



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

March 30, 1993

The Honorable George Miller
Chairman, Committee on Natural Resources
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

On behalf of the Commission, I am responding to your letter of March 3, 1993, in which you and several of your Congressional colleagues expressed concern about the recent security event at the Three Mile Island (TMI) Nuclear Station in Pennsylvania and its implications for NRC-imposed security requirements at nuclear power plants. In particular, you urged the Commission to require nuclear power reactor sites to have vehicle barriers and to reject a Nuclear Management and Resources Council (NUMARC) recommendation that security requirements be relaxed.

As you may know, the adequacy of nuclear power plant security to protect against terrorism or sabotage was the subject of a hearing before the Senate Subcommittee on Clean Air and Nuclear Regulation of the Committee on Environment and Public Works on March 19, 1993. Since the Commission's testimony at that hearing addressed many of the issues you have raised, I have enclosed a copy of our written testimony for your information.

With respect to the TMI security event, the NRC dispatched an incident investigation team (IIT) to review the circumstances surrounding the event and the adequacy of the response taken by GPU Nuclear Corporation. Members of the IIT are independent from NRC personnel involved in the day-to-day regulation of the TMI facility. We expect the IIT to issue its report in early April 1993, and we would like to provide you a copy of the final report when it is available.

The TMI event and the recent bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City raise anew issues we have reviewed several times in the last few years. As described in the enclosed NRC staff memorandum of March 11, 1993, we intend to reassess the design

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
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basis threat in light of these events. We will keep you informed of changes in our requirements dealing with external threats to commercial nuclear power plants.

If I can be of further assistance, please let me know.

Sincerely,


Ivan Selin

Enclosures:
As stated

cc: Representative Don Young



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

March 30, 1993

The Honorable Edward J. Markey
Committee on Natural Resources
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Congressman Markey:

On behalf of the Commission, I am responding to your letter of March 3, 1993, in which you and several of your Congressional colleagues expressed concern about the recent security event at the Three Mile Island (TMI) Nuclear Station in Pennsylvania and its implications for NRC-imposed security requirements at nuclear power plants. In particular, you urged the Commission to require nuclear power reactor sites to have vehicle barriers and to reject a Nuclear Management and Resources Council (NUMARC) recommendation that security requirements be relaxed.

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
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- 2 -

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If I can be of further assistance, please let me know.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'Ivan Selin'.

Ivan Selin

Enclosures:
As stated



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

March 30, 1993

CHAIRMAN

The Honorable Richard H. Lehman, Chairman
Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral Resources
Committee on Natural Resources
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

On behalf of the Commission, I am responding to your letter of March 3, 1993, in which you and several of your Congressional colleagues expressed concern about the recent security event at the Three Mile Island (TMI) Nuclear Station in Pennsylvania and its implications for NRC-imposed security requirements at nuclear power plants. In particular, you urged the Commission to require nuclear power reactor sites to have vehicle barriers and to reject a Nuclear Management and Resources Council (NUMARC) recommendation that security requirements be relaxed.

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
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Sincerely,



Ivan Selin

Enclosures:
As stated

cc: Representative Barbara Vucanovich



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

March 30, 1993

The Honorable Philip R. Sharp, Chairman
Subcommittee on Energy and Power
Committee on Energy and Commerce
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

On behalf of the Commission, I am responding to your letter of March 3, 1993, in which you and several of your Congressional colleagues expressed concern about the recent security event at the Three Mile Island (TMI) Nuclear Station in Pennsylvania and its implications for NRC-imposed security requirements at nuclear power plants. In particular, you urged the Commission to require nuclear power reactor sites to have vehicle barriers and to reject a Nuclear Management and Resources Council (NUMARC) recommendation that security requirements be relaxed.

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
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Sincerely,


Ivan Selin

Enclosures:
As stated

cc: Representative Michael Bilirakis



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

March 30, 1993

The Honorable Sam Gejdenson
Committee on Natural Resources
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Congressman Gejdenson:

On behalf of the Commission, I am responding to your letter of March 3, 1993, in which you and several of your Congressional colleagues expressed concern about the recent security event at the Three Mile Island (TMI) Nuclear Station in Pennsylvania and its implications for NRC-imposed security requirements at nuclear power plants. In particular, you urged the Commission to require nuclear power reactor sites to have vehicle barriers and to reject a Nuclear Management and Resources Council (NUMARC) recommendation that security requirements be relaxed.

