LIMERICK GENERATING STATION

UNITS 1 and 2

Docket Nos. 50-352 50-353

License Nos. NPF-39 NPF-85

PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS CHANGES

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REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

4.1.3.1.4 The scram discharge volume shall be determined OPERABLE by demonstrating:

- a. The scram discharge volume drain and vent valves OPERABLE, when control rods are scram tested from a normal control rod configuration of less than or equal to 50% ROD DENSITY at least once per 18 months, by verifying that the drain and vent valves:
 - Close within 30 seconds after receipt of a signal for control rods to scram, and
 - Open when the scram signal is reset.
- b. Proper level sensor response by performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of the scram discharge volume scram and control rod block level instrumentation at least once per 92 days.

TABLE 4.3.1.1-1

TWEDTON	FUNC	TIONAL UNIT	CHANNEL CHECK	CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST	CHANNEL CALIBRATION(a)	OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED
. INVIT 1	1.	Intermediate Range Monitors: a. Neutron Flux - High	S/U,S(b) S	S/U(c), W W(j)	R R	2 3, 4, 5
		b. Inoperative	N.A.	W(j)	N.A.	2, 3, 4, 5
	2.	Average Power Range Monitor ^(f) : a. Neutron Flux - Upscale, Setdown	S/U,S(b) S	S/U(c). W W(j)	SA SA	2 3, 5 ^(k)
		 b. Neutron Flux - Upscale 1) Flow Blased 	S,D(g)	S/U(c), Q	W(d)(e), SA	1
		2) High Flow Clamped	S	S/U(c), Q	W(d)(e), SA	1
		c. Inoperative	N.A.	Q(j)	Ν.Α.	1, 2, 3, 5 ^(k) .
3/4		d. Downscale	S	Q	SA	1
3-7	3.	Reactor Vessel Steam Dome Pressure - High	S	Q	R	1, 2(h)
	4.	Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3	5	Q	R	1, 2
Amendment	5.	Main Steam Line Isolation Valve - Closure	N.A.	Q	R	1
ent No.	6.	Main Steam Line Radiation - High	S	Q	R	1, 2(h)
. 41,	7.	Drywell Pressure - High	5	Q	R	1, 2
, 53	8.	Scram Discharge Volume Water Level - High a. Level Transmitter b. Float Switch	S N.A.	Q Q	R R	$\begin{array}{c}1, 2, 5(1)\\1, 2, 5(1)\\1\end{array}$

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TABLE 4.3.3.1-1

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

TRIP	FUNCTION	CHANNEL	CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST	CHANNEL CALIBRATION	OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED
1.	CORE SPRAY SYSTEM				
	 a. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low, Level 1 b. Drywell Pressure - High c. Reactor Vessel Pressure - Low d. Manual Initiation 	S S N.A.	Q Q Q R	R R N.A.	1, 2, 3, 4*, 5* 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3, 4*, 5* 1, 2, 3, 4*, 5* 1, 2, 3, 4*, 5*
2.	LOW PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION MOD	E OF RHR S	YSTEM		
	 a. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low, Level 1 b. Drywell Pressure - High c. Reactor Vessel Pressure - Low d. Injection Valve Differential Pressure - Low (Permissive) 	S S N.A.	Q Q Q R	R R R N.A.	1. 2. 3. 4*, 5* 1. 2. 3 1. 2. 3 1. 2. 3 1. 2. 3. 4*, 5* 1. 2. 3. 4*, 5*
	e. Manual Initiation HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SY				
3.	a. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2	S S	Q	R R	1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3
	c. Condensate Storage Tank Leve	3	Q	R	1, 2, 3
	d. Suppression Pool Water Level	5	Q	R	1, 2, 3
	e. Reactor Vessel Water Level - High, Level 8 f. Manual Initiation	S Ν.Λ.	Q R	R N.A.	1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3

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Amendment No. 53

INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.4 RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION ATWS RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.4.1 The anticipated transient without scram recirculation pump trip (ATWS-RPT) system instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3.4.1-1 shall be OPERABLE with their trip setpoints set consistent with values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.3.4.1-2.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1.

ACTION:

- a. With an ATWS recirculation pump trip system instrumentation channel trip setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Values column of Table 3.3.4.1-2, declare the channel inoperable until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status with the channel trip setpoint adjusted consistent with the Trip Setpoint value.
- b. With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip System requirement for one or both trip systems, place the inoperable channel(s) in the tripped condition within 24 hours.
- c. With the number of OPERABLE channels two or more less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip System requirement for one trip system and:
 - If the inoperable channels consist of one reactor vessel water level channel and one reactor vessel pressure channel, place both inoperable channels in the tripped condition within 24 hours, or, if this action will initiate a pump trip, declare the trip system inoperable.
 - If the inoperable channels include two reactor vessel water level channels or two reactor vessel pressure channels, declare the trip system inoperable.
- d. With one trip system inoperable, restore the inoperable trip system to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least STARTUP within the next 6 hours.
- e. With both trip systems inoperable, restore at least one trip system to OPERABLE status within 1 hour or be in at least STARTUP within the next 6 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.3.4.1.1.Each ATWS recirculation pump trip system instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST and CHANNEL CALIBRATION operations at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3.4.1-1.

4.3.4.1.2 LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TESTS and simulated automatic operation of all channels shall be performed at least once per 18 months.

TABLE 3.3.4.1-1

ATWS RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

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	MINIMUM OPERABLE CHANNELS PER
TRIP FUNCTION	TRIP SYSTEM *

- Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low Low, Level 2
- 2. Reactor Vessel Pressure High

^{*} One channel may be placed in an inoperable status for up to 6 hours for required surveillance provided the other channel is OPERABLE.

TABLE 4.3.4.1-1

ATWS RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

TRIP	FUNCTION	CHANNEL CHECK	CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST	CHANNEL CALIBRATION
1.	Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2	S	Q	R
2.	Reactor Vessel Pressure - High	S	Q	R

END-OF-CYCLE RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.4.2 The end-of-cycle recirculation pump trip (EOC-RPT) system instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3.4.2-1 shall be OPERABLE with their trip setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.3.4.2-2 and with the END-OF-CYCLE RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME as shown in Table 3.3.4.2-3.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, when THERMAL POWER is greater than or equal to 30% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

ACTION;

- a. With an end-of-cycle recirculation pump trip system instrumentation channel trip setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Values column of Table 3.3.4.2-2, declare the channel inoperable until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status with the channel setpoint adjusted consistent with the Trip Setpoint value.
- b. With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip System requirement for one or both trip systems, place the inoperable channel(s) in the tripped condition within 12 hours.
- c. With the number of OPERABLE channels two or more less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip System requirement for one trip system and:
 - If the inoperable channels consist of one turbine control valve channel and one turbine stop valve channel, place both inoperable channels in the tripped condition within 12 hours.
 - If the inoperable channels include two turbine control valve channels or two turbine stop valve channels, declare the trip system inoperable.
- d. With one trip system inoperable, restore the inoperable trip system to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or take the ACTION required by Specification 3.2.3.
- e. With both trip systems inoperable, restore at least one trip system to OPERABLE status within one hour or take the ACTION required by Specification 3.2.3.

