TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401
400 Chestnut Street Tower II

January 25, 1982

HTRD-50-518/82-04, -520/82-04

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II - Suite 3100
101 Marietta Street
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

HARTSVILLE NUCLEAR PLANTS UNITS A1 AND A2 - REPORTABLE DEFICIENCY - ACCEPTANCE OF UNACCEPTABLE WELDS ON CONTAINMENT SHELL STIFFENERS - HTRD-50-518/82-04, -520/82-04

The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-OIE, Region II, Inspector Ross Butcher on December 24, 1981, as NCR HNPA-182 R1. In accordance with paragraph 50.55(e) of 10 CFR Part 50, we are enclosing the first interim report on the subject deficiency. We expect to transmit the final report to you on or before June 30, 1982. If you have any questions, please call Jim Domer at FTS 858-2725.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

L. M. Mills, Manager
Nuclear Regulation and Safety

Enclosure
cc: Mr. R. C. DeYoung, Director (Enclosure)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

ENCLOSURE
HARTSVILLE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS A1 AND A2
ACCEPTANCE OF UNACCEPTABLE WELDS ON CONTAINMENT SHELL STIFFENERS
10CFR50.55(e) REPORT NO. 1 (INTERIM)
HTRD-50-518/82-04, -520/82-04

DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY

During regular surveillance of inspectors activities, a containment shell stiffener weld was found to have rejectable indications on the surface of the weld. This weld was previously inspected and accepted by one inspector. Further investigation of 30 welds accepted by this inspector revealed 14 containment welds with rejectable indications. During the investigation and subsequent identification of the rejectable welds, unauthorized repair by welding or grinding had been attempted on 5 of the unacceptable welds. The apparent reason for acceptance of welds with unacceptable indications is a failure to apply acceptance criteria stringently.

This condition applies only to those welds inspected and accepted by the inspector previously mentioned and does not apply to other inspectors.

INTERIM PROGRESS

A reinspection is in progress for all accessible welds accepted by this inspector since the reinspection resulting from NCR HNPA-125. (NCR HNPA-125 required an extensive reinspection of accepted welds, both ASME and AWS, and provided weld quality information to that time. See final report on HTRD-50-518/81-07 transmitted to James P. O'Reilly on May 4, 1981.) The current reinspection is now approximately 80% complete and has disclosed a reject rate of approximately 5%. All unacceptable indications identified to date have been of such a nature that corrective action may be achieved with only minor rework.

The reinspection effort has also indicated that inspection of piping welds was fully adequate in that no unacceptable welds have been discovered to date. For this reason inaccessible welds which are primarily on embedded piping will not be reinspected.

The certification of the involved inspector has been revoked and his poor performance reported in a service review. He has been retrained and recertified, and his work for the next 90 days will be reviewed so that a decision on his retention, based on performance, can be rendered. Additionally, the appropriate lead inspector has been reprimanded for allowing lenient interpretation of acceptance criteria.

An investigation was conducted by the Boilermaker Superintendent to identify those welders responsible for the unauthorized repair work. The investigation included discussions with appropriate craft personnel and surveillance of the area to detect unauthorized work. The investigation did not develop any information relevant to determining responsibility for the unauthorized repair work.

The reinspection effort will be completed by April 5, 1982. The final report will include data on the number of welds reinspected and the number rejected. This report will be submitted by June 30, 1982.