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
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Sincerely,


Ivan Selin

Enclosures:
As stated

STATEMENT SUBMITTED BY
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

TO THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CLEAN AIR AND NUCLEAR REGULATION
COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS
UNITED STATES SENATE

CONCERNING

THE ADEQUACY OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SECURITY TO PROTECT
AGAINST TERRORISM AND SABOTAGE

PRESENTED BY
IVAN SELIN
CHAIRMAN

SUBMITTED: MARCH 18, 1993

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XA

MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE, WE ARE PLEASED TO APPEAR BEFORE YOU TODAY TO DISCUSS THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION'S PROGRAM FOR SAFEGUARDING NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS AND THE ACTIVITIES WE HAVE UNDERWAY TO REVIEW THE ADEQUACY OF THAT PROTECTION IN LIGHT OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS. WE BELIEVE THAT OUR TESTIMONY ALSO RESPONDS TO YOUR RECENT LETTER TO THE COMMISSION ON THIS SUBJECT. AT THE OUTSET, WE WANT TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT WE BELIEVE THAT CURRENT SAFEGUARD MEASURES IN PLACE AT NRC LICENSED POWER REACTORS CONTINUE TO PROVIDE REASONABLE ASSURANCE OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY; THE QUESTION IS WILL THE PLANTS CONTINUE TO BE SAFE WITHOUT FURTHER PROTECTIVE MEASURES.

IT IS IRONIC THAT THE STAFF ALREADY HAD A REVIEW UNDERWAY, STARTING IN LATE 1991. THE REVIEW, HOWEVER, WAS PRIMARILY FOCUSED ON INTERNAL ACCESS MEASURES, AND NOT ON EXTERNAL ATTACKS SUCH AS TRUCK BOMBS. AS PART OF THIS REVIEW, THE STAFF WAS ASKED TO CONSIDER A PROPOSAL BY THE NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT AND RESOURCES COUNCIL (NUMARC) TO MODIFY THE DESIGN BASIS THREAT AND PLACE GREATER RELIANCE ON INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION. NUMARC ALSO QUESTIONED INTERNAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS. IN A FEW MINUTES I'LL DISCUSS WHAT A DESIGN BASIS THREAT MEANS.

IN LIGHT OF THE RECENT UNAUTHORIZED VEHICLE ENTRY AT THE THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR POWER STATION AND THE BOMBING AT THE WORLD TRADE CENTER IN NEW YORK CITY, WE ARE EXPANDING OUR REVIEW TO TAKE A FRESH LOOK AT THE QUESTION OF PROTECTING AGAINST UNAUTHORIZED VEHICLE ENTRY AND A VEHICLE BOMB. IT IS NOT OUT OF THE QUESTION THAT AT THE CONCLUSION OF OUR REVIEW, WE MIGHT, ON THE ONE HAND, DECIDE TO STRENGTHEN SOME MEASURES, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME, MODIFYING OR DELETING OTHER REQUIREMENTS WHICH HAVE PROVEN TO BE INEFFECTIVE.

GOAL

THE FIRST QUESTION TO ADDRESS IS OUR OBJECTIVE. THE OBJECTIVE OF OUR PHYSICAL PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS AT COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS IS TO PROTECT THE GENERAL PUBLIC FROM SABOTAGE-INDUCED RELEASES OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL OFF THE SITE. THE OBJECTIVE IS NOT THE DISCOURAGEMENT OF TERRORISM PER SE, NOR IS IT THE PROTECTION OF THE REST OF THE POWER PLANT. IT IS THE LICENSEES' RESPONSIBILITY TO DECIDE HOW MUCH ADDITIONAL PROTECTION THEY MAY WISH TO PROVIDE FOR THEIR FACILITY, EQUIPMENT, AND EMPLOYEES.

