ENCLOSURE 3

MARKED-UP AND TYPED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES CHANGE

9304190056 930413
PDR ADOCK 05000348
P PDR

See Insert A

~~The maximum peak pressure expected to be obtained from a LOCA event is 45 psig. The limit of 3 psig for initial positive containment pressure will limit the total pressure to 48 psig which is less than design pressure and is consistent with the accident analyses.~~

3/4.6.1.5 AIR TEMPERATURE

The limitations on containment average air temperature ensure that the overall containment average air temperature does not exceed the initial temperature condition assumed in the accident analysis for a LOCA or steam line break accident.

3/4.6.1.6 CONTAINMENT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY

This limitation ensures that the structural integrity of the containment will be maintained comparable to the original design standards for the life of the facility. Structural integrity is required to ensure that the containment will withstand the maximum pressure of 48 psig in the event of a LOCA. The measurement of the containment lift off force, visual examination of tendons, anchorages and exposed interior and exterior surfaces of the containment, and the Type A leakage test is sufficient to demonstrate this capability.

The surveillance requirements for demonstrating the containment's structural integrity are in compliance with the recommendations of paragraph C.1.3 of Regulatory Guide 1.35 "Inservice Surveillance of Ungrouted Tendons in Prestressed Concrete Containment Structures," January 1976.

3/4.6.1.7 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM

The 48-inch containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves are required to be closed in MODES above COLD SHUTDOWN since these valves have not been demonstrated capable of closing during a LOCA or steam line break accident. Maintaining these valves closed during plant operations ensures that excessive quantities of radioactive materials will not be released via the containment purge system.

The use of the containment purge lines is restricted to the 8-inch vent supply and exhaust isolation valves to ensure that the site boundary dose guidelines of 10 CFR Part 100 would not be exceeded in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident during venting operations.

BASES

See Insert A

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Insert A

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