile Point - Unit 2 site, the following conditions were observed:

1. All nine operators have several loose screws in the limit switch assemblies.
2. Two operators have loose torque switch mounting screws.
3. Limit switch and torque switch subassemblies in at least six operators will require adjustments in accordance with the manufacturer's newly developed adjustment procedure.
4. Electrical terminals at the torque switches in two operators are loose.

The problem is still being investigated and a final report, including the corrective action to be taken and an analysis of safety implications, will be submitted by June 30, 1982.