


Portland General Electric Company
Trojan Nuclear Plant
P.O. Box 439
Rainier, Oregon 97048
(503) 556-3713

December 31, 1981
CPY-1039-81

Mr. R. H. Engelken, Director
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region V - Suite 210
1450 Maria Lane
Walnut Creek, CA 94596-5368



Dear Sir:

In accordance with the Trojan Plant Operating License, Appendix A, US NRC Technical Specification 6.9.1.9.c, attached is Licensee Event Report No. 81-30, concerning the use of pressure indicators which measure Containment absolute pressure for maintaining pressure within Technical Specification limits vice differential pressure indicators as stated in STS 3.6.1.4. There was no effect on public health or safety. This is a 30-day reportable occurrence.

Sincerely,

RP Barkhurst
for C. P. Yundt
General Manager

meo hqv
CPY/MLD/GJK:bb
Attachments

c: LER Distribution List

REGION V

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REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE

1. Report No.: 81-30
2. a. Report Date: December 31, 1981
b. Occurrence Date: December 2, 1981
3. Facility: Trojan Nuclear Plant, PO Box 439, Rainier, Oregon 97048
4. Identification of Occurrence:

Containment pressure indicators PI-10075 and PI-10076 measure Containment absolute pressure vice Containment differential pressure as required in STS 3.6.1.4.

5. Conditions Prior to Occurrence:

The plant was in Mode 1 at 100% and steady state operation at the time of the discovery and had experienced all routine evolutions prior to this occurrence.

6. Description of Occurrence:

During research for a Plant Problem Report, it was determined that Containment pressure indicators PI-10075 and PI-10076 were not reading psig as indicated on the meter face. These pressure indicators use sensors with a sealed reference leg. Indications on these meters are dependent upon the atmospheric pressure on the day they are calibrated and therefore, reflect a number which is not true gage pressure.

7. Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

This occurrence is attributed to improper design and installation of these indicators based on application to STS 3.6.1.4 as it is presently worded.

8. Significance of Occurrence:

The design basis of differential pressure across the Containment had the potential for being exceeded in the event of a LOCA due to changing atmospheric pressure and calibration techniques. This event had no effect on public health or safety. The evaluation of this event determined that normal plant practices make it highly unlikely that the +1.6 psig pressure limit was ever exceeded.

9. Corrective Action:

Operations personnel were directed to use an alternate means of monitoring Containment pressure through a pressure sensor not having a sealed reference leg. This sensor is monitored on the plant computer and is set to alarm to allow operators ample time to perform a Containment pressure reduction when required to meet Technical Specifications. In addition, plant procedures have been revised to provide techniques for determining Containment differential pressure if the computer is out-of-service.