TABLE 3.3.4.2-1

END-OF-CYCLE RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

TRIP	FUNCTION	MINIMUM OPERABLE CHANNELS <u>PER TRIP SYSTEM*</u>
1.	Turbine Stop Valve - Closure	2**
2.	Turbine Control Valve-Fast Closure	2**

^{*} A trip system may be placed in an inoperable status for up to 6 hours for required surveillance provided that the other trip system is OPERABLE.

^{**} This function shall be automatically bypassed when turbine first stage pressure is equivalent to THERMAL POWER LESS than 30% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

TABLE 4.3.4.2.1-1

END-OF-CYCLE RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP SYSTEM SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

TRIF	FUNCTION	CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST	CHANNEL CALIBRATION	
1.	Turbine Stop Valve-Closure	Q*	R	
2.	Turbine Control Valve-Fast Closure	Q*	R	

* Including trip system logic testing.

3/4.3.6 CONTROL ROD BLOCK INSTRUMENTATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.6. The control rod block instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3.6-1 shall be OPERABLE with their trip setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.3.6-2.

APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3.6-1.

ACTION;

- a. With a control rod block instrumentation channel trip setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Values column of Table 3.3.6-2, declare the channel inoperable until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status with its trip setpoint adjusted consistent with the Trip Setpoint value.
- b. With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requirement, take the ACTION required by Table 3.3.6-1.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.6 Each of the above required control rod block trip systems and instrumentation channels shall be demonstrated OPERABLE* by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST, and CHANNEL CALIBRATION operations for the OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3.6-1.

*A channel may be placed in an inoperable status for up to 6 hours for required surveillance without placing the trip system in the tripped condition, provided at least one other operable channel in the same trip system is monitoring that parameter.

TABLE 3.3.6-1 (Continued)

CONTROL ROD WITHDRAWAL BLOCK INSTRUMENTATION

ACTION STATEMENTS

- ACTION 60 Declare the RBM inoperable and take the ACTION required by Specification 3.1.4.3.
- ACTION 61 With the number of OPERABLE Channels:
 - a. One less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 12 hours or place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition.
 - b. Two or more less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requirement, place at least one inoperable channel in the tripped condition within one hour.
- ACTION 62 With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requirement, place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition within 12 hours.
- ACTION 63 With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requirement, initiate a rod block.

NOTES

- With THERMAL POWER ≥ 30% of RATED THERMAL POWER.
- ** With more than one control rod withdrawn. Not applicable to control rods removed per specification 3.9.10.1 or 3.9.10.2.
- *** These channels are not required when sixteen or fewer fuel assemblies, adjacent to the SRMs, are in the core.
- (a) The RBM shall be automatically bypassed when a peripheral control rod is selected or the reference APRM channel indicates less than 30% of RATED THERMAL POWER.
- (b) This function shall be automatically bypassed if detector count rate is > 100 cps or the IRM channels are on range 3 or higher.
- (c) This function is automatically bypassed when the associated IRM channels are on range 8 or higher.
- (d) This function is automatically bypassed when the IRM channels are on range 3 or higher.
- (e) This function is automatically bypassed when the IRM channels are on range 1.
- (f) Required to be OPERABLE only prior to and during shutdown margin demonstrations as performed per Specification 3.10.3.

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TABLE 4.3.7.1-1

RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

INSTRUMENTATION	CHANNEL CHECK	CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST	CHANNEL CALIBRATION	OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE IS REQUIRED
 Main Control Room Normal Fresh Air Supply Radiation Monitor 	S	Q	R	1, 2, 3, 5 and *
2. Area Monitors				
a. Criticality Monitors				
1) Spent Fuel Storage	S	м	R	(a)
b. Control Room Direct Radiation Monitor	S	Μ	R	At All Times
3. Reactor Enclosure Cooling Water Radiation Monitor	S	М	R(b)	At All Times

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3/4 3-6

CHLORINE DETECTION SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.7.8.1 Two independent chlorine detection system subsystems shall be OPERABLE with their alarm and trip setpoints adjusted to actuate at a chlorine concentration of less than or equal to 0.5 ppm

APPLICABILITY: All OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS.

ACTION:

- a. With one chlorine detection subsystem inoperable, restore the inoperable detection system to OPERABLE status within 7 days or, within the next 6 hours, initiate and maintain operation of at least one control room emergency filtration system subsystem in the chlorine isolation mode of operation.
- b. With both chlorine detection subsystems inoperable, within 1 hour initiate and maintain operation of at least one control room emergency filtration system subsystem in the chlorine isolation mode of operation.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.3.7.8.1 Each of the above required chlorine detection system subsystems shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of a:

- a. CHANNEL CHECK at least once per 12 hours,
- b. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST at least once per 92 days, and
- c. CHANNEL CALIBRATION at least once per 18 months.

3/4.3.9 FEEDWATER/MAIN TURBINE TRIP SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.9 The feedwater/main turbine trip system actuation instrumentation channels shown in the Table 3.3.9-1 shall be OPERABLE with their trip setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.3.9-2.

APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3.9-1.

ACTION:

- a. With a feedwater/main turbine trip system actuation instrumentation channel trip setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Values column of Table 3.3.9-2, declare the channel inoperable and either place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status with its trip setpoint adjusted consistent with the Trip Setpoint value, or declare the associated system inoperable.
- b. With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least STARTUP within the next 6 hours.
- c. With the number of OPERABLE channels two less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels requirement, restore at least one of the inoperable channels to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least STARTUP within the next 6 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.3.9.1 Each feedwater/main turbine trip system actuation instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE* by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST, and CHANNEL CALIBRATION operations for the OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3.9.1-1.

4.3.9.2 LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TESTS and simulated automatic operation of all channels shall be performed at least once per 18 months.

*A channel may be placed in an inoperable status for up to 6 hours for required surveillance without placing the trip system in the tripped condition.

TABLE 3.3.9.1-1

FEEDWATER/MAIN TURBINE TRIP SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

IRIP	FUNCTION	CHANNEL CHECK	CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST	CHANNEL CALIBRATION	CONDITIONS FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED	
1.	Reactor Vessel Water Level-High, Level 8	D	Q	R	1	

OPERATIONAL

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 3/4.4.2 SAFETY/RELIEF VALVES -LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.2 The safety valve function of at least 11 of the following reactor coolant system safety/relief valves shall be OPERABLE with the specified code safety valve function lift settings:*#

4 safety/relief valves @ 1130 psig ± 1%
5 safety/relief valves @ 1140 psig ± 1%
5 safety/relief valves @ 1150 psig ± 1%

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

а.

- With the safety valve function of one or more of the above required safety/relief valves inoperable, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours.
- b. With one or more safety/relief valves stuck open, provided that suppression pool average water temperature is less than 105°F, close the stuck open safety/relief valve(s); if unable to close the stuck open valve(s) within 2 minutes or if suppression pool average water temperature is 110°F of greater, place the reactor mode switch in the Shutdown position.
- c. With one or more safety/relief valve acoustic monitors inoperable, restore the inoperable acoustic monitors to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.2.1 The acoustic monitor for each safety/relief valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE with the setpoint verified to be 0.20 of the full open noise level## by performance of a:

a. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST at least once per 92 days, and a
 b. CHANNEL CALIBRATION at least once per 18 months**.