INTELLIGENCE AND ITS CONTRIBUTION

THE SECOND QUESTION IS "HOW MUCH SECURITY IS ENOUGH"? THIS IS NOT AN AREA WHERE ONE CAN SAY, "WHAT DOES THE INTELLIGENCE INDICATE?" AND THEN DETERMINE THE THREAT AGAINST WHICH WE PROTECT. INTELLIGENCE IN THIS AREA IS ONE PART HARD DATA AND SEVERAL PARTS JUDGMENT. WE DEFEND AGAINST A RATIONAL ADVERSARY - WE CANNOT ANTICIPATE THE ACTIONS OF A DERANGED PERSON WHO DOESN'T FOLLOW LOGIC. SHOULD WE REQUIRE IMPREGNABLE BARRIERS OR ONES THAT END UP BY REDIRECTING A WOULD-BE ADVERSARY TO A LESS WELL PROTECTED TARGET? ALL THESE CONSIDERATIONS ARE REFLECTED IN A DESIGN BASIS THREAT, IN OTHER WORDS, A SET OF POSTULATED THREATS AGAINST WHICH PLANT DEFENSES ARE DESIGNED, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT ACTUAL EVENTS; THE DETERRENCE PROVIDED BY THE SECURITY SYSTEM FROM A POTENTIAL ADVERSARY'S POINT OF VIEW; THE DIFFICULTY OF INSTALLING AND MAINTAINING A SECURITY SYSTEM; THE AVAILABILITY OF OTHER, PERHAPS MORE ATTRACTIVE TARGETS; AND INTELLIGENCE, WHEN IT IS AVAILABLE.

IT IS THE ABSENCE OF A KNOWN, CREDIBLE THREAT THAT FORCES US TO CREATE A DESIGN BASIS THREAT AGAINST WHICH TO PROTECT. HOWEVER, I WOULD LIKE TO STRESS

THAT THE DESIGN BASIS THREAT IS A JUDGMENTAL SUBJECT ON WHICH PAST COMMISSIONS HAVE SPENT A GOOD DEAL OF EFFORT. CONCLUSIONS DRAWN ON THE VEHICLE BOMB THREAT HAVE NOT BEEN UNANIMOUS. I DON'T KNOW HOW THE CURRENT COMMISSION WILL DECIDE THE ISSUES UNDER RECONSIDERATION (WHICH INCLUDE VEHICLE BOMBS), BUT WE WILL DEFINITELY GIVE THEM A FRESH AND OPEN-MINDED LOOK.

PAST ACTIVITIES

NRC'S POLICY REGARDING THE VEHICLE BOMB THREAT AND THE NEED FOR VEHICLE BARRICADES AT POWER REACTORS HAS BEEN REVIEWED ON SEVERAL PREVIOUS OCCASIONS. AFTER THE BOMBING OF THE MARINE BARRACKS IN BEIRUT IN 1983, THE NRC INITIATED EXTENSIVE, CLASSIFIED STUDIES WITH SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES TO EVALUATE THE VULNERABILITY OF A NUCLEAR FACILITY TO A LARGE VEHICLE BOMB, AND TO IDENTIFY BARRIER TECHNOLOGIES THAT COULD BE USED TO PROTECT FACILITIES. THE COMMISSION CONCLUDED THAT SUCH PROTECTION WAS NOT NEEDED AT THAT TIME. THE COMMISSION PUT A LOT OF RELIANCE ON THE STURDINESS OF REACTOR BUILDINGS, ON REDUNDANT SAFETY SYSTEMS AND ON DAMAGE MITIGATION FEATURES OF POWER REACTORS, IN OTHER WORDS ON THE TRADITIONAL DEFENSE-IN-DEPTH PHILOSOPHY. THEY ALSO GAVE WEIGHT TO THE POTENTIAL DRASTIC NATURE OF THE CONSEQUENCES AND THE LIKELY POLITICAL BACKLASH THAT WOULD BE DIRECTED AGAINST THE CAUSES OF THE SABOTEUR. THEY CONSULTED WITH THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND HEARD THAT THE COMMUNITY BELIEVED THAT THERE WAS NO CREDIBLE THREAT OF TERRORISM AGAINST NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS. TO ENSURE THE BEST THREAT ASSESSMENT, NRC ALSO REQUESTED THE VIEWS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL. IN TURN, THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL REQUESTED INPUT FROM THE DEPARTMENTS OF DEFENSE AND ENERGY AS WELL AS THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.

