

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Reports No. 50-266/93007(DRSS); 50-301/93007(DRSS)

Dockets No. 50-266; 50-301

Licenses No. DPR-24; DPR-27

Licensee: Wisconsin Electric Power Company

Facility Name: Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2

Inspection At: Point Beach Site, Two Creeks, WI

Inspection Conducted: February 22 - 26, 1993

Inspector: J. W. McCormick-Barger, for
J. Foster

3/18/93
Date

Approved By: J. W. McCormick-Barger
J. W. McCormick-Barger, Chief
Emergency Preparedness and
Non-Power Reactor Section

3/18/93
Date

Inspection Summary

Inspection on February 22-26, 1993 (Reports No. 50-266/93007(DRSS);
50-301/93007(DRSS))

Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of the operational status of Point Beach's emergency preparedness program (IP 82701).

Results: No violations or deviations were identified. The licensee continued to have a well maintained emergency preparedness (EP) program. Several changes made in late 1992 and early 1993 have enhanced the overall EP program and increased its visibility. One issue was identified concerning the licensee's control room evacuation procedures not addressing emergency planning aspects of an evacuation. This issue will be tracked as an Inspector Followup Item.

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

R. Chojnacki, EP Coordinator
R. LaViolette, EP Quality Specialist
L. Epstein, Senior Training Specialist
S. Johnson, Training Specialist
R. Seizert, Manager - Regulatory Services

The personnel listed above attended the NRC exit interview on February 26, 1993.

The inspector also contacted other licensee personnel during the inspection.

2. Licensee Actions on Previously Identified Items (IP 82701)

(Closed) Open Items No. 50-266/92003-01; 50-301/92003-01: Lack of procedural guidance for Technical Support Center (TSC) or Operations Support Center (OSC) evacuations. Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure (EPIP) 6.4.2 "Technical Support Center/Operations Support Center (TSC/OSC) Evacuation," Revision 1, dated January 1, 1993, was reviewed. This procedure provides guidance as to possible relocation sites for personnel, which organizations should be notified, transfer of responsibilities, and contamination control during evacuations. Comments were provided regarding modification of the proceduralized sequence of notifications. The current procedure is adequate as reviewed, and this item is closed.

(Open) Open Items No. 50-266/92003-02; 50-301/92003-02: During the 1992 annual emergency preparedness exercise, it was apparent that the protective measures and reactor safety groups in the TSC needed to communicate more adequately regarding assessing offsite safety significance of degraded equipment, release duration, and release composition assumptions. Training documentation, including lesson plans LP2006 and LP1105, indicated that pertinent lesson plans had been modified to sensitize personnel to the need for improved communication on these issues. This item will remain open pending assessment in the 1993 annual emergency preparedness exercise.

3. Emergency Plan Activations (IP 82701)

The Point Beach plant has not had any actual Emergency Plan activations since the last routine NRC Emergency Preparedness inspection conducted during 1/27-31/92.

No violations or deviations were identified.

4. Operational Status of the Emergency Preparedness Program (IP 82701)

a. Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures

There have been several major changes to the Point Beach Emergency Plan since the last routine inspection. These changes were reviewed by the NRC Region III staff and approved via letter dated March 12, 1993, subsequent to this inspection. Several positions in the emergency response organization were found to be unneeded and were eliminated. Most significant of these was the position of Technical Support Manager in the Technical Support Center. The responsibilities of this position will now be split between the Site Manager and the Plant Operations Manager. Deletion of this position partially addresses a problem in TSC performance noted in the past in that the chain of command was not clear to observers or exercise participants.

Other changes involved deletion of the Training Supervisor position in the Operations Support Center and the combination of the Plant Process Computer System (PPCS) Coordinator and Core Physics Coordinator Positions.

Current copies of the Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs) were found to be maintained in the emergency response facilities and the control room. EPIP revision previously required corporate review and approval; this is now a site responsibility.

