

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

1 0 H D B S 1 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 4 5
1 8 9 LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TYPE 30 57 CAT 58

0 1 REPORT SOURCE L 6 0 5 0 0 0 3 4 6 7 0 8 0 7 8 1 6 1 2 1 8 8 1 9
1 8 9 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

2 2 (NP-33-81-52) On 8/7/81 at 1530 hours, two architect engineers reported finding five
3 3 open places between the corrugated metal decking in the ceiling of the hallway to the
4 4 diesel generators and the high voltage switchgear rooms 322 and 324, respectively.
5 5 The ceiling is a fire barrier. Upon inspection, some Kaowool was found in the holes.
6 6 However, sufficient Kaowool was not present to maintain fire wall integrity. There
7 7 was no danger to the health and safety of the public or station personnel. There was
8 8 no fire which required the fire wall to have its integrity intact.

0 9 SYSTEM CODE A B 11 CAUSE CODE A 12 CAUSE SUBCODE E 13 COMPONENT CODE Z Z Z Z Z Z 14
1 17 LER NO. REPORT NUMBER 8 1 21 22 0 4 6 24 26 0 3 28 29 X 30 31 1 32 REVISION NO.
ACTION TAKEN FUTURE ACTION EFFECT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN METHOD HOURS ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED NPD-4 FORM SUB. PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
X 18 X 19 Z 20 Z 21 0 0 0 0 22 Y 23 N 24 Z 25 Z 9 9 9 26 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 The cause was due to personnel error during initial construction. The construction
1 1 personnel involved should have ensured the holes were sufficiently sealed at the com-
2 2 pletion of their work. The holes were filled with Kaowool on 8/7/81 at 1615 hours
3 3 under MWO 81-3107. The action statement of Technical Specification 3.7.10 was not
4 4 implemented since the work was completed within one hour of discovery of holes.

1 5 FACILITY STATUS D 28 0 0 0 29 NA 30 OTHER STATUS 31 A 32 Discovered by two architect engineers
1 6 ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE Z 32 Z 34 NA 35 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY 36 LOCATION OF RELEASE 36

1 7 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER 0 0 0 37 Z 38 NA 39 DESCRIPTION
1 8 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER 0 0 0 40 NA 41 DESCRIPTION

1 9 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE Z 42 NA 43 DESCRIPTION
2 0 PUBLICITY ISSUED N 44 NA 45 DESCRIPTION

8201040097

TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-81-52

DATE OF EVENT: August 7, 1981

FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Penetrations in a safety-related fire wall were found to be unsealed

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 5 with Power (MWT) = 0 and Load (Gross MWE) = 0.

Description of Occurrence: On August 7, 1981 at 1530 hours, two architect engineers reported finding five open places between the corrugated metal decking in the ceiling of the hallway to the diesel generators and the high voltage switchgear rooms, Rooms 322 and 324, respectively. The ceiling is a fire barrier. Upon inspection, some Kaowool was found in the holes. However, sufficient Kaowool was not present to maintain fire wall integrity.

When reported, Maintenance Work Order 81-3107 was written to stuff the holes with additional Kaowool. This effort was completed on August 7, 1981 at 1615 hours. Thus, the action statement of Technical Specification 3.7.10 was not implemented.

Technical Specification 3.7.10 states "all penetration fire barriers protecting safety related areas shall be functional" with an applicability of "at all times". The action statement reads "with one or more of the above penetration fire barriers non-functional, establish a continuous fire watch on at least one side of the affected penetration within one hour". As Maintenance Work Order 81-3107 was completed in less than one hour from the time of the holes' discovery, this action statement was not implemented.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The cause of this occurrence was due to personnel error during initial construction of Davis-Besse. The construction personnel involved should have ensured the holes were sufficiently sealed with fire barrier material at the completion of their work activities.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or to station personnel. There was no fire which required the fire wall to have its integrity intact.

Corrective Action: When reported, Maintenance Work Order 81-3107 was written to fill the holes with additional Kaowool. This effort was completed on August 7, 1981 at 1615 hours. The action statement of Technical Specification 3.7.10 was not implemented as the maintenance work order was completed within one hour of discovery of the holes.

1 Maintenance Procedure MP 1410.39 covers proper procedures for sealing and documenting penetrations through designated fire barriers to insure that fire barrier integrity is maintained.

Training was initiated during October 1981 to all contractor supervision (down to the foreman level), to provide information on applicable procedural requirements while working within the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station.

Surveillance Test ST 5016.11, Fire Protection System Barriers, is in the process of being modified to ensure complete coverage of the safety-related fire wall penetration seals by the surveillance test program. Personnel responsible for the preparation of the modification are ensuring the safety-related ceilings/floors which act as fire barriers are included in the surveillance test procedure.

Failure Data: Licensee Event Rept NP-33-81-24 reported a similar occurrence on March 16, 1981 and April 3, 1981 when fire barrier holes were discovered.

Other violations of the integrity of a fire barrier were reported in Licensee Event Reports NP-33-80-11 (80-008), NP-33-79-063 (79-060), NP-33-79-061 (79-059), and NP-33-78-137 (78-117).

LER #81-046