

# Jersey Central Power & Light Company



MADISON AVENUE AT PUNCH BOWL ROAD • MORRISTOWN, N. J. 07960 • 539-6111

October 6, 1972

Mr. A. Giambusso  
Deputy Director for Reactor Projects  
Directorate of Licensing  
United States Atomic Energy Commission  
Washington, D. C. 20545



Dear Mr. Giambusso:

Subject: Oyster Creek Station  
Docket No. 50-219  
Inoperable Standby Liquid Control System

The purpose of this letter is to report to you an accident that occurred at Oyster Creek on September 26, 1972 in which it was discovered that the two pumps in the standby liquid control system were inoperable at the same time.

At 10:45 a.m. on September 25, 1972, the "A" standby liquid control pump was removed from service for replacement of the pump packing. The pump was taken out of service using Technical Specification 3.2.C.3 as the basis. It states, "If one standby liquid control system pumping circuit becomes inoperable during the run mode and specification 3.2.A is met, the reactor may remain in operation for a period not to exceed seven days, provided the pump in the other circuit is demonstrated daily to be operable". Specification 3.2.A is met, therefore, the "A" pump breaker was racked out and the pump secured in accordance with plant safety procedures. The work was not completed by the end of the day shift, and the "A" pump was left in an inoperable condition. At 4:20 a.m. on September 26, 1972, the "B" liquid control system pump was to be run to comply with Technical Specification 3.2.C.3. When the operator depressed the start button, the pump did not start.

An interlock in the starting circuitry prevents two standby liquid control pumps from being run simultaneously. This interlock also prevents the "B" pump from starting when the "A" pump breaker is in the racked out position. The interlock is composed of a normally closed contact in the starting circuit of each pump. This contact is operated from a relay in the opposite pump circuit. If the "A" standby liquid control pump is started either from the control room with the key lock switch or locally from the

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
push button station, a relay is picked up which opens the normally closed contact in the "B" standby liquid control pump starting circuit which prevents this pump from operating with the "A" pump running. The reverse is true if the "B" pump is started. The problem developed when the breaker for the "A" pump was racked out. It disabled the pump and at the same time it physically removed the contact in the starting circuitry for the "B" pump which simulated an open contact. This prevented the "B" pump from starting.

As soon as the Shift Foreman was aware of the inoperability of both pumps, he started a normal shutdown of the plant. In the meantime, he received permission to clear the maintenance safety tags and rack the "A" pump breaker to its normal position. He then ran a successful operability check on the "B" pump. The load reduction was stopped and the plant returned to full load.

In order to prevent a recurrence of this event, operating procedures have been changed so that operability tests of redundant engineered safeguards system components will be made immediately following any action that requires one of the systems to be inoperable for maintenance purposes.

We are enclosing forty copies of this letter.

Very truly yours,

  
Ivan R. Finfrock, Jr.  
Vice President

IRF/pk

Enclosures

cc: Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Director  
Directorate of Regulatory Operations, Region 1