Discussion with licensee personnel indicated that valid annual attempts (in conjunction with the Kewaunee plant) are made to conduct training of local media representatives. In 1991, the utility started providing information packets to local, Green Bay, Madison, and Milwaukee-based media organizations, with enclosed response forms offering to provide additional information and training. Few media organizations have responded to these offers.

No violations or deviations were identified.

b. Emergency Facilities, Equipment, Instrumentation, and Supplies

Tours were conducted through the Control Room, Technical Support Center (TSC), Operational Support Center (OSC), and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). Each facility was well maintained and in an operational state of readiness. It was verified that adequate numbers of current copies of the Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures and appropriate forms were present in each emergency response facility.

New telephone lines are being installed in numerous areas of the plant, including the TSC. A fiber optic system is planned for speed optimization of Plant Process Computer System (PPCS) Terminal located in the EOF.

Emergency procedures now provide for the transfer of a portable multi-channel analyzer from the count room to the EOF. This procedure provides equipment to speed the analysis of field monitoring team samples. New vehicles had been designated for field monitoring team use, and modifications to tailor these vehicles for team use were under consideration. Cellular telephones are now provided to field teams and have improved communication with the teams.

Inspection of a small, random sample of essential equipment, instrumentation, and supplies in the TSC, OSC, and EOF did not reveal any problem areas.

Activities conducted by the EP group are tracked by the "Emergency Planning Callups System." This system provides for a listing of activities by month. A review of this system indicated that routine periodic events such as equipment inventories, communication checks, and siren growl tests had taken place. Records also indicated that the following major events had taken place:

- Annual EAL review with state and counties: 12/7/92
- Inventory & review of siren posters & decals: 12/18/92
- Public safety booklets mailed out: 8/92
- Public safety information posters sent out: 11-12/92
- Offsite media information packets mailed: 12/28/92

No violations or deviations were identified.

c. Organization and Management Control

No changes have taken place in the EP organization or reporting chain of the EP Coordinator since the last routine inspection.

A review of position assignments indicated that adequate numbers of personnel have been identified for specific lead and support positions in the emergency response organization (ERO).

The EP group has initiated several worthwhile actions to both give the group some visibility and improve overall plant awareness of the EP program. One of these initiatives is the "EP Awareness Contest," where employees answer several questions regarding emergency procedures and are awarded small prizes and entered in a drawing for a gift certificate. Posters announcing the contest were visible throughout many areas of the plant. The contest is considered as a pilot effort, running between March 1-31, 1993.

Discussion indicated that Rochester Gas and Electric Co., Northern States Power, and Wisconsin Electric Power Company have entered into a cooperative effort at the corporate level to explore ways to enhance emergency preparedness programs, share worthwhile approaches, and increase efficiency.

No violations or deviations were identified.

d. Emergency Preparedness Training

Emergency preparedness training is accomplished by an EP trainer. The training "Historian" computer program is the formal means of documenting and tracking training needs/completion.

Qualification for an emergency response position is determined by a separate "EP Tracker" computer program. If an individual's training interval exceeds the allotted time, the individual is not removed from the ERO, but is listed as unqualified. The philosophy behind this approach is that qualified individuals would be utilized to fill emergency response positions during an emergency. If it were not possible to find currently qualified personnel, then personnel previously trained, but unqualified by virtue of lacking current training, would be utilized. This approach is viable only as long as there are enough personnel currently qualified to meet expected emergency response needs.

A review of "EP Tracker" system outputs did not indicate any problems. A review of a small selection of lesson plans indicated that they were complete, detailed, and had been recently modified to incorporate drill and exercise experience and/or NRC comments.

One Duty and Call Superintendent was interviewed regarding his emergency response responsibilities. He demonstrated a thorough grasp of the duties and responsibilities assigned to him in the Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures. He was also knowledgeable as to the documentation (forms) needed to accomplish his functions.