REALIZING THE EVANESCENT NATURE OF THE CONCLUSIONS AND THE SPEED WITH WHICH CIRCUMSTANCES MIGHT CHANGE, THE COMMISSION DID REQUIRE POWER REACTOR LICENSEES TO DEVELOP CONTINGENCY PLANNING TO PROVIDE SHORT-TERM PROTECTION AGAINST VEHICLE BOMBS; THE AGENCY VERIFIED THESE PLANS VIA INSPECTIONS IN 1989, 1990, AND AGAIN RECENTLY.

CURRENT ACTIVITIES

WHAT ARE WE DOING NOW? AS INDICATED EARLIER, THE COMMISSION BELIEVES THAT IT IS AN APPROPRIATE TIME TO REEVALUATE THE DESIGN BASIS THREAT FOR RADIOLOGICAL SABOTAGE. THE PRESENT THREAT STATEMENT DOES NOT ADDRESS THE USE OF A VEHICLE NOR THE USE OF A VEHICLE BOMB AGAINST A POWER REACTOR.

ONE STEP WE HAVE JUST TAKEN WAS TO HAVE LICENSEES REVIEW THEIR VEHICLE BOMB CONTINGENCY PLANS IN COORDINATION WITH THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTORS. GENERALLY, SUCH CONTINGENCY PLANS CALL FOR SUCH ACTIONS AS RETURNING TO SERVICE ANY EQUIPMENT, TEMPORARILY TAKEN OUT OF SERVICE, WHICH WOULD BE USED TO ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN A SAFE SHUTDOWN CONDITION. A NUMBER OF LICENSEES INSTALLED PERMANENT VEHICULAR BARRIERS SEVERAL YEARS AGO. MANY LICENSEES PLAN TO USE HEAVY EQUIPMENT, VEHICLES, OR CONCRETE BARRIERS, DIG DITCHES, OR EMPLACE LARGE MOUNDS OF GRAVEL AS TEMPORARY BARRIERS. MANY OF THESE SHORT-TERM MEASURES, HOWEVER, COULD NOT BE REALISTICALLY UNDERTAKEN ON A LONG-TERM OR PERMANENT BASIS. THEY MAY DISRUPT IMPORTANT PLANT MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES, THEY IMPOSE ADDITIONAL BURDENS ON EMPLOYEES SEEKING ACCESS, AND THEY ULTIMATELY DIMINISH OVERALL OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY. IF PERMANENT MEANS ARE REQUIRED, A DIFFERENT APPROACH MIGHT BE NECESSARY.

WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? THE COMMISSION IS REEVALUATING THE VULNERABILITY OF A NUCLEAR POWER REACTOR TO UNAUTHORIZED VEHICLE ENTRY AND VEHICLE BOMBS, REFLECTING CURRENT FACILITY CONFIGURATIONS AND TECHNOLOGY ADVANCEMENTS. SINCE THE ORIGINAL STUDIES WERE COMPLETED BY SANDIA, THE CONCEPT OF STORING IRRADIATED SPENT FUEL IN INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE FACILITIES HAS MATURED. THE POTENTIAL VULNERABILITY OF THESE FACILITIES AND OTHER EXTERNAL SAFETY SYSTEMS WILL ALSO BE STUDIED.

A RANGE OF PROTECTION OPTIONS AND ASSOCIATED COSTS WILL BE EVALUATED, TO INCLUDE SUCH CONSIDERATIONS AS VEHICLE BARRICADES AT THE PROTECTED AREA PERIMETER, AND ANALYSIS OF SITE-SPECIFIC STAND-OFF DISTANCES TO COMPENSATE FOR THE EFFECT OF A BLAST. FOR SOME POWER REACTORS, VEHICLE BARRICADES COULD EASILY BE IMPLEMENTED, WHILE OTHER FACILITIES, BECAUSE OF SITING OR SIZE, MIGHT HAVE CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTY UNDERTAKING SUCH MEASURES.

