



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

December 9, 1981



MEMORANDUM FOR: Lynn Scattolini, Chief, Public Document Room

FROM: T. A. Rehm, Assistant for Operations, Office of
the Executive Director for Operations

SUBJECT: CORRESPONDENCE FOR THE PDR

The attached correspondence from Henry Myers re the TMI-2 accident should be placed in the Public Document Room.

T. A. Rehm, Assistant for Operations
Office of the Executive Director
for Operations

Attachments:

- 11-9-81 letter fm Henry Myers to Dircks re
comments on Gamble memorandum and related
matters
- 11-16-81 letter fm Henry Myers to Dircks/Haller re
basis for I&E conclusion that Gary Miller was
unaware of the pressure pulse recorded at approximately
1:50 p.m. on 3-28-79
- 11-30-81 letter fm Henry Myers to Dircks/Haller re
basis for I&E conclusion that pressure pulse was
dismissed as an instrument anomaly
- 12-1-81 letter fm Henry Myers to Dircks/Haller re
NUREG 0760 statement (p.19): "The Investigators
conclude that the significance of superheated
steam was not understood on 3-28-79 by the people
at the site."

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P PDR

November 9, 1981

To Bill Dircks
From Henry Myers

Re: Comments on Gamble memorandum and related matters

Something to keep in mind as you read this is that the plant managers possessed significant information that they understood to be related to the severity of the accident and which they did not report to State and Federal officials. Unreported information related to: (A) circumstances leading to the conditions that prevailed when various reports were made, (B) temperatures indicating the core was or had been uncovered, (C) the fact that the plant was in a condition not covered by emergency procedures, and (D) an uncertain prognosis for bringing the plant to a stable condition. The information that was provided to State and Federal officials led these officials to conclude that the accident was much less severe than was in fact the case. Compare, for example, NRC PNO 79-67 and PNO 79-67A and the Lt. Governor's March 28 press releases with the recollections of those who were in the plant on March 28. I&E has no explanation for the reporting failures other than that the plant managers were ignorant. This explanation is inconsistent with the evidence compiled by the various investigations, a fact which will be clear to you from reading the Interior Committee report. While this may sound self-serving, neither NRC nor GPU has taken issue with our conclusions nor our specific findings with regard to who knew what when.

I think you should be wary of assertions that we have misread Gamble's memorandum. Gamble states clearly that he was instructed to interview State officials in a way such that it was unlikely that information would be obtained indicating precisely what these officials had been told or whether they thought they had been fully and accurately informed on March 28, 1979.

Note statement on top of NUREG-0760, p. 40:

"The three principal members of the BRP were interviewed to evaluate the operating information that was provided to BRP in contrast to information that was supplied to the NRC."

The foregoing is consistent with Gamble's recollection as stated in his memorandum that the purpose of interviewing state officials was to determine whether the state had been given information that was not provided to the NRC.

Note that Gamble was listed as an investigator in the December 1980 draft NUREG-0760, a designation that was dropped for reasons that are not clear. See, for example, page 2, of the December 1980 draft. Why did Richard Hoefling

not sign the final report? Also for whatever it is worth, I understand that Ronald Haynes, who was originally part of the I&E investigative team, and who previously worked on the Rogovin inquiry, believes that Met Ed managers played down the severity of the accident.

I believe also that the I&E investigators should have been but were not adequately informed as to the level of proof necesaray to reach a conclusion as to whether there was sufficient evidence of wrongdoing to warrant imposition of civil penalties.

Note statement on top of p.41, NUREG-0760, that:

"It shall be the responsiblity of all the above (i.e. all TMI managers) to provide maximum assistance and information possible to the various offsite groups; i.e., AEC, State of Pennsylvania, Bureau of Radiological Health.."(Underline added.)

In light of the foregoing, Moseley et al. should be asked the following:

Why was Lt. Governor Scranton not interviewed? What did they do to obtain notes that might have been taken during the briefing of State officials by Met-Ed in Scranton's office on the afternoon of March 28?

Was Dornsife told at approximately 9:00 A.M. on March 28, 1979 that the EMOV had been open on the order of 2 hours and 20 minutes; i.e. that a LOCA had been in progress until 6:20 A.M. or thereabouts?

Was Dornsife told at approximately 9:00 A.M. on March 28, 1979 that the HPI was throttled during the time the EMOV was open/leaking?

Was Dornsife told at approximately 9:00 A.M. on March 28, 1979 that in-core temperatures in excess of 2000 degrees had been measured?

Was Dornsife told at approximately 9:00 A.M. on March 28, 1979 that hot-leg temperatures in excess of 700 degrees were being measured?

