




Nebraska Public Power District


COOPER NUCLEAR STATION  
P.O. BOX 98, BROWNVILLE, NEBRASKA 68321  
TELEPHONE (402) 825-3811

CNSS820027

January 20, 1982



Mr. John T. Collins, Regional Administrator  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region IV  
611 Ryan Plaza Drive  
Suite 1000  
Arlington, Texas 76011



Dear Sir:

This report is submitted in accordance with Section 6.7.2.B.1 of the Technical Specifications for Cooper Nuclear Station and discusses a reportable occurrence that was discovered on December 23, 1981. A licensee event report form is also enclosed.

Report No.: 50-298-81-26  
Report Date: January 20, 1982  
Occurrence Date: December 23, 1981  
Facility: Cooper Nuclear Station  
Brownville, Nebraska 68321

Identification of Occurrence:

A safety system setting was discovered to be less conservative than the limiting setting established in Table 3.1.1 of the Technical Specifications.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence:

The reactor was operating at a steady state power level of approximately 99% of rated power.

Description of Occurrence:

While performing routine Surveillance Test Procedure 6.1.9, Level Indicating Switches NBI-LIS-101A and NBI-LIS-101B were observed to trip at 10.7" water indicated level instead of  $\geq 12.5$ " water indicated level as per Technical Specifications.

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Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

The apparent cause of this change in trip point on these instruments has been attributed to setpoint drift. The reactor water level indicating switches (NBI-LIS-101A and NBI-LIS-101B) are Barton Model 288A. Past records of these level switches show no evidence of excessive setpoint drift, however we have documented one previous problem with NBI-LIS-101A, (LER 80-38).

Analysis of Occurrence:


NBI-LIS-101A and NBI-LIS-101B are two of four level indicating switches in the Reactor Protection System. The logic arrangement for the reactor vessel low water level scram function is one-out-of-two-twice. The remaining two level indicating switches (NBI-LIS-101C and NBI-LIS-101D) were demonstrated to be operable during the surveillance test. Therefore, the required complement of switches was available to provide the necessary scram function if required. This occurrence presented no adverse potential consequences from the standpoint of public health and safety.

Corrective Action:

Level indicating switches (NBI-LIS-101A and NBI-LIS-101B) were reset to trip within the required limit at the time of the occurrence. Additionally, the setpoints for these level switches will be closely observed in future surveillance testing.

Based on the previous history of these switches, the normal surveillance test interval (monthly) is considered adequate for monitoring the switch performance.

Sincerely,



L. C. Lessor  
Station Superintendent  
Cooper Nuclear Station

LCL:cg  
Attach.