

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

5N 157B Lookout Place

**MAR 30 1990**

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
ATTN: Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

In the Matter of )  
Tennessee Valley Authority )

Docket Nos. 50-327  
50-328


SEQUOYA NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-77 - SPECIAL  
REPORT 90-04

This special report provides details concerning the auxiliary building Fire Door A-62 being breached for greater than seven days to facilitate traffic during the Unit 1 Cycle 4 refueling outage. This report is being made in accordance with technical specification Action Statement 3.7.12.a. The enclosure contains the details concerning the condition.

If you have any questions concerning this submittal, please telephone M. A. Cooper at (615) 843-6651.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

  
E. G. Wallace, Manager  
Nuclear Licensing and  
Regulatory Affairs

Enclosure  
cc: See page 2

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

MAR 30 1990

cc (Enclosure)

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Enclosure  
SQN Unit 1  
Special Report 90-04

Description of Condition

On March 16, 1990, with Unit 2 operating in Mode 1 (100 percent power, 2,235 pounds per square inch gauge, and 578 degrees Fahrenheit), and Unit 1 being shut down for a planned refueling outage, the auxiliary building Fire Door A-62 was removed to facilitate traffic entering and exiting the Unit 1 penetration room on Elevation 690. The fire door will be nonfunctional for the duration of the refueling outage. This report is being made in accordance with SQN Technical Specification, Action Statement 3.7.12.a.

Cause of the Condition

Auxiliary building Fire Door A-62 is a double door, and half of the door will be roped off for a contamination zone (C-zone) corridor to allow workmen access to the hot tool room constructed outside the penetration room. The location of the hot tool room is normally outside the C-zone. This C-zone corridor will greatly facilitate the reduction of time lost because of exiting the C-zone areas to obtain tools. The removal of the door was planned (Work Request B795938) with knowledge that the 7-day technical specification action statement would be exceeded.

Corrective Action

A breach permit was issued in response to the work request to remove the double door. The fire detectors inside the Unit 1 penetration room were verified operable. A roving fire watch was immediately established and will be maintained until the door is reinstalled and the breach is removed at the end of the outage. No further action is necessary.