Was Dornsife told at approximately 9:00 A.M. on March 28, 1979 that the plant was in a condition not covered, encompassed or envisioned by emergency procedures or technical specifications?.

Was Dornsife told at approximately 9:00 A.M. on March 28, 1979 that the plant status did not fit any of the categories specified in Item 4 on page 40 of NUREG 0760?

The following relates to the items of information (see list on page 41 of NUREG-0760) supplied by Met-Ed to the Bureau of Radiological Protection:

Item 3 states that Dornsife recalled knowledge that the EMOV had been opened for a period of time that was longer than normal. The crucial question is whether Dornsife was told that "longer than normal" meant something like 2 hours and 20 minutes or that it meant a few minutes. If the former it indicated big trouble, but if the latter it might have been relatively insignificant. Dornsife's notes and his apparent reporting to the Lt. Governor that everything was under control indicates that Dornsife understood "longer than normal" to be a time much less than 2 hours and 20 minutes. Therefore the question arises as to why Miller did not tell Dornsife that until approximately 6:20 A.M. the valve had apparently been passing fluid. This gets into the question of whether Miller knew the valve had been open for this period of time. If he did not know, the question then arises as to why he did not know. Among those who did know were Mike Ross (currently manager of plant operations at Unit 1); Ross' recollection is that the valve had been open for a long period of time and that this fact was discussed with Miller. (See House Interior Committee Staff Report, p.11.) Others among the supervisory personnel who knew at the time of the Miller-Dornsife conversation that the valve had been open until 6:20 A.M. were Zewe, Mehler, and possibly Kunder. (House Interior Committee Staff Report, p.6 - 11.) The fact of the valve having been open until 6:20 A.M. was not subsequently reported to the State officials assembled in the Lt. Governor's office at approximately 2:30 P.M. on March 28. Nor is there evidence of this fact having been reported to the NRC on March 28. In sum, Item 3 on page 41 of NUREG-0760 misleads by focussing on the fact that the State was informed that the valve was open for a longer time than was normal rather than focussing on the crucial fact that longer than normal meant 2 hours and 20 minutes.

Item 6 on page 41 of NUREG-0760 stresses Dornsife's ambiguous and retrospective recollection that he had been told the core was being cooled through a feed and bleed process. This recollection occurred during the October 1, 1980 I&E interview. Dornsife's notes, compiled in April 1979, show Dornsife saying that the plant was currently stabilized and cooling on the "A" steam generator. (Something that may or may not be of interest is that I&E cites Dornsife's October 1980 recollection as to cooling mode and ignores his recollection indicated in Dornsife's notes made less than a month after the accident.) Note also Dornsife's statement regarding plant stability made to I&E and reproduced on p. 106 of House Interior Committee Staff Report.

Item 7 of NUREG-0760 is misleading in stating that pertinent data from the "Status Board" was passed on to Dornsife at about 9:00 A.M. In particular, Dornsife was not told the plant was not in any of the conditions specified in Item 4 of the "Status Board" format. And since Item 4 had to do with whether or not the plant was in a stable cooling mode, the fact that Miller was unnecessarily ambiguous on this point is an indication that Miller through intent or inexplicable negligence conveyed the impression that the situation was more under control than was the case.

Item 8 of NUREG-0760 is unnecessarily ambiguous. The preponderance of evidence indicates that temperature data believed by the plant managers to be indicative of the severity of the situation (e.g. House Interior Committee Staff Report, p.23, 30 and pages in between) was not provided to State officials. Why does NUREG-0760 fail to state this fact? If the staff continues to believe that the TMI supervisors did not understand that 700 degree temperatures were indicative of the core being uncovered (a lack of understanding which I believe implausible) then the staff have no business allowing these same supervisors to operate TMI-1.

An interesting omission from NUREG 0760 is omission of discussion of the statement in the Miller-Troffer tape (Troffer was Met Ed person in Reading, Pa.) wherein Miller seems to be indicating to Troffer that he had not been forthcoming in talking to someone (presumably the State) and that "I had to choice but to talk to him," where "him" presumably means Dornsife. (This is an example of omitting statements that indicate Miller had not informed the State of disquieting aspects of the situation.)

In general, the discussion on pages 42 through 45 conveys whatever you want to read into it. I&E says in effect that the State was given a misleading picture of what was going on in the plant. Gerusky of the Pennsylvania BRP is reasonably clear in telling I&E that he felt on March 28 that the Met Ed officials were "...trying to play down the accident situation." (See House Interior Committee Staff Report, p.116. Also p. 110 - 115.) On the other hand, the convoluted explanations in NUREG-0760, p. 42 - 44 serve primarily to confuse the reader. If you want to get an idea whether the State was intentionally misled or not, you should read the House Interior Committee Staff Report.