**SNUPPS** 

Standardized Nuclear Unit Power Plant System

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November 16, 1981

SLNRC 81-125

FILE: 0278.10

SUBJ: IE Bulletin 81-02 Supplement #1

Mr. James G Keppler, Director Region III, Office of I&E U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 799 Roosevelt Road Gien Ellyn, Illinois 60137

Mr. Karl Seyfrit, Director Region IV, Office of I&E U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Suite 1000, Parkway Central Plaza 611 Ryan Plaza Arlington, Texas 76012

Docket Nos: STN 50-482 and STN 50-483

Ref: SLNRC 81-59, dated July 22, 1981, IE Bulletin 81-02

Gentlemen:

This letter is submitted in response to the subject IE Bulletin for the SNUPPS Utilities, Kansas Gas and Electric Company and Union Electric Company.

The referenced letter provided the SNUPPS response to IE Bulletin 81-02. Reports on the potential failure to close of Westinghouse-EMD valves also were made by SNUPPS in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e). Supplement 1 to Bulletin 81-02 noted that Westinghouse-EMD valves of sizes other than that reported in the original Bulletin also had the potential for failure to close.

The attached table provides the information requested by the Bulletin for the additional Westinghouse-EMD valves. The corrective action required for these valves and the schedule for the corrective action are the same as that given in the referenced letter.

Approximately 400 manhours have been expended investigating this matter and preparing this report. Manpower expenditures for the corrective action are not been determined.

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> RLS/jdk Attachment cc: See Attached

Very truly yours,

Nicholas A. Petrick

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cc: J. K. Bryan G. L. Koester D. T. McPhee W. Hansen UE KGE KCPL NRC/CAL NRC/WC

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NRC Region III

### WESTINGHOUSE EMD VALVE INFORMATION

### MAXIMUM ΔP(psi) AS FLOW APPROACHES ZERO

VALVE FUNCTION	VALVE LOCATION NUMBER	W EMD MODEL REFERENCE	EQUIP. SPEC.	FINAL FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENT	CONSEQUENCE OF FAILURE TO CLOSE*
VCT Outlet	LCV 112B,C	4GM72FB	200	100	1
RWST to Suction of CCP's	LCV 1 _D,E	8GM72FB	200	200	1
RHR Suction Isolation	8701A,B 8702A,B	12GM88SE	700	700	2
RHR Discharge Cross Connect	8716A,B	10GM74FE	700	300	1,4
RHR HX Discharge to CCP Suction	8804A	8GM74FE	700	300	4
RHR HX Discharge to SI Pump Suction	8804B	8GM74FE	700	300	4

## MAXIMUM &P(psi) AS FLOW APPROACHES ZERO

VALVE FUNCTION	VALVE LOCATION NUMBER	W EMD MODEL REFERENCE	EQUIP. SPEC.	FINAL FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENT	CONSEQUENCE OF FAILURE TO CLOSE*
RWST to SI Pump Suction	8806A,B	8GM72FB	206	200	1
CCP Suction to SI Pump Suction Crossover	8807A,B	6GM72FB	200	200	1
CCP Suction to SI Pump Suction Crossover	8924	6GM72FB	200	200	1
Accumulator Discharge	8808A,B,C,D	10GM78FN	2750	0	5
RHR Pump CL Injection	8809A,B	10GM78FN	2750	200	4
RWST to RHR Pump Suction	8812A,B	14GM74FE	700	100	1

# MAXIMUM ΔP(psi) AS FLOW APPROACHES ZERO

VALVE FUNCTION	VALVE LOCATION NUMBER	W EMD MODEL REFERENCE	EQUIP. SPEC.	FINAL FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENT	CONSEQUENCE OF FAILURE TO CLOSE*
Sump Suction	8811A,B	14GM74FE	700	100	3
SI Pump Discharge Cross Connect	8821A,B	4GM77FN	1500	1500	4
SI Pump Suction Cross Connect	8923A,B	6GM72FB	200	200	1

#### \*NOTES

- Potential incomplete isolation of ECCS injection/recirculation trains.
- 2. Potential overpressurization of RHR system.
- 3. Potential incomplete containment isolation.
- 4. Potential incomplete RCS hot leg/cold leg recirculation train isolation.
- 5. Potential RCS pressurization during cold shutdown operations.