NRC FORM 366
(7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 | O H D B S 1 (2) | Ø Ø - Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø - Ø Ø (3) | 4 1 1 1 1 (4) | (5)

7 8 9 LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TYPE 30 57 CAT 58

CON'T

0 1 | REPORT SOURCE L (6) | Ø 5 Ø Ø Ø 3 4 6 (7) | 1 1 2 8 8 Ø (8) | 1 2 1 8 8 1 (9)

7 8 60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 | (NP-33-80-110) On 11/28/80 at approximately 1500 hours while performing surveillance

0 3 | testing, operations personnel noted that PSL107D would not reset after actuating on

0 4 | low steam pressure. With this pressure switch inoperable, Auxiliary Feedwater System

0 5 | 1-2 was declared inoperable. This placed the unit in the action statement of Techni-

0 6 | cal Specification 3.7.1.2. There was no danger to the health and safety of the public

0 7 | or to station personnel. Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Train 1-1 was still operable.

0 8 | 7 8 9 80

SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUBCODE	COMPONENT CODE	COMP. SUBCODE	VALVE SUBCODE
C H (11)	E (12)	F (13)	I N S T R U (14)	S (15)	Z (16)

0 9 | 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 18 19 20

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER: EVENT YEAR 8 Ø (21 22) — (23) SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. Ø 8 4 (24 26) / (27) OCCURRENCE CODE Ø 3 (28 29) REPORT TYPE X (30) — (31) REVISION NO. 1 (32)

ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS (22)	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
A (18)	Z (19)	Z (20)	Z (21)	Ø Ø Ø Ø	Y (23)	N (24)	A (25)	S 3 8 2 (26)

33 34 35 36 37 40 41 42 43 44 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 | The cause was a defective actuation switch and actuator in PSL107D. The actuating

1 1 | stem in the microswitch was worn. Under Maintenance Work Order IC-802-80, the defec-

1 2 | tive parts were replaced. The applicable portion of ST 5071.04 was re-performed satis-

1 3 | factorily, and Auxiliary Feedwater Train 1-2 was declared operable at 2205 hours on

1 4 | 11/28/80.

7 8 9 80

FACILITY STATUS | % POWER | OTHER STATUS (30) | METHOD OF DISCOVERY | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)

1 5 | C (28) | Ø 9 1 (29) | NA | B (31) | Surveillance Test ST 5071.04

7 8 9 10 12 13 44 45 46 80

ACTIVITY RELEASED | CONTENT OF RELEASE | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) | LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)

1 6 | Z (33) | Z (34) | NA | NA

7 8 9 10 11 44 45 80

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES: NUMBER | TYPE | DESCRIPTION (39)

1 7 | Ø Ø Ø (37) | Z (38) | NA

7 8 9 11 12 13 80

PERSONNEL INJURIES: NUMBER | DESCRIPTION (41)

1 8 | Ø Ø Ø (40) | NA

7 8 9 11 12 80

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43): TYPE | DESCRIPTION

1 9 | Z (42) | NA

7 8 9 10 80

PUBLICITY: ISSUED | DESCRIPTION (45)

2 0 | N (44) | NA

7 8 9 10 68 69 80

NRC USE ONLY

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DVR 80-197 NAME OF PREPARER Dan Trautman PHONE (419) 259-5000, Ext. 235

TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-80-110

DATE OF EVENT: November 28, 1980

FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Auxiliary Feed Pump Turbine (AFPT) 1-2 Suction Line Pressure Switch PSL 107D Failed to Reset

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 1 with Power (MWT) = 2525 and Load (Gross MWE) = 853.

Description of Occurrence: On November 28, 1980 at approximately 1500 hours during the performance of ST 5071.04, Auxiliary Feedwater Channel Functional Test, it was noted by operations personnel that PSL 107D would not reset after actuating on low steam pressure. PSL 107D is one of four pressure switches located between the AFPT trip throttle valve and the AFPT steam isolation valve on each main steam line. The purpose of these pressure switches is to close the AFPT main steam isolation valves should a main steam line break occur between the Auxiliary Feed Pump Room and the isolation valves in the Auxiliary Building. The control logic requires actuation of both PSL 107A and PSL 107C or PSL 107B and PSL 107D to cause steam isolation to the AFPT. With this pressure switch inoperable, Auxiliary Feedwater System 1-2 was declared inoperable.

This placed the unit in the action statement of Technical Specification 3.7.1.2 which states that with one Auxiliary Feedwater System inoperable, restore the inoperable system to operable status within 72 hours or be in hot shutdown within the next 12 hours.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The apparent cause of this occurrence was determined to be a defective actuation switch and actuator in PSL 107D. The actuating stem in the microswitch was worn.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or to station personnel. Auxiliary Feedwater Train 1-1 was still operable.

Corrective Action: Maintenance Work Order IC-802-80 was issued to perform maintenance on PSL 107D. PSL 107D was removed, the defective parts replaced and the repaired switch installed. Multiple checks were made on the pressure switch calibration, both out of system and in the system and results proved satisfactory. The applicable portion of ST 5071.04 was re-performed satisfactorily, and Auxiliary Feedwater Train 1-2 was declared operable at 2250 hours on November 28, 1980.

Failure Data: There have been no previous similar occurrences of worn parts causing a pressure switch failure.

LER #80-084