THE NRC STAFF HAS FORMULATED A WORK PLAN AND HAS MADE IT AVAILABLE TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC. THE ACTION PLAN IS COMPOSED OF TWO PHASES. PHASE I WILL CONSIST OF A RECONNAISSANCE -- A BRINGING UP-TO-DATE OF EARLIER WORK AND A REVIEW OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS. THESE FINDINGS WILL BE PRESENTED TO THE COMMISSION NEXT MONTH; WE EXPECT TO BE ABLE TO MAKE AN INITIAL DETERMINATION OF DEPTH AND DIRECTION FOR NEXT STEPS. THE SECOND PHASE, LASTING UP TO SIX MONTHS, WOULD ENTAIL A MORE PROFOUND REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF THE CHANGES IN THE NUCLEAR POWER REACTOR INDUSTRY, THE USE OF A VEHICLE, AND THE DESIGN BASIS THREAT FOR RADIOLOGICAL SABOTAGE.

WE WANT THIS PROCESS TO INCLUDE PARTICIPATION BY THE PUBLIC TO THE GREATEST

EXTENT POSSIBLE, REALIZING THAT CERTAIN INTELLIGENCE AND VULNERABILITY INFORMATION MUST REMAIN CLASSIFIED. THE STAFF WILL CONDUCT A WORKSHOP TO SOLICIT IDEAS, VIEWS AND JUDGMENTS ON VARIOUS APPROACHES AND TECHNIQUES THAT CAN BE FACTORED INTO OUR FORMAL REVIEW. AFTER THE STAFF HAS COMPLETED ITS ANALYSIS AND DEVELOPED PROPOSED OPTIONS, WE PLAN TO PRESENT THEM TO THE PUBLIC DURING A COMMISSION MEETING, REPORT TO OUR CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT COMMITTEES, AND THEN PUBLISH OUR CONCLUSIONS IN THE FEDERAL REGISTER.

MR. CHAIRMAN, IN YOUR LETTER OF FEBRUARY 22, 1993, YOU POSED A QUESTION DEALING WITH THE DECISION BY GPU NUCLEAR CORPORATION TO CONTINUE OPERATION OF THE THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR STATION DURING THE FEBRUARY 7, 1993 EVENT. THAT DECISION IS BEING EVALUATED BY AN NRC INCIDENT INVESTIGATION TEAM (IIT) WHICH IS CONDUCTING A REVIEW OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE EVENT. WHILE THERE ARE ARGUMENTS ON BOTH SIDES, EVEN WITH THE BENEFIT OF OVER FIVE WEEKS OF HINDSIGHT, WE HAVE FOUND NO REASON TO QUESTION THE OPERATORS' DECISION TO CONTINUE OPERATION OF THE PLANT. THE IIT REPORT WILL BE SUBMITTED TO THE COMMISSION NEXT MONTH. WE WILL BE PLEASED TO PROVIDE YOU A COPY OF THE REPORT WHEN IT IS AVAILABLE.

SUMMARY

IN SUMMARY, WE PROMISE AN OPEN-MINDED, FRESH REVIEW OF THE DESIGN BASIS THREAT FOR RADIOLOGICAL SABOTAGE IN ORDER TO REEVALUATE THE ABILITY OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS TO ACHIEVE OUR OBJECTIVE OF PROTECTING THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY. WE PLAN TO DO THIS WITH AS MUCH PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AND SCRUTINY AS POSSIBLE, GIVEN SECURITY REQUIREMENTS, AND IN A PRUDENT BUT TIMELY MANNER.

MR. CHAIRMAN, THIS CONCLUDES OUR STATEMENT. WE WOULD BE PLEASED TO ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS THAT YOU AND THE SUBCOMMITTEE MAY HAVE.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

March 11, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Chairman
Commissioner Rogers
Commissioner Curtiss
Commissioner Remick
Commissioner de Planque

FROM: James M. Taylor
Executive Director for Operations

SUBJECT: DESIGN BASIS THREAT REEVALUATION -
PROPOSED ACTION PLAN

Staff has reviewed Mr. Chilk's memorandum, dated March 1, 1993, "Design Basis Threat." Given the sensitivity and potential significance of these issues we propose to proceed in two phases. Phase I will involve a rapid review of information available to NRC today to include revisiting the 1988 Commission decision on the need for vehicle protection requirements. We will be prepared to brief the Commission at the end of April on this relook, along with any new pertinent data, which will provide the Commission an opportunity to reassess the 1988 decision. We will also be prepared to discuss our plans regarding Phase II.

