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Vogtle Project

February 23, 1993



ELV-05237

Docket No. 50-425


U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Gentlemen:

**VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT
SPECIAL REPORT
INVALID DIESEL GENERATOR FAILURE**

In accordance with the requirements of the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Technical Specifications, sections 4.8.1.1.3 and 6.8.2, Georgia Power Company submits the enclosed special report concerning an invalid diesel generator failure.

Sincerely,


C. K. McCoy

CKM/NJS

Enclosure: Special Report 2-93-1

xc: Georgia Power Company
Mr. W. B. Shipman
Mr. M. Sheibani
NORMS

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Mr. S. D. Ebnetter, Regional Administrator
Mr. D. S. Hood, Licensing Project Manager, NRR
Mr. B. R. Bonser, Senior Resident Inspector, Vogtle

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VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT - UNIT 2
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SPECIAL REPORT 2-93-1
INVALID DIESEL GENERATOR 2B FAILURE

A. REQUIREMENT FOR REPORT

This report is required in accordance with the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Technical Specifications (TS), section 4.8.1.1.3, which requires all diesel generator (DG) failures, valid or nonvalid, be reported to the Commission in a special report pursuant to TS 6.8.2.

B. DESCRIPTION OF INVALID FAILURE OF DIESEL GENERATOR 2B

On February 4, 1993, DG 2B had been removed from service for scheduled maintenance activities. At 0617 EST, the DG was started for a surveillance test. However, after attempting to synchronize the DG to the grid, the operator realized he had manipulated the wrong synchronize switch. He retracted his steps and alerted the unit shift supervisor. The correct switch was actuated, but personnel were still unable to synchronize the DG to the grid. The system engineer was consulted, and the DG was stopped at 0634 EST. An investigation found that the synchronize switch which the operator had manipulated first had a stuck contact which led to blown fuses in the phase A and B potential transformers (PTs). Once these fuses had blown, it was no longer possible to synchronize to the grid. The switch with the stuck contact was exercised and shown to operate normally. It was then tagged with a caution to advise operators of its potential for sticking pending a review by engineering to determine final corrective actions. The PT fuses were replaced, and the surveillance test was successfully completed prior to the DG being returned to service at 2046 EST.

C. SUMMARY

This event had no effect on the ability of DG 2B to provide emergency power because synchronizing to the grid is not performed in an actual emergency. Diesel generator 2B has experienced no valid failures in the last 20 valid tests and one valid failure in a total of 90 valid tests. The test frequency remains at once per 31 days in accordance with the requirements of TS table 4.8-1.