

DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING

422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28242

81 DEC 7 10:34

WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
STEAM PRODUCTION

December 4, 1981

TELEPHONE: AREA 704
373-4083


Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Re: Catawba Nuclear Station
Unit 1
Docket No. 50-413

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55e, please find attached Significant Deficiency
Report SD 413/81-27.

Very truly yours,



William O. Parker, Jr.

RWO/php
Attachment

cc: Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Resident Inspector-NRC
Catawba Nuclear Station

Mr. Robert Guild, Esq.
Attorney-at-Law
314 Pall Mall
Columbia, South Carolina 29201

Palmetto Alliance
2135½ Devine Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29205



OFFICIAL COPY

8112140045 811204
PDR CHECK 05000413
S PDR

12, 27
11

CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION

REPORT NO.: SD-413/81-27

REPORT DATE: December 4, 1981

FACILITY: Catawba Nuclear Station - Unit 1

IDENTIFICATION OF DEFICIENCY:

Water in electrical area terminal cabinet - 1EATC-3

INITIAL REPORT:

On November 17, 1981 Al Ignatonis (NRC Region II, Atlanta, Georgia) was notified of the deficiency by W. O. Henry, R. T. Amos, and J. H. Lanier, of Duke Power Company, Charlotte, North Carolina.

SUPPLIER AND/OR COMPONENT:

The components subject to water damage were:

4	Cutler-Hammer D26MRD30A1 relays
2	Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70A1 relays
1	Cutler-Hammer D26MR80A relay
1	Cutler-Hammer D26MR40A relay

DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY:

During an unscheduled inspection it was noticed that water from a core-drilling machine on the floor above was dripping into electrical area terminal cabinet 1EATC-3. Normally this water would not have penetrated the cabinet, but in this instance, the left door was open. The components subjected to the water were investigated. This included terminal blocks, fuse blocks, fuses, relays, flaser units, and sockets. The investigation indicated the relays were the only components subject to potential damage.

ANALYSIS OF SAFETY IMPLICATIONS:

If undetected and the relays had failed, they could have caused misoperation of components in a single train of the following systems: Reactor Coolant Pump Monitoring, Auxiliary Feedwater, Containment Air Return and Hydrogen Skimming System, and Liquid Waste System.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

Although there was no apparent damage to the eight Cutler-Hammer relays, they will be replaced as a precautionary measure. It is estimated that this work will be accomplished by April 1, 1982.