

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report No. 50-346/81-22

Docket No. 50-346

License No. NPF-3

Licensee: Toledo Edison Company
Edison Plaza
300 Madison Avenue
Toledo, OH 43652

Facility Name: Davis-Besse, Unit 1

Inspection At: Davis-Besse Site, Oak Harbor, OH

Inspection Conducted: November 2 - 30, 1981

Inspectors: *JF Strater for*
L. A. Reyes

1/27/82

JF Strater for
W. G. Rogers

1/27/82

Approved By: *JF Strater for*
D. R. Hunter, Chief
Projects Section 2B

1/27/82

Inspection Summary

Inspection on November 2 - 30, 1981 (Report No. 50-346/81-22)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of followup on previous inspection findings, operational safety verification, monthly maintenance observation, monthly surveillance observation, licensee event report follow-up, and medical emergency drill. The inspection involved a total of 124 inspector-hours onsite by two NRC inspectors including 48 inspector-hours onsite during offshifts.

Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

- *T. Murray, Station Superintendent
- B. Beyer, Assistant Station Superintendent
- S. Quennoz, Assistant Station Superintendent
- P. Carr, Maintenance Engineer
- *J. Werner, Administrative Coordinator
- D. Miller, Operations Engineer
- D. Briden, Chemist and Health Physicist
- J. Hickey, Training Manager
- L. Simon, Operations Supervisor
- C. Daft, QA Director
- *J. Greer, QA Supervisor

The inspectors also interviewed other licensee employees, including members of the technical, operations, maintenance, I&C, training and health physics staff.

2. Followup on Previous Inspection Items

(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-346/80-29-01): Procedure to provide guidance to the operator on excessive feedwater addition. The licensee prepared Revision 1 to Alarm Procedures AP3012.13 and AP3012.14 and included guidance to the operators to control steam generator levels.

(Open) Unresolved Item (50-346/80-29-02): Feedwater system trip at steam generator levels greater than 82.5%. The licensee initiated facility change 80-110 to provide a trip on high level on the steam generator to prevent a spill into the steam lines. The facility change is not currently on the implementation schedule due to the unavailability of parts.

(Open) Unresolved Item (50-346/77-25-01): Inadvertant ground ties. NRR letter dated October 29, 1981, accepted the licensee's analysis and testing. The inspector reviewed the MWOs issued for the removal of the identified unintentional grounds. All MWOs with the exception of the work on the Vibration and Loose Part Monitoring System have been implemented. The outstanding work is currently scheduled for the 1982 refueling outage.

(Open) Unresolved Item (50-346/79-14-05): Procedure deficiencies. Procedure SF 1104.15, "Emergency Ventilation System", requires valves CV5014C and CV5000D to be open. Drawing M-029A and walkdown of the system revealed the valves do not exist. Additionally, the procedure does not require the position of valves CV5017A, CV5017B, CV5018A, and CV5018B to be verified. These valves provide the fan differential pressure signal to the SFAS interlock for both EVS fans.

3. Operational Safety Verification

The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the month of November. The inspector verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of containment building, auxiliary building and turbine building were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance. The inspector by observation and direct interview verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan.

The inspector observed plant housekeeping/cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls. During the month of November, the inspector walked down the accessible portions of the Emergency Ventilation System Trains 1 and 2 to verify operability. The inspector also witnessed portions of the radioactive waste system controls associated with radwaste shipments and barreling.

These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under technical specifications, 10 CFR, and administrative procedures.

During the walkdown of the Emergency Ventilation System (EVS), the inspector noticed that Procedure SP 1104.15 does not require verification of the lineup of valves CV5017A, CV5017B, CV5018A and CV5018B. These valves provide the differential pressure signal to the SFAS interlock for both EVS fans. The inspector verified that the valves were in the open position. The inspector will followup to assure the procedure is revised to require verification that these valves are open.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

4. Monthly Maintenance Observation

Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and components listed below were observed/reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with technical specifications.

The following items were considered during this review: the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and, fire prevention controls were implemented.

Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance.

The following maintenance activities were observed/reviewed:

Repairs to Containment Air Cooler 1-1

Following completion of maintenance on Containment Air Cooler 1-1, the inspector verified that these systems had been returned to service properly.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

5. Monthly Surveillance Observation

The inspector observed the monthly surveillance test (ST 5030.16) of Reactor Protection System Channel 1 required by the technical specifications and verified the testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, the test instrumentation was calibrated, the limiting conditions for operation were met, the removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, the test results conformed with technical specifications and procedure requirements and the completed tests were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.

The inspector also witnessed portions of the following test activities:

HPI Pump No. 2 and check valve test (ST 5051.09)
SFAS Channel 1 monthly test (ST 5031.01)

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

6. Licensee Event Reports Followup

Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with technical specifications:

- 81-34 Main Steam Safety Relief Valve Lifted Below the Technical Specification Setpoint.
- 81-37 Plant Trip on June 24, 1981, With Loss of NNI.
- 81-41 Unexpected Dilution of the RCS While in Cold Shutdown.
- 81-44 Decay Heat Pump Failed to Start Due to Bent Pin in Fuse Switch Box.

81-45 Plant Trip on July 30, 1981.

81-55 Shield Building Integrity Door 102 Left Open and Unattended.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

7. Medical Drill

On November 13, 1981, at approximately 8:30 a.m., the licensee conducted an unannounced medical emergency drill. The inspectors observed the drill, participated in the drill critique, and verified that the licensee has a program for correcting identified discrepancies. The inspector also verified that equipment disrupted was returned to its proper location after the drill.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

8. Exit Interview

The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) throughout the month of November and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities.

The inspector notified the licensee representatives that procedure SP1104.15 does not require the verification of position of valves CV5017A, CV5017B, CV5018A and CV5018B. These valves provide the differential pressure signal to the SFAS interlock for both EVS fans.