

LER 81-16/3X

CONTROL BLOCK:

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(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0	1	V	T	V	Y	S	1	2	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	3	4	1	1	1	1	4	5						
7	8	LICENSEE CODE						14	15	LICENSE NUMBER										25	LICENSE TYPE					30	CAT					58

CON'T

REPORT SOURCE: 0 1

DOCKET NUMBER: 6 0 5 0 0 0 2 7 1 7 0 6 2 2 8 1 8 1 2 1 7 8 1 9

EVENT DATE: 60 61 68 69 74 75 80

REPORT DATE: 7 8

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 | During normal operation of the Reactor Water Cleanup System, routine operator
0 3 | Surveillance discovered a small leak in a 1" X 3/4" socket weld reducing fitting
0 4 | in the tube-side vent line of Regenerative Heat Exchanger E-15-1A, upstream of
0 5 | valve V12-30A. There were no consequences adverse to the public health and
0 6 | safety as a result of this event. Similar previous occurrences were reported
0 7 | to the Commission as LER 79-01, 80-37, 80-41, and 81-11.

08 | _____

SYSTEM CODE C G 11		CAUSE CODE E 12		CAUSE SUBCODE D 13		COMPONENT CODE P I P E X X 14		COMP SUBCODE A 15		VALVE SUBCODE Z 16	
7 8		9 10		11 12		13 14		15 16		17 18	
LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 17		EVENT YEAR 8 1 21 22		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 0 1 6 23 24 25 26		OCCURRENCE CODE 27		REPORT TYPE 0 3 28 29		REVISION NO. 30 31 32	
ACTION TAKEN A 18 33		FUTURE ACTION A 19 34		EFFECT ON PLANT Z 20 35		SHUTDOWN METHOD Z 21 36		HOURS 0 0 0 0 22 37 38 39 40		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y 23 41	
NPRD-4 FORM SUB. Y 24 42		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER A 25 43		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER E 0 6 5 26 44 45 46 47							

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1	0	
1	1	See Attached.
1	2	
1	3	
1	4	

FACILITY STATUS: 1 5 E (28)
 % POWER: 1 0 0 (29)
 OTHER STATUS: NA (30)
 METHOD OF DISCOVERY: B (31)
 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: Operator Observation (32)

ACTIVITY CONTENT
RELEASED OF RELEASE

1 6 2 33 4 34

AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)

NA

LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)

NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES									
NUMBER			TYPE		DESCRIPTION				
1	7		0	0	0	37	Z	38	NA

PERSONNEL INJURIES		NUMBER		DESCRIPTION	
1	4	0	0	0	NA

1		9		7		8		2		3		4		5		6		10		11		12		13		14		15		16		17		18		19		20		21		22		23		24		25		26		27		28		29		30		31		32		33		34		35		36		37		38		39		40		41		42		43		44		45		46		47		48		49		50		51		52		53		54		55		56		57		58		59		60		61		62		63		64		65		66		67		68		69		70		71		72		73		74		75		76		77		78		79		80		81		82		83		84		85		86		87		88		89		90		91		92		93		94		95		96		97		98		99		100	
1		9		7		8		2		3		4		5		6		10		11		12		13		14		15		16		17		18		19		20		21		22		23		24		25		26		27		28		29		30		31		32		33		34		35		36		37		38		39		40		41		42		43		44		45		46		47		48		49		50		51		52		53		54		55		56		57		58		59		60		61		62		63		64		65		66		67		68		69		70		71		72		73		74		75		76		77		78		79		80		81		82		83		84		85		86		87		88		89		90		91		92		93		94		95		96		97		98		99		100	
1		9		7		8		2		3		4		5		6		10		11		12		13		14		15		16		17		18		19		20		21		22		23		24		25		26		27		28		29		30		31		32		33		34		35		36		37		38		39		40		41		42		43		44		45		46		47		48		49		50		51		52		53		54		55		56		57		58		59		60		61		62		63		64		65		66		67		68		69		70		71		72		73		74		75		76		77		78		79		80		81		82		83		84		85		86		87		88		89		90		91		92		93		94		95		96		97		98		99		100	

PUBLICITY		ISSUED		DESCRIPTION		NRC USE ONLY	
2	0	4	4	Daily Status Phone (6/23 & 6/24)			
7	8	9	10			68	69

8112290293 811217
PDR ADCK 05000271
S PDR

Warren P. Murphy

PHONE: (802) 257-7711

NRC USE ONLY

1000-0000/01/0000-0000\$10.00/0

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The Reactor Water Cleanup System was removed from service to allow the degraded fitting to be replaced with an identical spare. The fitting was sent to an independent laboratory where the mode of failure was determined to be intergranular stress corrosion cracking. During the 1981 refueling outage, this fitting and all similar fittings in the RWCU System were replaced with a differently designed reducing fitting which is less susceptible to this type of failure.

The laboratory analysis also revealed transgranular stress corrosion cracking (not through wall) adjacent to the subject through wall crack on the OD of the pipe. The transgranular cracking was attributed to the wetting of asbestos insulation with subsequent leaking of chlorides to the pipe surface.

As a result of this event and other transgranular cracking events, a detailed plant review was performed to determine if any other insulated high temperature stainless steel lines have been subjected to wetting. In addition, a field walkdown was performed to identify sources or potential sources of wetting. As a result of this review, only the suspect piping and fittings in the RWCU System were replaced during the 1981 refueling outage.

Any future wetting will be followed up by inspections as required. Purchase of all insulation and application of protective paints will be continued with the emphasis on chloride control. Implementation of the aforementioned program and controls will reduce the potential for any future stress corrosion cracking.

02/83