UPDATE REPORT - PREVIOUS REPORT DATE 8/14/81

NRC FORM 366 (7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 | A L B R F 3 (2) | 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 (3) | 4 1 1 1 1 (4) | (5)
LICENSEE CODE | LICENSE NUMBER | LICENSE TYPE | CAT

CON'T 0 1 | REPORT SOURCE L (6) | DOCKET NUMBER 0 5 0 0 0 2 9 6 (7) | EVENT DATE 0 7 2 3 8 1 (8) | REPORT DATE 1 2 3 1 8 1 (9)

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 During normal operation, containment atmosphere monitor (CAM) H_2O_2 analyzer B

0 3 sample return valves could not be energized. See T.S. 3.7.H.2. H_2O_2 analyzer A

0 4 was operable. There was no danger to the health or safety of the public. There

0 5 were no previous similar events.

0 6

0 7

0 8

	SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUBCODE	COMPONENT CODE	COMP. SUBCODE	VALVE SUBCODE
0 9	S A (11)	E (12)	A (13)	I N S T R U (14)	E (15)	Z (16)

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER

EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.
8 1	—	0 3 7	/	0 3	X	—	1

ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS (22)	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
A (18)	X (19)	A (20)	B (21)	0 0 4 5	Y (23)	Y (24)	L (25)	V 0 3 0 (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 Valcore Engineering Corporation model V52630-529-1 solenoid assembly FSV-76-61

1 1 failed to operate due to a shorted bridge rectifier and coil. In addition, a

1 2 voltage supply wire was found loose due to a broken screw head. The solenoid

1 3 assembly was replaced and SI 4.7.D.1.B-1(A) and SI 4.7.H were successfully completed.

1 4 See attached for recurrence control.

	FACILITY STATUS	% POWER	OTHER STATUS (30)	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
1 5	E (28)	1 0 0 (29)	NA	A (31)	Operator observed

	ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
1 6	Z (33)	Z (34)	NA	NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

	NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION (39)
1 7	0 0 0 (37)	Z (38)	NA

PERSONNEL INJURIES

	NUMBER	DESCRIPTION (41)
1 8	0 0 0 (40)	NA

8201130192 811231
PDR ADOCK 05000296
S PDR

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)

	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
1 9	Z (42)	NA

PUBLICITY

	ISSUED	DESCRIPTION (45)
2 0	N (44)	NA

NRC USE ONLY

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Tennessee Valley Authority
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

BF 15.2
6/04/81

LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

BFRO-50- 296 / 81037 R1 Technical Specification involved 3.7.H.2

Reported Under Technical Specification 6.7.2.b.2. *Date due NRC: NA

Date of Occurrence 7/23/81 Time of Occurrence 0815 Unit 3

Identification and Description of Occurrence:
During normal operation, containment atmosphere monitor (CAM) H_2O_2 analyzer B sample return valves could not be energized. The solenoid lead wire and relays R2, R5, and 86-76-92A were damaged.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence:

Unit 1 in refueling outage.

Unit 2 at 99%.

Unit 3 at 100%.

Action specified in the Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements met due to inoperable equipment. Describe.

None

Apparent Cause of Occurrence: Solenoid coils assembly for FSV-76-67 failed to operate due to a shorted bridge rectifier and coil. A voltage supply wire was found loose due to a broken screw head. Inadequate design information lead to improper flex conduit connections at FSV-76-67 which allowed the solenoid assembly to be exposed to torus environment, permitting corrosion on bridge rectifier failure possibly prevented dissipation of heat and contributed to rectifier failure. Screw was probably overtorqued by manufacturer.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health or safety of the public, no release of activity, no damage to the plant or equipment, and no resulting significant chain of events.

Corrective Action: Replaced FSV-76-67 solenoid assembly and relays R2, R5, and 86-76-92A. Flex connections for FSV-67-63, 76-65, and 76-67 sealed by taping with Scotch 70 and covered with Scotch 33+. Flex connector at body end of FSV-76-67 was replaced. SI-4.7.D.1.B-1(A) and 4.7.H were successfully completed. H_2O_2 valves inside the drywell on unit 3 will be checked during the next opportunity for drywell entry. Consideration is being given to moving these valves outside the torus and drywell. At a minimum the torus flex connectors will be replaced during the next refueling outage. These valves are outside the torus and drywell on units 1 and 2.

Failure Data:

None

Retention: Period - Lifetime; Responsibility - Document Control Supervisor

*Revision: