



General Electric Company
175 Currier Avenue, San Jose, CA 95128

April 2, 1993

Docket No. STN 52-001

Chet Poslusny, Senior Project Manager
Standardization Project Directorate
Associate Directorate for Advanced Reactors
and License Renewal
Office of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Subject: Submittal Supporting Accelerated ABWR Review Schedule - COL Action Items
14.1.3.3.7.3-1

Dear Chet:

Enclosed is a SSAR markup addressing DFFSER COL Action Item 14.1.3.3.7.3-1.

Please provide a copy of this transmittal to Shou Hou and Jim Brammer.

Sincerely,

Jack Fox
Advanced Reactor Programs

cc: Norman Fletcher (DOE)
Maryann Herzog (GE)

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requirement for redundant separation is met. Other redundant divisions are available for safe shutdown of the plant and no further evaluation is performed.

- (4) If damage could occur to more than one division of a redundant essential system within 30 ft of any high energy piping, other protection in the form of barriers, shields, or enclosures is used. These methods of protection are discussed in Subsection 3.6.1.3.2.3. Pipe whip restraints as discussed in Subsection 3.6.1.3.2.4 are used if protection from whipping pipe is not possible by barriers and shields.

(See Subsection 3.6.5.1, Item (B) for COL license 3.6.1.3.2.3 Barriers, Shields, and Enclosures information requirements)

Protection requirements are met through the protection afforded by the walls, floors, columns, abutments, and foundations in many cases. Where adequate protection is not already present due to spatial separation or existing plant features, additional barriers, deflectors, or shields are identified as necessary to meet the functional protection requirements.

Barriers or shields that are identified as necessary by the use of specific break locations in the drywell are designed for the specific loads associated with the particular break location.

The steam tunnel is made of reinforced concrete 2m thick. A steam tunnel subcompartment analysis was performed for the postulated rupture of a mainsteam line and for a feedwater line (see Subsection 6.2.3.3.1). The peak pressure from a mainsteam line break was found to be 11 psig. The peak pressure from a feedwater line break was found to be 3.9 psig. The steam tunnel is designed for the effects of an SSE coincident with high energy line break inside the steam tunnel. Under this conservative load combination, no failure in any portion of the steam tunnel was found to occur; therefore, a high energy line break inside the steam tunnel will not effect control room habitability.

The MSIVs and the feedwater isolation and check valves located inside the tunnel shall be designed for the effects of a line break. The details of how the MSIV and feedwater isolation and check valves functional capabilities are

protected against the effects of these postulated pipe failures will be provided by the applicant referencing the ABWR design (see Subsection 3.6.4.1, item 4 and 6).

Barriers or shields that are identified as necessary by the HELSA evaluation (i.e., based on no specific break locations), are designed for worst-case loads. The closest high-energy pipe location and resultant loads are used to size the barriers.

3.6.1.3.2.4 Pipe Whip Restraints

Pipe whip restraints are used where pipe break protection requirements could not be satisfied using spatial separation, barriers, shields, or enclosures alone. Restraints are located based on the specific break locations determined in accordance with Subsections 3.6.2.1.4.3 and 3.6.2.1.4.4. After the restraints are located, the piping and essential systems are evaluated for jet impingement and pipe whip. For those cases where jet impingement damage could still occur, barriers, shields, or enclosures are utilized.

The design criteria for restraints is given in Subsection 3.6.2.3.3.

3.6.1.3.3 Specific Protection Measures

- (1) Nonessential systems and system components are not required for the safe shutdown of the reactor, nor are they required for the limitation of the offsite release in the event of a pipe rupture. However, while none of this equipment is needed during or following a pipe break event, pipe whip protection is considered where a resulting failure of a nonessential system or component could initiate or escalate the pipe break event in an essential system or component, or in another nonessential system whose failure could affect an essential system.
- (2) For high energy piping systems penetrating through the containment, isolation valves are located as close to the containment as possible.
- (3) The pressure, water level, and flow sensor instrumentation for those essential systems.

3.6.4

See attach. ~~A~~ B

(1) A summary of the dynamic analyses applicable to high-energy piping systems in accordance with Subsection 3.6.2.5 of Regulatory Guide 1.70. This shall include:

(a) Sketches of applicable piping systems showing the location, size and orientation of postulated pipe breaks and the location of pipe whip restraints and jet impingement barriers.

(b) A summary of the data developed to select postulated break locations including calculated stress intensities, cumulative usage factors and stress ranges as delineated in BTP MEB 3-1,

as modified by Subsection 2.6.1.1.1.

(2) For failure in the moderate-energy piping systems listed in Tables 3.6-6, descriptions showing how safety-related systems are protected from the resulting jets, flooding and other adverse environmental effects.

3.6-5 and

(3) Identification of protective measures provided against the effects of postulated pipe failures for protection of each of the systems listed in Tables 3.6-1 and 3.6-2.

(4) The details of how the MSIV functional capability is protected against the effects of postulated pipe failures.

(5) Typical examples, if any, where protection for safety-related systems and components against the dynamic effects of pipe failures include their enclosure in suitably designed structures or compartments (including any additional drainage system or equipment environmental qualification needs).

(6) The details of how the feedwater line check and feedwater isolation valves functional capabilities are protected against the effects of postulated pipe failures.

(8) High-energy Line Separation analysis (HELSEA) will be performed by the COL applicant to determine which high-energy lines meet the spatial separation requirements and which lines require further protection. (See Subsection 3.6.1.3.2.2, for a summary of the HELSEA requirements.)

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3.6.4 COL License Information

5 Summary
3.6.4.1 Details of Pipe Break Analysis Results and Protection Methods

The following shall be provided by the COL applicant (See Subsection 3.6.2.5):

(7) see attach. ~~A~~ B

(8)

Att. B

3.6.4 As-Built Inspection of High Energy Pipe Break Mitigation Features

An as-built inspection of the high energy pipe break mitigation features shall be performed. The as-built inspection shall confirm that systems, structures and components, that are required to be functional during and following an SSE, are protected against the dynamic effects associated with high energy pipe breaks. An as-built inspection of pipe whip restraints, jet shields, structural barriers and physical separation distances shall be performed.

For pipe whip restraints and jet shields, the location, orientation, size and clearances to allow for thermal expansion shall be inspected. The locations of structures, identified as a pipe break mitigation feature, shall be inspected. Where physical separation is considered to be a pipe break mitigation feature, the assumed separation distance shall be confirmed during the inspection.

3.6.5 COL License Information

3.6.5.1 Details of Pipe Break Analysis Results and Protection Methods

- (7) An inspection of the as-built high energy pipe break mitigation features shall be performed. The pipe break analysis report or leak-before-break report shall document the results of the as-built inspection of the high energy pipe break mitigation features. (See Subsection 3.6.4, for a summary of the as-built inspection requirements.)

Note: This "Att. B" was previously submitted to the NRC in the letter dated 3-2-93, Subject "Submittal Supporting Accel. ABWR Review Schedule - SSAR Section 3.6"