Phase II will entail a more in depth review and analysis in the following areas:

1. Changes in the Nuclear Power Reactor Industry. Staff will review significant changes that have occurred in the near past and will analyze those changes, vulnerabilities, and systems not previously analyzed, e.g., the addition of Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations at reactor sites, in terms of the existing Design Basis Threat (DBT) and threat characteristics currently under consideration. Where warranted, staff will propose changes or additions to existing Nuclear Regulatory Commission safeguards requirements.
2. The Use of a Vehicle by an Adversary. The Three Mile Island (TMI) intrusion and the World Trade Center bombing require that the general topic of vehicle use by an adversary be examined, independent of the review of the DBT. Staff examination will focus on the use of a vehicle to gain access to the protected area and vital areas, the use of a vehicle as a weapon or as a bomb, and the synergistic effect of vehicle use on other design basis characteristics. Staff also will incorporate, as appropriate, findings of the TMI Incident Investigation Team. Results, including a range of protection options and costs, will be included in staff's response to the Commission.


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3. The Design Basis Threat for Radiological Sabotage. Staff will complete a fresh review of the validity of the DBT, particularly in light of the World Trade Center bombing. The characteristics of vehicle bomb attacks worldwide will be reviewed and compared to data derived from the investigation of the World Trade Center bombing. Further, in its assessment of the general threat of radiological sabotage, staff will incorporate input, such as estimates, assessments and other data, from the Intelligence Community. Recommendations and a range of options and cost estimates for each option will be provided to the Commission for its consideration as appropriate.

In order to further focus staff review of the above areas and to invite an open discussion of the issues, staff will conduct a public workshop. The workshop would provide interested parties with the opportunity to offer ideas, opinions, and suggestions, along with technical data and supporting information, on the matters under review.

Although work will begin immediately, each of the three major areas identified in Phase II by the staff will require different amounts of time to complete, particularly item 3 which is dependent on receiving input from other agencies that could take up to 1 year. Further, the results in one of the three areas may affect the recommendations offered in the remaining two. Therefore, staff recommends that its report on Phase II not be forwarded to the Commission for consideration until all actions are completed, and staff recommendations and accompanying cost estimates can be formulated based on complete results. With an accelerated staff effort and timely response by other agencies, actions noted above, including the workshop, may be completed in nine months. A draft timeline for conducting these activities is enclosed. Based on Executive Branch information presented at the March 5, 1993 Commission meeting that there does not appear to be an imminent credible threat, or any indication of significant change in the threat environment, and given the scope of the effort and need for other agencies to respond, staff believes this schedule is reasonable. The Commission will be kept informed staff progress with periodic status reports.


James M. Taylor
Executive Director
for Operations

Enclosure: Action Plan Outline

cc: SECY
OGC
OCA
OPA
PDR

DRAFT ACTION PLAN OUTLINE

ACTION	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sept	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan
1. Finalize Detailed Action Plan - Identify issues and scope Revise per Commission after Workshop	x-----x	x-----x			x----	x					
2. Interim Commission briefing re 1986		x									
3. Public Design Basis Workshop Schedule & conduct workshop Report to Commission Review and analyze input	x-----x	x-----x			x-----x						
4. Review & Consider IIT Findings		x-----x									
5. Design Basis Threat Collect & Analyze Adversary Numbers Data Collect & Analyze Weaponry Data Collect & Analyze Equipment Data Assessment Activity on Threat with Intelligence Community	x-----x	x-----x									
6. Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations Study Let contract Contract Study	x-----x	x-----x									
7. Vehicle Use By Adversary Vehicle as Transport to Target Vehicle as Ramming Weapon in Protected Area Vehicle as Bomb	x-----x	x-----x									
8. Report to Commission Periodic status reports Evaluate results, options, costs Final Report			x-----x	x-----x	x-----x		x-----x				