Portland General Electric Company

Bart D. Withers Vice President

50-344

February 3, 1982

Mr. Cyril J. Crane
Franklin Research Center
The Parkway at 20th Street
Philadelphia, PA 19103

Dear Mr. Crane:

Attached is the information requested by RFI-C5257-485, which was forwarded to us by the NRC. It is our understanding that you may also require additional test reports or evaluations that may either supplement or supersede those mentioned. The information provided for each request is itemized below.

Request 1.a: Amphenol Report 123-1236; 8/23/72.

Response: Attachment I is the complete report. This report does not contain any aging documentation and therefore a material analysis was required. The materials analyzed are identified by Amphenol letter BJA:1:1:001. A copy of this letter is inserted at the back of Attachment I.

Request 1.b: Joy Report on Fan Model No. 60-30-120.

Response: Attachment II is the applicable test report.

Request 1.c: Connecticut Yankee Report; 3/16/78.

Response: The report referred to is enclosed in Attachment III. This has been supplemented by the following:

a. Qualification Tests of Terminal and Fuse Blocks; FIEL Report F-C5143; 7/17/80.

b. Qualification Tests of Terminal Blocks and Spliced Insulating Assemblies in a Simulated LOCA - Phase A; FRC Report F-C5022-1; 10/78.

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c. Preliminary Evaluation and Examination of TMI Equipment: Terminal Blocks; Sandia National Laboratory Report SAND 80-2447A.

Copies of these documents can be provided upon request.

Request 1.d: Westinghouse Letter NC-CE-692.

Response: This was an incorrect reference. The letter referred to was an analysis of the effects of the post-accident chemical environment on transmitters inside Containment. The correct reference is Westinghouse letter NS-CE-719 and is included in Attachment III.

To expedite your evaluations, we should inform you that the Barton Series 300 transmitters remaining on the master list will be replaced by qualified units prior to June 30, 1982. Therefore, review of this equipment type would appear to be academic.

Request 1.e: Westinghouse Letter NS-CE-69.

Response: This was an incorrect reference. The letter referred to was a failure-mode analysis for safety-related solenoid valves in an accident environment. The correct reference is Westinghouse letter NS-CE-755 and is included in Attachment III.

Request 2: The postulated post-accident (HELB) environmental profiles are not specified in the FSAR. FRC requests that the licensee provide these profiles for all harsh environments.

Response: The two areas susceptible to harsh temperature and pressure environments due to a high-energy line break are Containment and the main steam support structure.

As allowed by Section 4.2.1 of the DOR guidelines, and explained in our August 26, 1981 SER response, the LOCA profiles described in the FSAR reflect the HELB requirements for Containment.

For the main steam support structure, we had previously identified a profile with a maximum temperature and pressure of 225°F and 4.3 psia, respectively. Subsequent analyses show Figures 1 and 2 (in Attachment III) to be the environment that safety-related equipment must endure for a high-energy line break in the main steam support structure. The relatively low values are due to the separation of safety-related equipment from high-energy lines and the compartmented design of the main steam support structure.

Although the enclosed reports are not the originals, we will require their return. Should you require additional information from our Qualification Central File to adequately perform your evaluations, please notify us.

Sincerely,

Bart D. Withers
Vice President
Nuclear

Attachments

c: Mr. Robert A. Clark, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch No. 3
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission wo/attach

Mr. Lynn Frank, Director
State of Oregon
Department of Energy wo/attach