4.4.2.2 At least 1/2 of the safety relief valves shall be removed, set pressure tested and reinstalled or replaced with spares that have been previously set pressure tested and stored in accordance with manufacturer's recommendations at least once per 24 months, and they shall be rotated such that all 14 safety relief valves are removed, set pressure tested and reinstalled or replaced with spares that have been previously set pressure tested and stored in accordance with manufacturer's recommendations at least once per 54 months.

- *The lift setting pressure shall correspond to ambient conditions of the valves at nominal operating temperatures and pressures.
- **The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable provided the Surveillance is performed within 12 hours after reactor steam pressure is adequate to perform the test.
- #Up to 2 inoperable valves may be replaced with spare OPERABLE valves with lower setpoints until the next refueling.
- ##Initial setting shall be in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendation. Adjustment to the valve full open noise level shall be accomplished during the startup test program.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

- c. By verifying at least 8 suppression pool water temperature indicators in at least 8 locations, OPERABLE by performance of a:
 - 1. CHANNEL CHECK at least once per 24 hours.
 - 2. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST at least once per 31 days, and
 - 3. CHANNEL CALIBRATION at least once per 18 months,

with the temperature alarm setpoint for:

- 1. High water temperature:
 - a) First setpoint ≤ 95°F
 - b) Second setpoint ≤ 105 °F
 - c) Third setpoint ≤ 110 °F
 - d) Fourth setpoint ≤ 120°F
- d. By verifying at least two suppression chamber water level indicators OPERABLE by performance of a:
 - CHANNEL CHECK at least one per 24 hours,
 - CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST at least once per 92 days, and
 - CHANNEL CALIBRATION at least once per 18 months,

with the water level alarm setpoint for high water level $\leq 24'1-1/2"$

e. At least once per 18 months by conducting a drywell-to-suppression chamber bypass leak test at an initial differential pressure of 4 psi and verifying that the A/√k calculated from the measured leakage is within the specified limit. If any drywell-to-suppression chamber bypass leak test fails to meet the specified limit, the test schedule for subsequent tests shall be reviewed and approved by the Commission. If two consecutive tests fail to meet the specified limit, a test shall be performed at least every 9 months until two consecutive tests meet the specified limit, at which time the 18 month test schedule may be resumed.

INSTRUMENTATION BASES

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION (Continued)

Specified surveillance intervals and maintenance outage times have been determined in accordance with NEDC-30936P, Parts 1 and 2, "Technical Specification Improvedment Methodology (with Demonstration for BWR ECCS Actuation Instrumentation)," as approved by the NRC and documented in the SER (letter to D. N. Grace from A. C. Thadani dated December 9 1988 (Part 1) and letter to D. N. Grace from C. E. Rossi dated December 9, 1988 (Part 2)).

Operation with a trip set less conservative than its Trip Setpoint but within its specified Allowable Value is acceptable on the basis that the difference between each Trip Setpoint and the Allowable value is an allowance for instrumentation drift specifically allocated for each trip in the safety analyses.

3/4.3.4 RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION

The anticipated transient without scram (ATWS) recirculation pump trip system provides a means of limiting the consequences of the unlikely occurrence of a failure to scram during an anticipated transient. The response of the plant to this postulated event falls within the envelope of study events in General Electric Company Topical Report NEDO-10349, dated March 1971, NEDO-24222, dated December 1979, and Section 15.8 of the FSAR.

The end-of-cycle recirculation pump trip (EOC-RPT) system is a supplement to the reactor trip. During turbine trip and generator load rejection events, the EOC-RPT will reduce the likelihood of reactor vessel level decreasing to level 2. Each EOC-RPT system trips both recirculation pumps. reducing coolant flow in order to reduce the void collapse in the core during two of the most limiting pressurization events. The two events for which the EOC-RPT protective feature will function as closure of the turbine stop valves and fast closure of the turbine control valves.

A fast closure sensor from each of two turbine control valves provides input to the EOC-RPT system; a fast closure sensor from each of the other two turbine control valves provides input to the second EOC-RPT system. Similarly, a position switch for each of two turbine stop valves provides input to one EOC-RPT system; a position switch form each of the other two stop valves provides input to the other EOC-RPT system. For each EOC-RPT system, the sensor relay contacts are arranged to form a 2-out-of-2 logic for the fast closure of turbine control valves and a 2-out-of-2 logic for the turbine stop valves. The operation of either logic will actuate the EOC-RPT system and trip both recirculation pumps.

Each EOC-RPT system may be manually bypassed by use of a keyswitch which is administratively controlled. The manual bypasses and the automatic Operating Bypass at less than 30% of RATED THERMAL POWER are annunciated in the control room.

The EOC-RPT system response time is the time assumed in the analysis between initiation of valve motion and complete suppression of the electric arc, i.e., 175 ms. Included in this time are: the response time of the sensor, the time allotted for breaker arc suppression, and the response time of the system logic.

INSTRUMENTATION BASES RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION (Continued)

Specified surveillance intervals and maintenance outage times have been determined in accordance with GENE-770-06-1, "Bases for Changes to Surveillance Test Intervals and Allowed Out-of-Service Times for Selected Instrumentation Technical Specifications," as approved by the NRC and documented in the SER (letter to R.D. Binz, IV, from C.E. Rossi dated July 21, 1992).

Operation with a trip set less conservative than its Trip Setpoint but within its specified Allowable value is acceptable on the basis that the difference between each Trip Setpoint and the Allowable Value is an allowance for instrument drift specifically allocated for each trip in the safety analyses.

3/4.3.5 REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION

The reactor core isolation cooling system actuation instrumentation is provided to initiate actions to assure adequate core cooling in the event of reactor isolation from its primary heat sink and the loss of feedwater flow to the reactor vessel. This instrumentation does not provide actuation of any of the emergency core cooling equipment.

Specified surveillance intervals and maintenance outage times have been specified in accordance with recommendations made by GE in their letter to the BWR Owner's Group dated August 7, 1989, SUBJECT: "Clarification of Technical Specification changes given i ECCS Actuation Instrumentation Analysis."

Operation with a trip set less conservative than its Trip Setpoint but within its specified Allowable value is acceptable on the basis that the difference between each Trip Setpoint and the Allowable Value is an allowance for instrument drift specifically allocated for each trip in the safety analyses.

3/4.3.6 CONTROL ROD BLOCK INSTRUMENTATION

The control rod block functions are provided consistent with the requirements of the specifications in Section 3/4.1.4, Control Rod Program Controls and Section 3/4.2 Power Distribution Limits and Section 3/4.3 Instrumentation. The trip logic is arranged so that a trip in any one of the inputs will result in a control rod block.

Specified surveillance intervals and maintenance outage time have been determined in accordance with NEDC-30851P, Supplement 1, "Technical Specification Improvement Analysis for BWR Control Rod Block Instrumentation," as approved by the NRC and documented in the SER (letter to D. N. Grace from C. E. Rossi dated September 22, 1988).

Operation with a trip set less conservative than its Trip Setpoint but within its specified Allowable Value is acceptable on the basis that the difference between each Trip Setpoint and the Allowable Value is an allowance for instrument drift specifically allocated for each trip in the safety analyses.

