

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: _____ (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 | A L B R F 3 | 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 | 4 1 1 1 1 | 5
7 8 9 | LICENSEE CODE 14 | LICENSE NUMBER 25 | LICENSE TYPE 30 | CAT 58 57

CON'T
0 1 | REPORT SOURCE I | 0 5 0 0 0 2 9 6 | 0 6 1 6 8 1 | 1 1 2 3 8 1 | 9
7 8 | 60 | DOCKET NUMBER 68 | EVENT DATE 74 | REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 | During normal operation, the fire protection preaction sprinkler systems for
0 3 | reactor building elevations 565, 593, and 621 were found isolated.
0 4 | (See T.S. 3.11.A.1.a) There was no danger to the health or safety of the public.
0 5 | There were no previous similar events. There are no redundant systems.
0 6 |
0 7 |
0 8 |

0 9 | SYSTEM CODE | CAUSE CODE | CAUSE SUBCODE | COMPONENT CODE | COMP SUBCODE | VALVE SUBCODE
A B | A | A | V A L V E X | H | D
9 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16
17 | LER/RO REPORT NUMBER | EVENT YEAR | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. | OCCURRENCE CODE | REPORT TYPE | REVISION NO.
8 1 | | 0 2 9 | 0 3 | X | 1
21 22 | 23 | 24 26 | 27 | 28 29 | 30 | 31 | 32
18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26
H | G | Z | Z | 0 0 0 | Y | N | L | M 4 7 5
33 34 | 35 | 36 | 37 | 38 40 | 41 | 42 | 43 | 44 | 45 | 46 | 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 | Lack of familiarity with the isolation valve operating characteristics caused
1 1 | personnel to believe valve was open. The Mueller type AWWA valve was opened and the
1 2 | systems were returned to normal. The operator involved has been instructed in the
1 3 | isolation valve characteristics. The event will also be covered in operator supple-
1 4 | mental training by 12/1/81.

1 5 | FACILITY STATUS | % POWER | OTHER STATUS | METHOD OF DISCOVERY | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION
E | 0 9 8 | NA | C | Inspector observed.
7 8 9 | 10 12 13 | 14 | 15 16 | 17 18 19

1 6 | ACTIVITY CONTENT | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY | LOCATION OF RELEASE
Z | 2 | NA | NA
7 8 9 | 10 11 | 12 13 | 14 15 16

1 7 | PERSONNEL EXPOSURES | NUMBER | TYPE | DESCRIPTION
0 0 0 0 | | | NA
7 8 9 | 10 11 12 | 13

1 8 | PERSONNEL INJURIES | NUMBER | DESCRIPTION
0 0 0 0 | | NA
7 8 9 | 10 11 12 | 13

1 9 | LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY | TYPE | DESCRIPTION
Z | | NA
7 8 9 | 10 11 12 | 13

2 0 | PUBLICITY ISSUED | DESCRIPTION | PDR ADOCK 05000296 | PDR | NA
N | S | | NA
7 8 9 | 10 | 11 12 | 13 14 | 15 16 17 18 19 20

NAME OF PREPARER: Gene Holder PHONE: (205) 729-6134

LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

BFRO-50- 296 / 81029 R1 Technical Specification Involved 3.11.A.1.a
Reported Under Technical Specification 6.7.2.a(2) *Date due NRC: N/A
Date of Occurrence 6/16/81 Time of Occurrence 1730 Unit 3

Identification and Description of Occurrence:

The fire protection preaction sprinkler systems for reactor building elevations 565, 593, and 621 were found isolated. This system had been taken out of service the previous day, and a patrolling fire watch established per T.S. 3.11.A.3. The hold order, under which this maintenance was performed, was lifted. The valve was manually opened, subsequently, the system was checked on the three elevations in the reactor

Conditions Prior to Occurrence:

(See attachment 2)

Unit 1 refueling outage

Unit 2 modification outage

Unit 3 at 98%

Action specified in the Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements met due to inoperable equipment. Describe.

Established patrolling fire watch.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

Lack of familiarity with the isolation valve operating characteristics.

Analysis of Occurrence:

There was no danger to the health or safety of the public, no release of activity, no damage to the plant or equipment, and no resulting significant chain of events.

Corrective Action:

The valves were opened, returning the systems to normal, and the operator involved has been instructed in the isolation valve operating characteristics. The event will also be covered in operator supplemental training by December 1, 1981.

Failure Data:

None

*Retention: Period - Lifetime; Responsibility - Document Control Supervisor

*Revision:

ATTACHMENT 2
LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
BFRO-50-296/81029 R1

Identification and Description of Occurrence (Continued)

building. He then notified the shift engineer that the system was in service and relieved the fire watch. It appears that the valves were not opened (there is no position indication on the valves) and that the observed pressure was the result of the system maintaining pressure due to the isolated condition. The pressure on the isolated portion subsequently bled down over a period of time and was noted to be low by an NRC inspector. At 1100 on the day the system pressure was noted low, the isolation valves were rechecked and found to be not fully opened. The isolation valves were fully opened and system pressure reestablished.