TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

400 Chestnut Street Tower II

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February 2, 1982

BLRD-50-438/81-58
BLRD-50-439/81-72

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
Attn: Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - DEFICIENT WELDS ON PENETRATIONS SUPPLIED BY SARGENT - BLRD-50-438/81-58, BLRD-50-439/81-72 - FINAL REPORT

The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-OIE Inspector R. V. Crlenjak on September 14, 1981 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as NCR 1584. This was followed by our first interim report dated October 14, 1981. Since that time, related NCR 1609 was written on unit 2. This was followed by our second interim report dated December 14, 1981. Enclosed is our final report. We consider 10 CFR Part 21 applicable to this deficiency.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at FTS 858-2688.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

L. M. Mills, Manager
Nuclear Regulation and Safety

Enclosure
cc: Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director (Enclosure)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

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ENCLOSURE

BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2
DEFICIENT WELDS ON PENETRATIONS SUPPLIED BY SARGENT
BLRD-50-438/81-58, BLRD-50-439/81-72
10 CFR 50.55(e)
FINAL REPORT

Description of Deficiency

Four ASME Section III, class 2, penetration assemblies (two each for units 1 and 2) supplied by Sargent Industries were received at Bellefonte with incomplete welds on weldolet branch connections.

A routine inspection by Mechanical/Welding Group inspectors after installation of the unit 1 emergency sump suction lines 1A and 1B, supplied by Sargent Industries, El Segundo, California, revealed insufficient filler metal deposits on two weldolets on line 1A (penetration S23) and one weldolet on line 1B (penetration S22). This is NCR 1584.

NCR 1609 deals with insufficient filler metal deposits on two weldolets on unit 2 line 1A (penetration S23) and two weldolets on line 1B (penetration S22).

Safety Implications

A rupture of the subject weldolets during a LOCA and simultaneous seismic event could result in a breach of containment.

Corrective Action

The cause of the deficiency was an apparent failure of Sargent Industries to make the subject welds to the size required by the applicable detail on the design drawing and of their quality control system to detect the condition. This appears to be an isolated occurrence in that there have been no other welding problems noted to date on components received from this supplier at Bellefonte.

The penetration assemblies at Bellefonte will be reworked by TVA to correct the deficiency. We anticipate completion of this action by March 31, 1982.

TVA Quality Engineering Branch (QEB 811211 005) has instructed its Los Angeles Regional Inspection Office to increase their surveillance inspection activity on any future work coming from Sargent Industries with special attention to welded branch connections to avoid recurrence of this problem.