INSTRUMENTATION	
BASES	
3/3.3.7 MONITORIN	G INSTRUMENTATION
3/4.3.7.1 RADIATI	ON MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the radiation monitoring instrumentation ensures that: (1) the radiation levels are continually measured in the areas served by the individual channels, and (2) the alarm or automatic action is initiated when the radiation level trip setpoint is exceeded; and (3) sufficient information is available on selected plant parameters to monitor and asses these variable following an accident. This capability is consistent with 10CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria 19, 41, 60, 61, 63, and 64.

The specified surveillance interval for the Main Control Room Normal Fresh Air Supply Radiation Monitor has been determined in accordance with GENE-770-06-1, "Bases for Changes to Surveillance Test Intervals and Allowed Out-of-Service Times for Selected Instrumentation Technical Specifications," as approved by the NRC and documented in the SER (letter to R.D. Binz, IV, from C.E. Rossi dated July 21, 1992).

3/4.3.7.2 SEISMIC MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the seismic monitoring instrumentation ensures that sufficient capability is available to promptly determine the magnitude of a seismic event and evaluate the response of those features important to safety. This capability is required to permit comparison of the measured response to that used in the design basis for the unit.

3/4.3.7.3 (Deleted) - INFORMATION FROM THIS SECTION RELOCATED TO THE ODCM.

3/4.3.7.4 REMOTE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS

The OPERABILITY of the remote shutdown system instrumentation and controls ensures that sufficient capability is available to permit shutdown and maintenance of HOT SHUTDOWN of the unit from locations outside of the control room. This capability is required in the event control room habitability is lost and is consistent with General Design Criterion 19 of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A. The Unit 1 RHR transfer switches are included only due to their potential impact on the RHRSW system, which is common to both units.

3.4.3.7.5 ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the accident monitoring instrumentation ensures that sufficient information is available on selected plant parameters to monitor and asses important variables following an accident. this capability is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.97, "Instrumentation for Light Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant Conditions During and Following an Accident," December 1975 and NUREG-0737, "Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements, "November 1980.

3/4.3.7.6 SOURCE RANGE MONITORS

The source range monitors provide the operator with information of the status of the neutron level in the core at very low power levels during startup and shutdown. At these power levels, reactivity additions shall not be made without this flux level information available to the operator. When the intermediate range monitors are on scale, adequate information is available without the SRMs and they can be retracted.

INSTRUMENTATION BASES

3/4.3.7.7 TRAVERSING IN-CORE PROBE SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the traversing in-core probe system with the specified minimum complement of equipment ensures that the measurements obtained from use of this equipment accurately represent the spatial neutron flux distribution of the reactor core.

The TIP system OPERABILITY is demonstrated by normalizing all probes (i.e., detectors) prior to performing an LPRM calibration function. Monitoring core thermal limits may involve utilizing individual detectors to monitor selected areas of the reactor core, thus all detectors may not be required to be OPERABLE. The OPERABILITY of individual detectors to be used for monitoring is demonstrated by comparing the detector(s) output in the resultant heat balance calculation (P-1) with data obtained during a previous heat balance calculation (P-1).

3/4.3.7.8 CHLORINE AND TOXIC GAS DETECTION SYSTEMS

The OPERABILITY of the chlorine and toxic gas detection systems ensures that an accidental chlorine and/or toxic gas release will be detected promptly and the necessary protective actions will be automatically initiated for chlorine and manually initiated for toxic gas to provide protection for control room personnel. Upon detection of a high concentration of chlorine, the control room emergency ventilating system will automatically be placed in the chlorine isolation mode of operation to provide the required protection. Upon detection of a high concentration of toxic gas, the control room emergency ventilation system will manually be placed in the chlorine isolation mode of operation to provide the required protection. The detection systems required by this specification are consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.95 "Protection of Nuclear Power Plant Control Room Operators against an Accidental Chlorine Release," February 1975.

Specified surveillance intervals and maintenance outage times have been determined in accordance with GENE-770-06-1, "Bases for Changes to Surveillance Test Intervals and Allowed Out-of-Service Times for Selected Instrumentation Technical Specifications," as approved by the NRC and documented in the SER (letter to R.D. Binz, IV, from C.E. Rossi dated July 21, 1992).

3/4.3.7.9 FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION

OPERABILITY of the detection instrumentation ensures that both adequate warning capability is available for prompt detection of fires and that fire suppression systems, that are actuated by fire detectors, will discharge extinquishing agent in a timely manner. Prompt detection and suppression of fires will reduce the potential for damage to safety-related equipment and is an integral element in the overall facility fire protection program.

Fire detectors that are used to actuate fire suppression systems represent a more critically important component of a plant's fire protection program than detectors that are installed solely for early fire warning and notification. Consequently, the minimum number of OPERABLE fire detectors must be greater.

INSTRUMENTATION BASES

FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION (Continued)

The loss of detection capability for fire suppression systems, actuated by fire detectors, represents a significant degradation of fire protection for any area. As a result, the establishment of a fire watch patrol must be initiated at an earlier stage than would be warranted for the loss of detectors that provide only early fire warning. The establishment of frequent fire patrols in the affected areas is required to provide detection capability until the inoperable instrumentation is restored to OPERABILITY.

3/4.3.7.10 LOOSE PART DETECTION SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the loose-part detection system ensures that sufficient capability is available to detect loose metallic parts in the primary system and avoid or mitigate damage to primary system components. The allowable out-of-service times and surveillance requirements are consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.133, "Loose-Part Detection Program for the Primary System of Light-Water-Cooled Reactors," May 1981.

3/4.3.7.11 (Deleted) - INFORMATION FROM THIS SECTION RELOCATED TO THE ODCM.

3/4.3.7.12 OFFGAS MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

This instrumentation includes provisions for monitoring the concentrations of potentially explosive gas mixtures and noble gases in the off-gas system.

3/4.3.8. TURBINE OVERSPEED PROTECTION SYSTEM

This specification is provided to ensure that the turbine overspeed protection system instrumentation and the turbine speed control valves are OPERABLE and will protect the turbine from excessive overspeed. Protection from turbine excessive overspeed is required since excessive overspeed of the turbine could generate potentially damaging missiles which could impact and damage safety related components, equipment or structures.

3/4.3.9 FEEDWATER/MAIN TURBINE TRIP SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION

The feedwater/main turbine trip system actuation instrumentation is provided to initiate action of the feedwater system/main turbine trip system in the event of failure of feedwater controller under maximum demand.

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

4.1.3.1.4 The scram discharge volume shall be determined OPERABLE by demonstrating:

- a. The scram discharge volume drain and vent valves OPERABLE, when control rods are scram tested from a normal control rod configuration of less than or equal to 50% ROD DENSITY at least once per 18 months, by verifying that the drain and vent valves:
 - Close within 30 seconds after receipt of a signal for control rods to scram, and
 - 2. Open when the scram signal is reset.
- b. Proper level sensor response by performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of the scram discharge volume scram and control rod block level instrumentation at least once per 92 days.

