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Vice President-Power Production

D. L. ASWELL

November 30, 1981

W3K81-0422 Q-3-A35.07.38

Mr. K. V. Seyfrit, Director, Region IV U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Arlington, Texas 76012

SUBJECT:

Waterford SES Unit No. 3

Docket No. 50-382

Interim Report of Significant Construction Deficiency No. 38 "Startup Test Control; Flooding of Emergency Diesel Generator

Control and Relay Panel"

REFERENCE: Telecon - L. Bass (LP&L) to L. Martin (NRC) on October 28, 1981

Dear Mr. Seyfrit:

In accordance with the requirements of 10CFR 50.55(e), we are hereby providing two copies of the Interim Report of Significant Construction Deficiency No. 38, "Startup Test Control; Flooding of Emergency Diesel Generator Control and Relay Panel."

If you have any questions, please advise.

Very truly yours,

DL aswell

D. L. Aswell

DLA/LLB/rd Attachment

cc: 1) Director Office of Inspection & Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 (with 15 copies of report)

> 2) Director Office of Management Information and Program Control U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 (with 1 copy of report)

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LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY WATERFORD SES UNIT NO. 3

Interim Report of Significant Construction Deficiency No. 38

STARTUP TEST CONTROL; FLOODING OF EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR CONTROL AND RELAY PANEL

Reviewed	by: R. J. Milbiger - Site Manager	11/25 /81 Date
Reviewed	by: J. L. Wills - Project Superintendent	11/25/8) Date
Reviewed	by: Darred Comen for John Hart	Der teleor 11/25/81
Reviewed	by:	11-25-5/ Date
Reviewed	by: W. Yaeger - Sr. Resident Engineer	11-25-81 Date

November 24, 1981

INTERIM REPORT OF SIGNIFICANT CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCY NO. 38 STARTUP TEST CONTROL; FLOODING OF EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR CONTROL AND RELAY PANEL

INTRODUCTION

This report is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.55(e). It describes problems as related to the flooding of the Emergency Diesel Generator Control and Relay Panel. This problem is considered reportable under the requirements of 10CFR 50.55(e). To the best of our knowledge, this problem has not been identified to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission pursuant to 10CFR21.

DESCRIPTION

During a flush of the Turbine Cooling System (#35), drain valve 6TCV601 was inadvertently isolated from its power source causing a loss of level control on the Turbine Cooling Water Surge Tank resulting in an overflow of this tank. Water cascaded to the lower elevations of the Turbine Generator Building, passing through construction cutouts in the Turbine Generator Building/Reactor Auxiliary Building Wall flooding the Emergency Diesel Generator Control and Relay Panel causing the following problems:

- a) standing water on the panel floor,
- b) water running along the inside south wall of the panels wetting instrumentation and conductors,
- c) water dripping from conduit holes wetting conductors and instrumentation on the inside of the west wall,
- d) water running down the outside of the panel wetting gauges and control knobs.

SAFETY IMPLICATIONS

The deficiency as outlined in Engineering Evaluation, if left uncorrected, could degrade the control and relay panel of the Diesel Generator. This could result in unavailability on demand of one onsite emergency power source. Consequently, the "Limiting Conditions for Operation" of the plant would have to be imposed as stipulated in Technical Specification Section 3/4.8.1, in compliance with CDC 17, 10CFR50.36(c)(2) and RC 1.93.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

The high-voltage (left) cubicle components will be sent back to Cooper Energy Services (formerly Cooper-Bessemer). These components will be dried, baked, coated, tested and returned to the site for use. All insulation tape shall be replaced.

The low-volta, middle) cubicle, two walls and two sub-panels, will be returned to Cooper Energy Services and be replaced. The existing units will be dried and cleaned, and components will be replaced as necessary to allow temporary use at the site for testing of the diesel generator.

The General Electric relays will be reordered from Cooper Energy Services. The existing relays will be cleaned and rewired at the site and used temporarily until the new, replaced relays are delivered.

We expect the temporary components to be repaired and returned by January 15, 1982, with permanent components to be replaced within six months.

Corrective action will be accomplished and a Final Report submitted on or before July 15, 1982. This corrective action will close Nonconformance Report W3-3124.