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NJK-82-02

January 4, 1982

Mr. Edson G. Case, Deputy Director
 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
 Washington, D. C. 20555

Dear Mr. Case:

Enclosed please find a listing of those changes, tests, and experiments completed during the month of December, 1981, for Quad-Cities Station Units 1 and 2, DPR-29 and DPR-30. A summary of the safety evaluation is being reported in compliance with 10 CFR 50.59.

Thirty-nine copies are provided for your use.

Very truly yours,

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY
 QUAD-CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION

N. J. Kalivianakis
 Station Superintendent

bb

Enclosure

cc: T. J. Rausch

Acc 5/11
Add: Edson Case

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M-4-1(2)-81-23

Upgrade Emergency Lighting

Description

This modification will update the existing emergency battery lights in areas needed for safe shutdown and add lighting packs so that the plant may be brought to a cold shutdown state with loss of off-site A.C. power, and a fire in any area of the plant. This is in compliance with Appendix R, Fire Protection, 10 CFR Part 50.

Evaluation

The addition and updating of emergency lighting will improve safety by providing lighted pathways to safe shutdown equipment and area lighting to operate the equipment for up to eight hours after loss of A.C. power.

M-4-1/2-77-29

1/2 Diesel Generator SDR Relay Trip of
Diesel Generator Breaker

Description

In the "Test" mode of operation, the 1/2 Diesel Generator now trips its load breaker if the engine trips. Formerly, if the engine tripped, it would motor until the Control Room operator tripped the breaker. The load breaker will also trip under the conditions of loss of excitation, excessive neutral voltage, reverse power, and over-current. All of the trips are defeated when the Diesel Generator auto starts.

The modification was initiated to reduce the possibility of motoring the Diesel Generator in the "Test" mode.

An auxiliary relay was added to the shutdown relay (SDR) in the Diesel Generator exciter cabinet. When the SDR de-energizes, shutting down the engine, the auxiliary relay also de-energizes, tripping the load breakers.

Evaluation

The added trips function only in the "Test" mode, providing more protection to the Diesel Generator during surveillance testing. Operation on auto start is unchanged, so the margin of safety in emergency use is not affected.

M-4-1-81-8

RCIC Suction Swapover

Description

The NRC required the RCIC Systems modified such that the pump suction valves automatically change-over to the Suppression Pool on low CCST level or high Suppression Pool level. This was done manually in the past, but by using existing CCST and Torus level switches, and relays 2330-150 and 2330-151 from HPCI; this is now done automatically. To accomplish this, a 4-conductor cable was run from HPCI panel 901-39 to Control Room panel 901-4. Using relays 2330-150 and 2330-151 in panel 901-39 (spare contacts 5-6 & 9-10) the pump suction valves now automatically change-over. This is a commitment to NUREG 0737, "Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements".

Evaluation

The RCIC System now has two modes of change-over to the Suppression Pool. The pump suction valves will now automatically change-over on low CCST level or high Suppression Pool level. The design, function, and intent of the RCIC System remains unchanged. This modification provides for an automatic function which previously had to be done normally.

M-4-1(2)-81-4

Group II Isolation on High Radiation

Description

This modification was initiated in accordance with NUREG 0737 requiring containment vent and purge valves to isolate on high Drywell radiation. These valves are already part of a Group II isolation function; therefore, only a signal to Group II is required to isolate the proper valves. The high radiation signal will be generated by the Containment Atmospheric Monitor radiation monitors.

Evaluation

This modification does not affect any of the existing Group II isolation signals or their setpoints. This system is designated to initiate a Group II isolation in the event high radiation is present in the Drywell without a low Reactor level or high Drywell pressure signal. A system failure would not inhibit the initiation of a Group II isolation from the other sources.