TABLE 4.3.1.1-1

REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

FUNC	TIONAL UNIT	CHANNEL CHECK	CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST	CHANNEL CALIBRATION(a)	OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED
1.	Intermediate Range Monitors: a. Neutron Flux - High	S/U,S(b) S	S/U(c), W W(j)	R R	2 3, 4, 5
	b. Inoperative	N.A.	W(j)	N.A.	2, 3, 4, 5
2.	Average Power Range Monitor(f): a. Neutron Flux - Upscale, Setdown	S/U,S(b) S	S/U(c), W W(j)	SA SA	2 3, 5 ^(k)
	 b. Neutron Flux - Upscale 1) Flow Blased 	S,D(g)	S/U(c), Q	W(d)(e), SA	1
	2) High Flow Clamped	2	S/U(c), Q	W(d)(e), SA	1
	c. Inoperative	N.A.	Q(j)	N.A.	1, 2, 3, 5 ^(k)
	d. Downscale	S	Q .	SA	1
3.	Reactor Vessel Steam Dome Pressure - High	S	Q	R	1, 2(h)
4.	Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3	S	Q	R	1, 2
5.	Main Steam Line Isolation Valve - Closure	N.A.	Q	R	1
6.	Main Steam Line Radiation - High	5	Q	R	1, 2(h)
7.	Drywell Pressure - High	S	Q	R	1,2 .
8.	Scram Discharge Volume Water Level - High a. Level Transmitter b. Float Switch	S N.A.	Q Q	R R	$\begin{array}{c}1, & 2, & 5\binom{1}{1}\\1, & 2, & 5\binom{1}{1}\end{array}$

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TABLE 4,3.3.1-1

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

TRIP	FUNCTION	CHANNEL CHECK	CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST	CHANNEL	OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED
1.	CORE SPRAY SYSTEM				이 그는 영화 관람
	 a. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low, Level 1 b. Drywell Pressure - High c. Reactor Vessel Pressure - Low d. Manual Initiation 	N.A.	Q Q Q R	R R N.A.	1, 2, 3, 4*, 5* 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3, 4*, 5* 1, 2, 3, 4*, 5* 1, 2, 3, 4*, 5*
2.	LOW PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION MOD	DE OF RHR S	YSTEM		
	 a. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low, Level 1 b. Drywell Pressure - High c. Reactor Vessel Pressure - Low d. Injection Valve Differential 	5 8 8 8	Q Q Q	R R R	1, 2, 3, 4*, 5* 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3
	Pressure - Low (Permissive) e. Manual Initiation	5 N.A.	Q R	N.A.	1, 2, 3, 4*, 5*
3.	HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION S	YSTEM***			
	 a. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 b. Drywell Pressure - High 	S	Q Q	R	1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3
	c. Condensate Storage Tank Leve	1 - s	Q	R	1, 2, 3
	d. Suppression Pool Water Level	3	Q	R	1, 2, 3
	e. Reactor Vessel Water Level - High, Level 8 f. Manual Initiation	S N.A.	Q R	R N.A.	1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3

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Amendment No. 17 DEC 17 1531 INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.4 RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION ATWS RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.4.1 The anticipated transient without scram recirculation pump trip (ATWS-RPT) system instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3.4.1-1 shall be OPERABLE with their trip setpoints set consistent with values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.3.4.1-2.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1.

ACTION:

- a. With an ATWS recirculation pump trip system instrumentation channel trip setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Values column of Table 3.3.4.1-2, declare the channel inoperable until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status with the channel trip setpoint adjusted consistent with the Trip Setpoint value.
- b. With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip System requirement for one or both trip systems, place the inoperable channel(s) in the tripped condition within 24 hours.
- c. With the number of OPERABLE channels two or more less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip System requirement for one trip system and:
 - If the inoperable channels consist of one reactor vessel water level channel and one reactor vessel pressure channel, place both inoperable channels in the tripped condition within 24 hours, or, if this action will initiate a pump trip, declare the trip system inoperable.
 - If the inoperable channels include two reactor vessel water level channels or two reactor vessel pressure channels, declare the trip system inoperable.
- d. With one trip system inoperable, restore the inoperable trip system to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least STARTUP within the next 6 hours.
- e. With both trip systems inoperable, restore at least one trip system to OPERABLE status within 1 hour or be in at least STARTUP within the next 6 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.3.4.1.1.Each ATWS recirculation pump trip system instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST and CHANNEL CALIBRATION operations at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3.4.1-1.

4.3.4.1.2 LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TESTS and simulated automatic operation of all channels shall be performed at least once per 18 months.

TABLE 3.3.4.1-1

ATWS RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

TRIP FUNCTION		MINIMUM OPERABLE CHANNELS PER TRIP SYSTEM *		
1.	Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2	2		
2.	Reactor Vessel Pressure - High	2		

^{*} One channel may be placed in an inoperable status for up to 6 hours for required surveillance provided the other channel is OPERABLE.

TABLE 4.3.4.1-1

ATWS RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

TR	IP FUNCTION		CHANNEL CHECK	CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST	CHANNEL CALIBRATION
1.	Reactor Vessel Water Low Low, Level		S	Q	R
2.	Reactor Vessel Presso High	ure -	S	Q	R

END-OF-CYCLE RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.4.2 The end-of-cycle recirculation pump trip (EOC-RPT) system instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3.4.2-1 shall be OPERABLE with their trip stooints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of Tation 3.3.4.2-2 and with the END-OF-CYCLE RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME as shown in Table 3.3.4.2-3.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, when THERMAL POWER is greater than or equal to 30% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

ACTION:

- a. With an end-of-cycle recirculation pump trip system instrumentation channel trip setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Values column of Table 3.3.4.2-2, declare the channel inoperable until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status with the channel setpoint adjusted consistent with the Trip Setpoint value.
- b. With the number of OPERABLE channels one less the quired by the

Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip System requirement for one or both trip systems, place the inoperable channel(s) in the tripped condition within 12 hours.

- c. With the number of OPERABLE channels two or more less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip System requirement for one trip system and:
 - If the inoperable channels consist of one turbine control valve channel and one turbine stop valve channel, place both inoperable channels in the tripped condition within 12 hours.
 - If the inoperable channels include two turbine control valve channels or two turbine stop valve channels, declare the trip system inoperable.
- d. With one trip system inoperable, restore the inoperable trip system to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or take the ACTION required by Specification 3.2.3.
- e. With both trip systems inoperable, restore at least one trip system to OPERABLE status within one hour or take the ACTION required by Specification 3.2.3.

TABLE 3.3.4.2-1

END-OF-CYCLE REC RCULATION PUMP TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

TRIP FUNCTION	MINIMUM OPERABLE CHANNELS <u>PER TRIP SYSTEM*</u>
1. Turbine Stop Valve - Closure	2**
2. Turbine Control Valve-Fast Closure	2**

* A trip system may be placed in an inoperable status for up to 6 hours for required surveillance provided that the other trip system is OPERABLE.

** This function shall be automatically bypassed when turbine first stage pressure is equivalent to THERMAL POWER LESS than 30% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

TABLE 4.3.4.2.1-1

END-OF-CYCLE RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP SYSTEM SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

TRIP	FUNCTION	CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL CHAN TEST CALIBRA		
1.	Turbine Stop Valve-Closure	Q*	R	
2.	Turbine Control Valve-Fast Closure	Q*	R	

* Including trip system logic testing.

