PALISADES PLANT

NRC FORM 366 U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (7.77) LICENSEE EVENT REPORT CONTROL BLOCK: (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL ACQUIRED INFORMATION) 010101010 P I A 0 1 5 CCA T 1118110 1212191811 REPORT DATE 0 1 010101 5011 211 SOURCE EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10) [During preparations for plant startup, it was determined that a PCS charging/ 0 2 letdown mismatch of 32 gpm had occurred. It was assumed that this 03 difference was PCS leakage. At the time of discovery, the plant was in the 04 hot shutdown condition. The assumed leakage exceeded the 10 gpm limit 0 5 specified by TS 3.1.5, and is reportable per TS 6.9.2.b(2). PSC cooldown 0 6 was initiated and the plant was placed in the cold shutdown condition. 0 7 Based on changes in containment sump level, total leakage is est at 1000 gal 0 8 CODE COMP SUBCODE E A 0 9 (13) OCCURRENCE SEQUENTIAL CODE REVISION REPORT NO 80 LER RO 3 014 9 0 N 4(21 0 4 CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27) Leakage caused by improperly installed gasket in CRDM seal housing. The 10 individual who installed the gasket apparently did not follow the procedur-1 1 al step specifying gasket installation; the supervisor who verified 1 2 proper gasket installation did not properly perform the verification. Both 1 3 individuals involved have been disciplined. 1 4 80 METHOD OF DISCOVERY FACILITY STATUS OTHER STATUS (30) Observation 32 & POWER G (28) Hot Shutdown A (31 1 5 0 0 0 CONTENT 80 ACTIVITY NA AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY 35 NA ATION OF RELEASE 36 TELEASED OF PELEASE 1 6 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES 80 DESCRIPTION 39 NUMBER TYPE (37) 0 0 0 Z 7 (38 PERSONNEL INJURIES DESCRIPTION MREP. 0 (40) 80 OSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY 43 (42) 1 9 PUBLICITY NRC USE ONLY DESCRIPTION 45 N (44) NA 

8201060381 811229 PDR ADOCK 0500025 Attachment to LER 81-49-03-L-0 Consumers Power Company Palisades 50-255

Event Description - On December 11, 1981, preparations for plant startup from the Palisades 1981 refueling outage were in progress; at 1236, PCS pressure had been increased to 2000 psia, and primary coolant temperature was 532° F. At approximately 1300, a control operator discovered a charging/letdown mismatch of approximately 32 gpm. Through use of a containment TV monitor, the operator observed steam coming from the vicinity of the reactor vessel head. At 1310, plant cooldown was commenced; at 1320, an unusual Event was declared and the Site Emergency Plan was implemented. At 1320, containment pressure had increased to 1.3 psig; service water flow to containment air coolers was increased, and by 1430, pressure was reduced to 1.0 psig. At 1820, a containment entry was made, and the source of leakage was identified as being the seal housing for CRDM No. 3. At 2005, the shutdown cooling system was put in service in order to complete the cooldown, and the Unusus' Event was terminated. At 2325, the cold shutdown condition was achieved.

<u>Consequences</u> - Based on the observed change in containment sump level, it is estimated that 1000 gallons of primary coolant leaked into the containment building. The reactor vessel head was cleaned to remove boric acid residue, and a number of cable connectors (eg, incore detectors) required drying. Area and process radiation monitors, including those area radiation monitors inside containment, showed no upward trends. No measurable release to the environment occurred as a result of this event. No challenges to engineered safety features equipment occurred, and all equipment required to achieve the cold shutdown condition operated normally. Based on the above, it is concluded that no threat to public health or safety existed.

<u>Cause</u> - In October, 1981, during reinstallation of seal housing components for control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) Number 3, the seal housing gasket was improperly installed, in that it was apparently not placed in its specified location within the seal housing. As a result, an inadequate seal existed, and leakage occurred through the seal housing.

The procedure being used specified the correct gasket location, and also required verification by the supervisor in charge of the work that the gasket had been correctly installed. The supervisor was in the area where the work was being performed, was able to observe the repairman during the CRDM seal installation sequence, and based or the activity he was able to observe, concluded that the seal housing components had been properly installed; however, the supervisor did not physically inspect the seal housing to verify proper assembly.

<u>Corrective Actions</u> - The seal housing for CRDM number 3 was assembled in accordance with the procedure. The crew which had performed the assembly of CRDM number 3 had also assembled another seal housing, which was subsequently opened, inspected and found to have been properly assembled.

The repairman and the supervisor involved have been disciplined.

Attachment to LER 81-49-03-L-0

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Prior to startup from the current refueling outage, this event will be discussed with all available maintenance supervisory personnel; particular emphasis will be placed on the meaning of verification signatures. Personnel not available for this instruction will be briefed prior to resuming on shift supervisory duties. Procedures related to Maintenance Department Administration are being revised to clearly define the meaning of review and verification signatures as they apply to completed maintenance activities.