

Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 168 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Salem Generating Station

January 19, 1982

Mr. R. C. Haynes Director of USNRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region 1 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

LICENSE NO. DPR-75 DOCKET NO. 50-311 REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 81-43/03X-1

Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 2, Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 81-43/03X-1. This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours,

H.J. refichera

H. J. Midura General Manager -Salem Operations

(true)

FD:al CC: Distribution

The Energy People



Report Number:	81-43/03X-1
Report Date:	01-19-82
Occurrence Date:	06-12-81 and 06-18-81
Facility:	Salem Generating Station, Unit 2 Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Overpressure Protection System - Inoperable.

This report was initiated by Incident Reports 81-190 and 81-199.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

June 12 - Mode 4 - Rx Power 0% - Unit Load 0 MWe June 18 - Mode 5 - Rx Power 0% - Unit Load 0 MWe

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

During the cooldown of the unit for maintenance on June 12, 1981, the Pressurizer Overpressure Protection System (POPS) was not armed when Reactor Coolant System (RCS) temperature decreased to 312°F. Previously the POPS valves (2PR47 and 2PR48) and pressurizer power operated relief valves (PORV's) (2PR1 and 2PR2) were isolated by closing 2PR6 and 2PR7 due to excessive leakage to the pressurizer relief tank (PRT). Action Statement 3.4.10.3.b was entered at 0437 hours due to both POPS channels being isolated and inoperable. The RCS was depressurized and a vent flow path to the PRT from the RCS was established within 8 hours in accordance with the requirements of Action Statement 3.4.10.3.b. The POPS and PORV's were inspected, restroked, and functionally checked during the maintenance outage. Action Statement 3.4.10.3.b was terminated at 1500 hours, June 14, 1981, when POPS channels 1 and 2 were returned to service.

After pressurizer steam bubble formation, in preparation for returning the unit to service, PORV 2PR1 and/or POPS valve 2PR47 were again identified as leaking through to the PRT. At 1830 hours, June 18, 1981, 2PR6 was closed to isolate the leakage to the PRT and POPS channel 1 was declared inoperable and Action Statement 3.4.10.3.a was entered. At 1035 hours, June 21, 1981, RCS temperature was increased to greater than 3120F and Action Statement 3.4.10.3.a was terminated. As the RCS heatup continued, leakage to the PRT developed through PORV 2PR2, and 2PR7 was closed to isolate the leakage. When the unit entered mode 3 Action Statement 3.4.5.a was entered at 1235 hours, due to the isolation of both PORV's (2PR1 and 2PR2). LGR 81-43/03X-1

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

PORV 2PR2 and POPS valve 2PR47 were previously identified to be leaking through and they were isolated by closing 2PR6 and 2PR7. When RCS temperature decreased to 312°F both POPS channels 1 and 2 were declared inoperable since they were isolated.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

Technical Specification 3.4.10.3.b requires:

With both POPS inoperable, depressurize and vent the RCS through a 3.14 square inch vent within the next 8 hours.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

Valve 2PR47 will be repaired and tested at the next refueling outage. A supplemental report will be submitted upon completion.

Seat leakage problems with the Copes-Vulcan D100-160 relief valves have been experienced by a number of power plants, and have been identified as generic in nature.

FAILURE DATA:

Valve 2PR2 Copes-Vulcan

Valve 2PR47 Marotta

Prepared By F. Dickey

J. Midun

Genéral Manager -Salem Operations

SORC Meeting No. 81-60