3/4.3.6 CONTROL ROD BLOCK INSTRUMENTATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.6. The control rod block instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3.6-1 shall be OPERABLE with their trip setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.3.6-2.

APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3.6-1.

ACTION:

- a. With a control rod block instrumentation channel trip setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Values column of Table 3.3.6-2, declare the channel inoperable until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status with its trip setpoint adjusted consistent with the Trip Setpoint value.
- b. With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per trip Function requirement, take the ACTION required by Table 3.3.6-1.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.6 Each of the above required control rod block trip systems and instrumentation channels shall be demonstrated OPERABLE* by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST, and CHANNEL CALIBRATION operations for the OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3.6-1.

*A channel may be placed in an inoperable status for up to 6 hours for required surveillance without placing the trip system in te tripped condition, provided at least one other operable channel in the same trip system is monitoring that parameter.

TABLE 3.3.6-1 (Continued)

CONTROL ROD WITHDRAWAL BLOCK INSTRUMENTATION

ACTION STATEMENTS

- ACTION 60 Declare the RBM inoperable and take the ACTION required by Specification 3.1.4.3.
- ACTION 61 With the number of OPERABLE Channels:
 - a. One less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 12 hours or place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition.
 - b. Two or more less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requirement, place at least one inoperable channel in the tripped condition within one hour.
- ACTION 62 With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requirement, place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition within 12 hours.
- ACTION 63 With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requirement, initiate a rod block.

NOTES

- * With THERMAL POWER ≥ 30% of RATED THERMAL POWER.
- ** With more than one control rod withdrawn. Not applicable to control rods removed per specification 3.9.10.1 or 3.9.10.2.
- *** These channels are not required when sixteen or fewer fuel assemblies, adjacent to the SRMs, are in the core.
- (a) The RBM shall be automatically bypassed when a peripheral control rod is selected or the reference APRM channel indicates less than 30% of RATED THERMAL POWER.
- (b) This function shall be automatically bypassed if detector count rate is > 100 cps or the IRM channels are on range 3 or higher.
- (c) This function is automatically bypassed when the associated IRM channels are on range 8 or higher.
- (d) This function is automatically bypassed when the IRM channels are on range 3 or higher.
- (e) This function is automatically bypassed when the IRM channels are on range 1.
- (f) Required to be OPERABLE only prior to and during shutdown margin demonstrations as performed per Specification 3.10.3.

TABLE 4.3.7.1-1

RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

INSTRUMENTATION	CHANNEL CHECK	CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST	CHANNEL CALIBRATION	OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE IS REQUIRED
 Main Control Room Normal Fresh Air Supply Radiation Monitor 	S	Q	R	1, 2, 3, 5 and *
2. Area Monitors				
a. Criticality Monitors				
1) Spent Fuel Storage Pool	S	М	R	(a)
b. Control Room Direct Radiation Monitor	S	М	R	At All Times
 Reactor Enclosure Cooling Water Radiation Monitor 	S	м	R(b)	At All Times

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CHLORINE DETECTION SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.7.8.1 Two independent chlorine detection system subsystems shall be OPERABLE with their alarm and trip setpoints adjusted to actuate at a chlorine concentration of less than or equal to 0.5 ppm

APPLICABILITY: ATT OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS.

ACTION:

- a. With one chlorine detection subsystem inoperable, restore the inoperable detection system to OPERABLE status within 7 days or, within the next 6 hours, initiate and maintain operation of at least one control room emergency filtration system subsystem in the chlorine isolation mode of operation.
- b. With both chlorine detection subsystems inoperable, within 1 hour initiate and maintain operation of at least one control room emergency filtration system subsystem in the chlorine isolation mode of operation.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.3.7.8.1 Each of the above required chlorine detection system subsystems shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of a:

- a. CHANNEL CHECK at least once per 12 hours,
- b. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST at least once per 92 days, and
- c. CHANNEL CALIBRATION at least once per 18 months.

3/4.3.9 FEEDWATER/MAIN TURBINE TRIP SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.9 The feedwater/main turbine trip system actuation instrumentation channels shown in the Table 3.3.9-1 shall be OPERABLE with their trip setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.3.9-2.

APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3.9-1.

ACTION:

- a. With a feedwater/main turbine trip system actuation instrumentation channel trip setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Values column of Table 3.3.9-2, declare the channel inoperable and either place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status with its trip setpoint adjusted consistent with the Trip Setpoint value, or declare the associated system inoperable.
- b. With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least STARTUP within the next 6 hours.
- c. With the number of OPERABLE channels two less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels requirement, restore at least one of the inoperable channels to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least STARTUP within the next 6 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.3.9.1 Each feedwater/main turbine trip system actuation instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE* by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST, and CHANNEL CALIBRATION operations for the OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3.9.1-1.

4.3.9.2 LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TESTS and simulated automatic operation of all channels shall be performed at least once per 18 months.

* A channel may be placed in an inoperable status for up to 6 hours for required surveillance without placing the trip system in the tripped condition.

TABLE 3.3.9.1-1

FEEDWATER/MAIN TURBINE TRIP SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

TRIP_FUNCTION		CHANNEL CHECK	CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST	CHANNEL CALIBRATION	OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED
1.	Reactor Vessel Water Level-High, Level 8	D	Q	R	1

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 3/4.4.2 SAFETY/RELIEF VALVES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.2 The safety valve function of at least 11 of the following reactor coolant system safety/relief valves shall be OPERABLE with the specified code safety valve function lift settings:*#

4 safety/relief valves @ 1130 psig ± 1%
5 safety/relief valves @ 1140 psig ± 1%
5 safety/relief valves @ 1150 psig ± 1%

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

- a. With the safety valve function of one or more of the above required safety/relief valves inoperable, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours.
- b. With one or more safety/relief valves stuck open, provided that suppression pool average water temperature is less than 105°F, close the stuck open safety/relief valve(s); if unable to close the stuck open valve(s) within 2 minutes or if suppression pool average water temperature is 110°F of greater, place the reactor mode switch in the Shutdown position.
- c. With one or more safety/relief valve acoustic monitors inoperable, restore the inoperable acoustic monitors to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.2.1 The acoustic monitor for each safety/relief valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE with the setpoint verified to be 0.20 of the full open noise level## by performance of a:

- a. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST at least once per 92 days, and a
- b. CHANNEL CALIBRATION at least once per 18 months**.

4.4.2.2 At least 1/2 of the safety relief valves shall be removed, set pressure tested and reinstalled or replaced with spares that have been previously set pressure tested and stored in accordance with manufacturer's recommendations at least once per 24 months, and they shall be rotated .uch that all 14 safety relief valves are removed, set pressure tested and reinstalled or replaced with spares that have been previously set pressure tested and stored in accordance with manufacturer's recommendations at least once per 54 months.

- *The lift setting pressure shall correspond to ambient conditions of the valves at nominal operating temperatures and pressures.
- **The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable provided the Surveillance is performed within 12 hours after reactor steam pressure is adequate to perform the test.

#Up to 2 inoperable valves may be replaced with spare OPERABLE valves with lower setpoints until the next refueling.

