


OYSTER CREEK



NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

JCP&L / GPU

Jersey Central Power & Light
Company is a Member of the
General Public Utilities System

(609) 693-6000 P.O. BOX 388 • FORKED RIVER • NEW JERSEY • 08731

November 30, 1981


Mr. Ronald Haynes, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region I
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

SUBJECT: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Docket No. 50-219
Licensee Event Report
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/81-55/3L

This letter forwards three copies of a Licensee Event Report to report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/81-55/3L in compliance with paragraph 6.9.2.b.2 of the Technical Specifications.

Very truly yours,


J. T. Carroll, Jr.
Acting Director Oyster Creek

JTC:dh
Enclosures

cc: Director (40 copies)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Director (3)
Office of Management Information
and Program Control
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

NRC Resident Inspector (1)
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Forked River, N. J.



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OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

Licensee Event Report
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/81-55/3L

Report Date

November 30, 1981

Occurrence Date

October 31, 1981

Identification of Occurrence

The Acoustic Monitoring System (AMS) for safety and relief valve position indication was found to have two channels that provided no or low response. Acoustic monitors are required by Technical Specification paragraph 3.13.A.1.

This event is considered to be reportable as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.9.2.b.2.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

Plant was in cold shutdown condition when the failure was recognized.

Description of Occurrence

During reactor operation, prior to shutdown, an investigation into noise indication on two other acoustic monitors was performed. The investigation indicated that the acoustic monitors were operable. On Saturday, October 31, 1981, an entry into the drywell to further investigate the AMS performance revealed the following equipment failures: The AMS channel for safety valve NR28C was found to have a broken cable at the accelerometer and a channel for relief valve NR108B was found to have a bad accelerometer. Operability of all AMS channels was required in the Startup and Run Mode of the plant operation per T.S. paragraph 3.13,A.1.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence

The cause of failure for the AMS channel for safety valve NR28C was attributed to the broken cable at the accelerometer. The cause of NR108B Acoustic Monitor failure was due to the accelerometer malfunction. At the time of discovery, the plant was shutdown for reasons other than the suspected malfunction of AMS channels.

Analysis of Occurrence

The AMS provides position indication of the safety and relief valves and is considered to be accident monitoring instrumentation. Valve open position is alarmed in the Control Room by the AMS. A failure of safety or relief valve to close from its open position constitutes a small break LOCA and the AMS alerts the Control Room operator of such an event.

The failure of two AMS channels to provide the respective valve position indication degraded the accident monitoring capability, however, the operator still had backup instrumentation (thermocouples) per T.S. paragraph 3.13,A.1 (Table 3.13.1) that would provide the trend of valve tail pipe temperature. In addition, an inference can be made from the reactor pressure and level instrumentation as to whether or not the valve associated with the failed channel has closed. Therefore, failure of two AMS channels would not have resulted in an undetectable transient. In addition, adjacent acoustic monitors would detect a failed open valve and possibly actuate the alarm. The safety significance, therefore, is considered minimal.

Corrective Action

The broken cable in the AMS channel for safety valve NR28C and the bad accelerometer in the channel for relief valve NR108B were replaced. All channels were tested and found to be satisfactory. Trouble shooting and performance evaluation techniques were improved following this event and will be incorporated into existing or new procedures.

Failure Data

The AMS is supplied by Babcock & Wilcox.

Reference: B & W Technical Manual #BAW-1587, Rev. 1, February 1980