No violations or deviations were identified.

e. Emergency Drill Observation

On February 24, 1993, an EOF facility drill was observed. This was intended to be the first in a series of quarterly facility drills, with the annual exercise and annual exercise "dress rehearsal" counting as quarterly drills. Development of quarterly drills was intended to make training more interesting through direct participation rather than passive classroom training. While counting as a quarterly drill, the annual evaluated emergency exercise will not be conducted as a drill (where prompting/counseling is allowable). The drill utilized a reduced scenario from a 1989 exercise, a "control cell" to mimic other centers (Technical Support Center, Operations Support Center), and included the actual dispatch of field monitoring teams. The drill was conducted between 0800 hours and 1030 hours, followed by a short critique.

Overall drill performance was excellent. Players effectively utilized their procedures, including the EOF activation procedure (EPIP 4.3) and the "EOF Guidebook" in activating the facility. Periodic briefings and announcements were made by the Emergency Site Manager. An excellent announcement was made when the EOF took over communication responsibilities from the simulated TSC. A decision was properly made to delay full EOF activation in the midst of a classification change being proposed by the simulated TSC.

An innovative portion of the drill involved the NRC requesting the utility to provide justification for continued operation of the unaffected unit. This task was referred to appropriate (simulated) personnel.

During the drill, one of the players, technically knowledgeable, but filling a non-technical position (communicator), raised a significant question regarding the status of sodium hydroxide addition to injected cooling water. The question was well-based and resulted in better understanding of overall plant status and release potential. This was an excellent example of technical staff communicating insights/concerns as appropriate regardless of assigned position during an emergency response.

Near the end of the drill, an appropriate decision was made to delay declassification of the event until plant status improved and radiation levels in the containment building had decreased somewhat. The post-drill critique was adequate in scope and detail.

No violations or deviations were identified.

f. Independent Reviews/Audits

The most recent annual audit of the Emergency Preparedness Program (EP) was conducted by the Quality Assurance Section during April 13-16, 1992. The audit covered the adequacy and implementation of the Emergency Plan in general, selected implementation of maintenance procedures, EP training, drills/exercises, and a review of offsite interfaces. The audit report (Audit No. A-P-92-06, dated May 16, 1992) was reviewed in detail. The audit concluded that the "Emergency Preparedness Program is considered an effectively implemented program."

Audit documentation was complete and very thorough, including the section dealing with the adequacy of offsite interfaces, which is required by 10 CFR 50.54(t). The audit resulted in three condition reports, none of which reflected a major programmatic deficiency. Documents reviewed indicated that all three conditions reports had been closed as of September 3, 1992.

In terms of adequacy of documentation, audit depth, apparent understanding of the EP program by the auditors, and the defensibility of findings and comments, this was the best audit of the Point Beach EP program in several years. Discussion with plant personnel indicated that the 1993 annual audit of the EP program was to take place during the last week of March 1993.

In addition to the above audit, the plant requested and received an Institute for Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) Assist Visit during September 14-18, 1992. During this visit, the 5 person INPO team reviewed the EP program regarding training, procedures, and adequacy of the EP organization.

No violations or deviations were identified.

g. Control Room Evacuation

Point Beach Abnormal Operating Procedure AOP-10A, "Control Room Inaccessibility" (Revision 12, dated October 7, 1991), was reviewed. The procedure provides operator guidance for plant control in the event of a worst-case fire and generic guidance when the control room is to be evacuated for any reason. The procedure provides highly detailed guidance as to operator actions and sequence of actions to be taken after control room evacuation. The procedure does not provide criteria as to when control room evacuation must be evaluated, e.g., extensive smoke, excessive heat, high radiation levels, or toxic/flammable gasses. The procedure is also silent on emergency planning aspects of control room evacuations. Licensee personnel indicated that this procedure would be reviewed. This is an Inspector Followup Item (50-266/93007-01; 50-301/93007-01).

No violations or deviations were identified.

5. Exit Interview

The inspector held an exit interview on February 26, 1993, with the licensee representatives identified in Section 2 to present and discuss the preliminary inspection findings. The licensee indicated that none of the matters discussed were proprietary in nature.