##Initial setting shall be in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendation. Adjustment to the valve full open noise level shall be accomplished during the startup test program.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

- c. By verifying at least 8 suppression pool water temperature indicators in at least 8 locations, OPERABLE by performance of a:
 - 1. CHANNEL CHECK at least once per 24 hours.
 - 2. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST at least once per 31 days, and
 - 3. CHANNEL CALIBRATION at least once per 18 months,

with the temperature alarm setpoint for:

- 1. High water temperature:
 - a) First setpoint ≤ 95°F
 - b) Second setpoint ≤ 105°F
 - c) Third setpoint ≤ 110°F
 - d) Fourth setpoint ≤ 120°F
- d. By verifying at least two suppression chamber water level indicators OPERABLE by performance of a:
 - 1. CHANNEL CHECK at least one per 24 hours,
 - 2. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST at least once per 92 days, and
 - 3. CHANNEL CALIBRATION at least once per 18 months,

with the water level alarm setpoint for high water level \leq 24'1-1/2"

e. At least once per 18 months by conducting a drywell-to-suppression chamber bypass leak test at an initial differential pressure of 4 psi and verifying that the A/√k calculated from the measured leakage is within the specified limit. If any drywell-to-suppression chamber bypass leak test fails to meet the specified limit, the test schedule for subsequent tests shall be reviewed and approved by the Commission. If two consecutive tests fail to meet the specified limit, a test shall be performed at least every 9 months until two consecutive tests meet the specified limit, at which time the 18 month test schedule may be resumed.

BASES

CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION (Continued) EMERGENCY

Specified surveillance intervals and maintenance outage times have been determined in accordance with NEDC-30936P, Parts 1 and 2, "Technical Specification Improvement Methodology (with Demonstration for BWR ECCS Actuation Instrumentation)," as approved by the NRC and documented in the SER (letter to D. N. Grace from A. C. Thadani dated December 9 1988 (Part 1) and letter to D. N. Grace from C. E. Rossi dated December 9, 1988 (Part 2)).

Operation with a trip set less conservative than its Trip Setpoint but within its specified Allowable Value is acceptable on the basis that the difference between each Trip Setpoint and the Allowable value is an allowance for instrumentation drift specifically allocated for each trip in the safety analyses.

3/4.3.4 RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION

The anticipated transient without scram (ATWS) recirculation pump trip system provides a means of limiting the consequences of the unlikely occurrence of a failure to scram during an anticipated transient. The response of the plant to this postulated event falls within the envelope of study events in General Electric Company Topical Report NEDO-10349, dated March 1971, NEDO-24222, dated December 1979, and Section 15.8 of the FSAR.

The end-of-cycle recirculation pump trip (EOC-RPT) system is a supplement to the reactor trip. During turbine trip and generator load rejection events, the EOC-RPT will reduce the likelihood of reactor vessel level decreasing to level 2. Each EOC-RPT system trips both recirculation pumps. reducing coolant flow in order to reduce the void collapse in the core during two of the most limiting pressurization events. The two events for which the EOC-RPT protective feature will function as closure of the turbine stop valves and fast closure of the turbine control valves.

A fast closure sensor from each of two turbine control valves provides input to the EOC-RPT system; a fast closure sensor from each of the other two turbine control valves provides input to the second EOC-RPT system. Similarly, a position switch for each of two turbine stop valves provides input to one EOC-RPT system; a position switch form each of the other two stop valves provides input to the other EOC-RPT system. For each EOC-RPT system, the sensor relay contacts are arranged to form a 2-out-of-2 logic for the fast closure of turbine control valves and a 2-out-of-2 logic for the turbine stop valves. The operation of either logic will actuate the EOC-RPT system and trip both recirculation pumps.

Each EOC-RPT system may be manually bypassed by use of a keyswitch which is administratively controlled. The manual bypasses and the automatic Operating Bypass at less than 30% of RATED THERMAL POWER are annunciated in the control room.

The EOC-RPT system response time is the time assumed in the analysis between initiation of valve motion and complete suppression of the electric arc, i.e., 175 ms. Included in this time are: the response time of the sensor, the time allotted for breaker arc suppression, and the response time of the system logic.

INSTRUMENTATION BASES

Specified surveillance intervals and maintenance outage times have been determined in accordance with GENE-770-06-1, "Bases for Changes to Surveillance Test Intervals and Allowed Out-of-Service Times for Selected Instrumentation Technical Specifications," as approved by the NRC and documented in the SER (letter to R.D. Binz, IV, from C.E. Rossi dated July 21, 1992).

Operation with a trip set less conservative than its Trip Setpoint but within its specified Allowable Value is acceptable on the basis that the difference between each Trip Setpoint and the Allowable Value is an allowance for instrument drift specifically allocated for each trip in the safety analyses.

3/4.3.5 REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION

The reactor core isolation cooling system actuation instrumentation is provided to initiate actions to assure adequate core cooling in the event of reactor isolation from its primary heat sink and the loss of feedwater flow to the reactor vessel. This instrumentation does not provide actuation of any of the emergency core cooling equipment.

Specified surveillance intervals and maintenance outage times have been specified in accordance with recommendations made by GE in their letter to the BWR Owner's Group dated August 7, 1989, SUBJECT: "Clarification of Technical Specification changes given in ECCS Actuation Instrumentation Analysis."

Operation with a trip set less conservative than its Trip Setpoint but within its specified Allowable value is acceptable on the basis that the difference between each Trip Setpoint and the Allowable Value is an allowance for instrument drift specifically allocated for each trip in the safety analyses.

3/4.3.6 CONTROL ROD BLOCK INSTRUMENTATION

The control rod block functions are provided consistent with the requirements of the specifications in Section 3/4.1.4, Control Rod Program Controls and Section 3/4.2 Power Distribution Limits and Section 3/4.3 Instrumentation. The trip logic is arranged so that a trip in any one of the inputs will result in a control rod block.

Specified surveillance intervals and maintenance outage time have been determined in accordance with NEDC-30851P, Supplement 1, "Technical Specification Improvement Analysis for BWR Control Rod Block Instrumentation," as approved by the NRC and documented in the SER (letter to D. N. Grace from C. E. Rossi dated September 22, 1988).

Operation with a trip set less conservative than its Trip Setpoint but within its specified Allowable Value is acceptable on the basis that the difference between each Trip Setpoint and the Allowable Value is an allowance for instrument drift specifically allocated for each trip in the safety analyses.

LIMERICK - UNIT 2

B 3/4 3-4

BASES 3/4.3.7 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.7.1 RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the radiation monitoring instrumentation ensures that; (1) the radiation levels are continually measured in the areas served by the individual channels, and (2) the alarm or automatic action is initiated when the radiation level trip setpoint is exceeded; and (3) sufficient information is available on selected plant parameters to monitor and asses these variable following an accident. This capability is consistent with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria 19, 41, 60, 61, 63, and 64.

The specified surveillance interval for the Main Control Room Normal Fresh Air Supply Radiation Monitor has been determined in accordance with GENE-770-06-1, "Bases for Changes to Surveillance Test Intervals and Allowed Out-of-Service Times for Selected Instrumentation Technical Specifications," as approved by the NRC and documented in the SER (letter to R.D. Binz, IV, from C.E. Rossi dated July 21, 1992).

