SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY TA. GEORGE

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COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA 29218

November 16, 1981 8 NOV

T. C. NICHOLS, JR. Vice President and Group Executive Nuclear Operations

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II, Suite 3100 101 Marietta Street, N.W. Atlanta, GA 30303

Subject:

Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station Docket No. 50/395 IE Bulletin 81-02, Supplement 1 and Reportable Substantial Safety Hazard on Westinghouse EMD 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16 and 18 Inch Valves

USNRC REGION

RECEIVE

JAN 26 1982

Re: Westinghouse 3" Gate V _ve Closure Letter to NRC dated Novemb r 25, 1980 Westinghouse 4" Gate Valve Closure Letter to NRC dated March 12, 1981 Westinghouse 3" and 4" Gate Valves Letter to NRC dated July 7, 1981 IE Bulletin 81-02 Letter to NRC dated July 7, 1981 Westinghouse EMP 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, and 18 Inch Valves Letter to NRC dated July 30, 1981

IEIIS /

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

IE Bulletin 81-02, Supplement No. 1, "Failure of Gate Type Valves to Close Against Differential Pressure," required identification and action taken or planned for Westinghouse Electro-Mechanical Division 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, and 18-inch nominal size valves in addition to 3- and 4- inch valves previously submitted. Table 1 tabulates the required information for each of these additional valves. The following corrective action was identified and performed on each valve as follows:

- x Torque Switch Adjustment
- y Gear Change
- z Torque to Limit Closed

Final documentation changes are being processed.

This letter also serves as the final report on the subject additional valves and follows up on the South Carolina Electric and Gas Company notification to the NRC Region II on June 30, 1981. An interim report dated July 30, 1981, was transmitted as referenced above.

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Mr. James P. O'Reilly November 16, 1981 Page 2

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Should there be any questions or additional information desired, please give us a call.

Very truly yours,

Michh

T. C. Nichols, Jr.

RMC:TCN:1kb Attachment cc: V. C. Summer G. H. Fischer T. C. Nichols, Jr. H. N. Cyrus O. W. Dixon, Jr. D. A. Nauman W. A. Williams, Jr. R. B. Clary O. S. Bradham A. R. Koon Site QA H. Radin M. N. Browne G. J. Braddick B. A. Bursey J. C. Ruoff J. K. Skolds J. B. Knotts, Jr. H. T. Babb I&E (Washington) Document Management Branch (55e, 21, LER only) NPCF File

TABLE 1

Item	Valve No.	Valve Type	System Abbrev.	Service Description	Max. P As Flow Approaches Zero		
					Equipment Specification	Functional Requirement	Consequence of Failure to Close
1 ^x .	LCV 115 C, E	4GM72FB	CS	VCT Outlet	200	100	Two valves in series; failure of either valve to close reduces redundancy of providing isolation.
2 ^{x, y,}	ZICV 115	8GM72FB	CS	RWST to Charging	200	200	One MOV in each of two
	B, D			Pump Suction			parallel paths from the RWST to suction of the charging pumps; Failure reduces redun- dancy of providing isolation of RWST during the recircula- tion phase following a postu- LOCA. Isolation will be pro- vided by a check valve in series with the two paths.
з ^{х, у,}	² 8130 A, B	8GM72FB	CS	Charging Pump Suction Header Separation, MELB	200	200	Same as Item 1
4 ^x , y,	² 8131 A, B	8GM72FB	cs	Charging Pump Suction Header Separation, MELB	200	200	Same as Item 1
5	8808 A, B, C	, 12GM88FNH	SI	Accumulatory Discharge	2750	0	Value is closed to prevent RCS pressurization during cold shutdown operation. If the value fails to close, the accumulator may be depres- surized by venting the N ₂ to the containment atmosphere

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Item	Valve No.	Valve Type	System Abbrev.	Service Description	Max. P As Flow Approaches Zero		
					Equipment Specification	Functional Requirement	Consequence of Failure to Close
6 [.]	8809 A, B	14GM74FE	SI	RWST to RHR Pump Suction	700	100	Value is closed for recir- culation phase following a postualated LOCA. If value fails to close, backflow into RWST is prevented by a clock value
7	8811 A, B	14GM74FEH	SI	Containment Sump to RHR Pump Suction	700	100	Valve is opened for recir- culation following a post- ulated LOCA. Valve would be closed for containment isolation. Valve is encap- sulated within a protective housing which acts as a redundant containment isolation
8 ^{y, z}	8812 A, B	14GM74FE	SI	Containment Sump to RHR Pump Suction	700	100	Valve 8811A (B) is in series with 8812A (B), and is redundant.
9 ^x	8887 A, B	10GM74FE	SI	Low Head Inject- ion Crossover Line	700	300	Failure of valve to close reduces redundancy of pro- viding low head train separation during cold leg recirculation phase following a postulated LOCA. Train separation can be achieved by closing the other valve.

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Item	Valve No.	Valve Type	System Abbrev.	Service Description	Max. P As Flo Equipment Specification	ow Approaches Zero Functional Requirement	Consequence of Failure to Close
10	8888 A, B	10GM78FN	SI	Low Head Injec- tion	2750	200	Value is closed for switchover from cold leg to hot leg re- circulation. Failure of value to close will degrad flow to hot legs.
11	8889	10GM78FN	SI	Low Head Injec- tion	2750	200	Valve is closed for switch over from hot leg to cold leg recirculation following a LOCA. If valve fails to close isolation is provided by closing the RHR discharge cross-connect valves 8887 A & B.
,⊼, Z	8702 A, B	1207488SEH	RHR	RHR Inlet Isolation, Inner	700	700	Two values in series; Failure of inner isolation value to close reduces redundancy of providing isolation. Isolation is provided by closing the other value.
13 ^{x, z}	8701 A, B	12GM88SEH	RHR	RHR Inlet Isolation, Outer	700	700	Same as Item 12 except for closing the inner valve.
14 ^x	8706 A, B	8GM74FE	RHR	RHR HX to Chargin Pump Isolation	g 700	300	Valve is opened for recirculation phase following a postulated LOCA. Failure of valve to close precludes re- alignment of RHRS for normal operation

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TABLE 1