

TEXAS UTILITIES GENERATING COMPANY

2001 BRYAN TOWER - DALLAS, TEXAS 75201

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
R. J. GARY
EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT
AND GENERAL MANAGER

November 12, 1981

Mr. Karl V. Seyfrit, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region IV
611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000
Arlington, TX 76012

RIV
Docket Nos. 50-445/IE Bulletin 81-02
50-446/IE Bulletin 81-02

SUBJECT: COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION
1981-83 2300 MW INSTALLATION
RESPONSE TO NRC IE BULLETIN 81-02 SUPPLEMENT 1



Dear Mr. Seyfrit:

In response to Supplement 1 of IE Bulletin 81-02 we offer the following response.

CPSES uses Westinghouse Electro-Mechanical Division (W-EMD) valves extensively in safety related applications. All W-EMD valves in safety related applications have been reviewed to verify their capability to close under their limiting conditions. For those valves where closing capability could not be verified, corrective action has been taken. Information for 3 and 4 inch valves requiring corrective action was provided in our response to the original bulletin. For valves greater than 4 inches requiring corrective actions, information is supplied in the attached table.

Corrective actions, applied to the operators of the W-EMD valves, consist of: increasing the torque setting, changing the gear ratio, or a combination of both. All corrective actions have been completed.

Manpower expended for reports and corrective actions was primarily a result of the CPSES 10CFR50.55(e) submittal. Only minimal additional work was required by the bulletin.

If you have any additional questions, please advise.

Sincerely,

R. J. Gary
R. J. Gary

RJG:tlS

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cc: U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Division of Reactor Operations Inspection
Washington, D.C. 20555

CPSES W-END VALVES*
(GREATER THAN 4 INCHES)
FOR WHICH CORRECTIVE ACTION IS REQUIRED

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<u>VALVE FUNCTION</u>	<u>VALVE LOCATION NUMBER</u>	<u>W END MODEL REFERENCE</u>	<u>MAXIMUM DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE</u>	<u>CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE TO CLOSE</u>
RWST to suction of CCP'S	LCV-112D,E	8GM72FB	200	One MOV in each of two parallel paths from the RWST to suction of the CCP'S; failure reduces redundancy of providing isolation of RWST during the recirculation phase following a LOCA. Isolation will be provided by a check valve in series with the two paths.
RHR Suction Isolation, Inner	8702A,B	12GM88SE	700	Two valves in series, failure of inner isolation valve to close reduces redundancy of providing isolation. Isolation is provided by closing the outer valve.
RHR Suction Isolation, Outer	8701A,B	12GM88SE	700	Two valves in series, failure of outer isolation valve to close reduces redundancy of providing isolation. Isolation is provided by closing the inner valve.
RHR Discharge Cross Connect	8716A,B	10GM74FE	300	Failure of valve to close reduces redundancy of providing low head train separation during CL recirculation phase following a LOCA. Train separation can be achieved by closing other valve.
RHR HX Discharge to CPP Suction	8804A	8GM74FE	300	Valve is opened for recirculation phase following a LOCA. Failure of valve to close precludes realignment of RHRS for normal operation.

* Valves listed are for Unit 1 only. Unit 2 has identical valves.

CPSES W-EMD VALVES
(GREATER THAN 4 INCHES)
FOR WHICH CORRECTIVE ACTION IS REQUIRED

(Page 2 of 2)

<u>VALVE FUNCTION</u>	<u>VALVE LOCATION NUMBER</u>	<u>W END MODEL REFERENCE</u>	<u>MAXIMUM DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE</u>	<u>CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE TO CLOSE</u>
RHR HX Discharge to SI Pump Suction	8804B	8GM74FE	300	Valve is opened for recirculation phase following a LOCA. Failure of valve to close precludes realignment of RHRS for normal operation.
RWSI to SI Pump, Suction	8806	8GM72FB	200	Valve is closed for recirculation phase following a LOCA. If valve fails to close backflow into RWST is prevented by check valve in line.
CCP Suction to SI Pump Crossover	8807A,B	6GM72FB	200	Two valves in parallel (8807A,B) in series with one valve (8924); failure of any one valve to close will not preclude isolation.
CCP Suction to SI Pump Crossover	8924	6GM72FB	200	Two valves in parallel (8807A,B) in series with one valve (8924); failure of any one valve to close will not preclude isolation.
SI Pump Suction Cross Connect	8923A,B	6GM72FB	200	Valves are closed to provide SI Pump train separation. Two valves are present; failure of one valve to close will not preclude achieving separation.