3/4.3.7.2 SEISMIC MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the seismic monitoring instrumentation ensures that sufficient capability is available to promptly determine the magnitude of a seismic event and evaluate the response of those features important to safety. This capability is required to permit comparison of the measured response to that used in the design basis for the unit.

3/4.3.7.3 (Deleted) - INFORMATION FROM THIS SECTION RELOCATED TO THE ODCM.

3/4.3.7.4 REMOTE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS

The OPERABILITY of the remote shutdown system instrumentation and controls ensures that sufficient capability is available to permit shutdown and maintenance of HOT SHUTDOWN of the unit from locations outside of the control room. This capability is required in the event control room habitability is lost and is consistent with General Design Criterion 19 of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A. The Unit 1 RHR transfer switches are included only due to their potential impact on the RHRSW system, which is common to both units.

3.4.3.7.5 ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the accident monitoring instrumentation ensures that sufficient information is available on selected plant parameters to monitor and asses important variables following an accident. this capability is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.97, "Instrumentation for Light Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant Conditions During and Following an Accident," December 1975 and NUREG-0737, "Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements," November 1980.

3/4.3.7.6 SOURCE RANGE MONITORS

The source range monitors provide the operator with information of the status of the neutron level in the core at very low power levels during startup and shutdown. At these power levels, reactivity additions shall not be made without this flux level information available to the operator. When the intermediate range monitors are on scale, adequate information is available without the SRMs and they can be retracted.

INSTRUMENTATION BASES

3/4.3.7.7 TRAVERSING IN-CORE PROBE SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the traversing in-core probe system with the specified minimum complement of equipment ensures that the measurements obtained from use of this equipment accurately represent the spatial neutron flux distribution of the reactor core.

The TIP system OPERABILI Y is demonstrated by normalizing all probes (i.e., detectors) prior to performing an LPRM calibration function. Monitoring core thermal limits may involve utilizing individual detectors to monitor selected areas of the reactor core, thus all detectors may not be required to be OPERABLE. The OPERABILITY of individual detectors to be used for monitoring is demonstrated by comparing the detector(s) output in the resultant heat balance calculation (P-1) with data obtained during a previous heat balance calculation (P-1).

3/4.3.7.8 CHLORINE AND TOXIC GAS DETECTION SYSTEMS

The OPERABILITY of the chlorine and toxic gas detection systems ensures that an accidental chlorine and/or toxic gas release will be detected promptly and the necessary protective actions will be automatically initiated for chlorine and manually initiated for toxic gas to provide protection for control room personnel. Upon detection of a high concentration of chlorine, the control room emergency ventilating system will automatically be placed in the chlorine isolation mode of operation to provide the required protection. Upon detection of a high concentration of toxic gas, the control room emergency ventilation system will manually be placed in the chlorine isolation mode of operation to provide the required protection. The detection systems required by this specification are consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.95 "Protection of Nuclear Power Plant Control Room Operators against an Accidental Chlorine Release," February 1975.

Specified surveillance intervals and maintenance outage times have been determined in accordance with GENE-770-06-1, "Bases for Changes to Surveillance Test Intervals and Allowed Out-of-Service Times for Selected Instrumentation Technical Specifications," as approved by the NRC and documented in the SER (letter to R.D. Binz, IV, from C.E. Rossi dated July 21, 1992).

3/4.3.7.9 FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION

OPERABILITY of the detection instrumentation ensures that both adequate warning capability is available for prompt detection of fires and that fire suppression systems, that are actuated by fire detectors, will discharge extinquishing agent in a timely manner. Prompt detection and suppression of fires will reduce the potential for damage to safety-related equipment and is an integral element in the overall facility fire protection program.

Fire detectors that are used to actuate fire suppression systems represent a more critically important component of a plant's fire protection program than detectors that are installed solely for early fire warning and notification. Consequently, the minimum number of OPERABLE fire detectors must be greater.

BASES

FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION (Continued)

The loss of detection capability for fire suppression systems, actuated by fire detectors, represents a significant degradation of fire protection for any area. As a result, the establishment of a fire watch patrol must be initiated at an earlier stage than would be warranted for the loss of detectors that provide only early fire warning. The establishment of frequent fire patrols in the affected areas is required to provide detection capability until the inoperable instrumentation is restored to OPERABILITY.

3/4.3.7.10 LOOSE PART DETECTION SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the loose-part detection system ensures that sufficient capability is available to detect loose metallic parts in the primary system and avoid or mitigate damage to primary system components. The allowable out-of-service times and surveillance requirements are consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.133, "Loose-Part Detection Program for the Primary System of Light-Water-Cooled Reactors," May 1981.

3/4.3.7.11 (Deleted) - INFORMATION FROM THIS SECTION RELOCATED TO THE ODCM.

3/4.3.7.12 OFFGAS MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

This instrumentation includes provisions for monitoring the concentrations of potentially explosive gas mixtures and noble gases in the off-gas system.

3/4.3.8. TURBINE OVERSPEED PROTECTION SYSTEM

This specification is provided to ensure that the turbine overspeed protection system instrumentation and the turbine speed control valves are OPERABLE and will protect the turbine from excessive overspeed. Protection from turbine excessive overspeed is required since excessive overspeed of the turbine could generate potentially damaging missiles which could impact and damage safety related components, equipment or structures.

3/4.3.9 FEEDWATER/MAIN TURBINE TRIP SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION

The feedwater/main turbine trip system actuation instrumentation is provided to initiate action of the feedwater system/main turbine trip system in the event of failure of feedwater controller under maximum demand.

Enclosure 1

TSCR No. 92-11-0 Docket Nos. 50-352 and 50-353

Limerick Generating Station, Unit 1 Instrumentation Drift Data for Selected Boiling Water Reactor Actuation Instrumentation

There are 23 channels of trip instrumentation for the Actuation Instrumentation which are currently tested monthly as required by Technical Specifications (TS), Tables 4.3.2.1-1, 4.3.4.1-1, 4.3.4.2.1-1, 4.3.7.1-1, 4.3.9.1-1 and TS Sections 4.1.3.1.4, 4.3.7.8.1, 4.4.2.1.

A review of surveillance data sheets was performed for a random sample of four (4) of the trip units to determine how much the trip setting changes over a period of three (3) consecutive surveillance intervals from July, 1992 to October, 1992. The results are provided below.

DESCRIPTION

CHANNEL

1) 2) 3) 4)

NET SETPOINT CHANGE (3 MOS)

11	PS-X-M1-20127	ATWS-REACTOR VESSEL PRESSURE-HIGH	0.00	MA
į	PS-X-M1-20133	ATWS-REACTOR VESSEL PRESSURE-HIGH	0.00	MA
1.1	LISH-47-2N601B	RPS-SCRAM DISCHARGE VOLUME LEVEL-HIGH	0.00	MA
): T	LISH-47-2N601D	RPS-SCRAM DISCHARGE VOLUME LEVEL-HIGH	0.00	MA

The worst case as-found drift for the trip units in this sample for a three month period, was ± 0.00 MA. The applicable instrumentation setpoint calculations allow drift of ± 0.02 MA. In this sample no drift was evident. We have therefore confirmed that the as-found drift is within that allowed by setpoint calculations.