UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

DOCKET NO. 50-260

BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 213
License No. DPR-52

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A. The application for amendment by Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee) dated December 23, 1992 complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-52 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 213, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days from the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Frederick J. Hebdon

Frederick J. Hebdon, Director
Project Directorate II-4
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: May 5, 1993

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 213

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-52

DOCKET NO. 50-260

Revise the Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by the captioned amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the area of change. Overleaf* and spillover** pages are provided to maintain document completeness.

REMOVE	INSERT
3.2/4.2-11a	3.2/4.2-11a
3.2/4.2-42	3.2/4.2-42**
3.2/4.2-43	3.2/4.2-43
3.7/4.7-35	3.7/4.7-35

TABLE 3.2.A (Continued)
PRIMARY CONTAINMENT AND REACTOR BUILDING ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION

Minimum No. Instrument Channels Operable Per Trip Sys(1)(11)	Function	Trip Level Setting	Action (1)	Remarks
2	Instrument Channel Reactor Water Cleanup System Main Steam Valve Vault (TIS-069-834A-D)	≤ 201.0°F	C	Above Trip Setting initiates Isolation of Reactor Water Cleanup Lines to and from the Reactor
2	Instrument Channel Reactor Water Cleanup System Pipe Trench (TIS-069-835A-D)	≤ 135.0°F	C	Above Trip Setting initiates Isolation of Reactor Water Cleanup Lines to and from the Reactor
2	Instrument Channel Reactor Water Cleanup System Pump Room 2A (TIS-069-836A-D)	≤ 152.0°F	C	Above Trip Setting initiates Isolation of Reactor Water Cleanup Lines to and from the Reactor
2	Instrument Channel Reactor Water Cleanup System Pump Room 2B (TIS-069-837A-D)	≤ 152.0°F	C	Above Trip Setting initiates Isolation of Reactor Water Cleanup Lines to and from the Reactor
2	Instrument Channel Reactor Water Cleanup System Heat Exchanger Room (TIS-069-838A-D)	≤ 143.0°F	C	Above Trip Setting initiates Isolation of Reactor Water Cleanup Lines to and from the Reactor
2	Instrument Channel Reactor Water Cleanup System Heat Exchanger Room (TIS-069-839A-D)	≤ 170.0°F	C	Above Trip Setting initiates Isolation of Reactor Water Cleanup Lines to and from the Reactor

TABLE 4.2.A (Cont'd)
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR PRIMARY CONTAINMENT AND REACTOR BUILDING ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION

Function	Functional Test	Calibration Frequency	Instrument Check
Group 1 (Initiating) Logic	Checked during channel functional test. No further test required.(11)	N/A	N/A
Group 1 (Actuation) Logic	Once/operating cycle (21)	N/A	N/A
Group 2 (Initiating) Logic	Checked during channel functional test. No further test required.	N/A	N/A
Group 2 (RHR Isolation-Actuation) Logic	Once/operating cycle (21)	N/A	N/A
Group 8 (Tip-Actuation) Logic	Once/operating cycle (21)	N/A	N/A
Group 2 (Drywell Sump Drains-Actuation) Logic	Once/operating cycle (21)	N/A	N/A
Group 2 (Reactor Building and Refueling floor, and Drywell Vent and Purge-Actuation) Logic	Once/operating cycle (21)	N/A	N/A
Group 3 (Initiating) Logic	Checked during channel functional test. No further test required.	N/A	N/A
Group 3 (Actuation) Logic	Once/operating cycle (21)	N/A	N/A
Group 6 Logic	Once/operating cycle (18)	N/A	N/A
Group 8 (Initiating) Logic	Checked during channel functional test. No further test required.	N/A	N/A
Reactor Building Isolation (refueling floor) Logic	Once/6 months (18)	(6)	N/A
Reactor Building Isolation (reactor zone) Logic	Once/6 months (18)	(6)	N/A

TABLE 4.2.A (Cont'd)
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR PRIMARY CONTAINMENT AND REACTOR BUILDING ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION

Function	Functional Test	Calibration Frequency	Instrument Check
SGTS Train A Logic	Once/6 months (19)	N/A	N/A
SGTS Train B Logic	Once/6 months (19)	N/A	N/A
SGTS Train C Logic	Once/6 months (19)	N/A	N/A
Instrument Channel - Reactor Water Cleanup System Main Steam Valve Vault (TIS-069-834A-D)	(1)(27)	4 months	N/A
Instrument Channel - Reactor Water Cleanup System Pipe Trench (TIS-069-835A-D)	(1)(27)	4 months	N/A
Instrument Channel - Reactor Water Cleanup System Pump Room 2A (TIS-069-836A-D)	(1)(27)	4 months	N/A
Instrument Channel Reactor Water Cleanup System Pump Room 2B (TIS-069-837A-D)	(1)(27)	4 months	N/A
Instrument Channel Reactor Water Cleanup System Heat Exchanger Room (TIS-069-838A-D)	(1)(27)	4 months	N/A
Instrument Channel - Reactor Water Cleanup System Heat Exchanger Room (TIS-069-839A-D)	(1)(27)	4 months	N/A

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in the system, isolation is provided by high temperature in the cleanup system area. Also, since the vessel could potentially be drained through the cleanup system, a low-level isolation is provided.

Groups 4 and 5 - Process lines are designed to remain OPERABLE and mitigate the consequences of an accident which results in the isolation of other process lines. The signals which initiate isolation of Groups 4 and 5 process lines are therefore indicative of a condition which would render them inoperable.

Group 6 - Lines are connected to the primary containment but not directly to the reactor vessel. These valves are isolated on reactor low water level (538"), high drywell pressure, or reactor building ventilation high radiation which would indicate a possible accident and necessitate primary containment isolation.

Group 7 - (Deleted)

Group 8 - Line (traveling in-core probe) is isolated on high drywell pressure or reactor low water level (538"). This is to assure that this line does not provide a leakage path when containment pressure or reactor water level indicates a possible accident condition.

The maximum closure time for the automatic isolation valves of the primary containment and reactor vessel isolation control system have been selected in consideration of the design intent to prevent core uncovering following pipe breaks outside the primary containment and the need to contain released fission products following pipe breaks inside the primary containment.

In satisfying this design intent, an additional margin has been included in specifying maximum closure times. This margin permits identification of degraded valve performance prior to exceeding the design closure times.

In order to assure that the doses that may result from a steam line break do not exceed the 10 CFR 100 guidelines, it is necessary that no fuel rod perforation resulting from the accident occur prior to closure of the main steam line isolation valves. Analyses indicate that fuel rod cladding perforations would be avoided for main steam valve closure times, including instrument delay, as long as 10.5 seconds.