


OYSTER CREEK



NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION


JCP&L GPU

Jersey Central Power & Light
Company is a Member of the
General Public Utilities System

(609) 693-6000 P.O. BOX 388 • FORKED RIVER • NEW JERSEY • 08731

November 18, 1981

Mr. Ronald Haynes, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region I
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406




Dear Mr. Haynes:

SUBJECT: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Docket No. 50-219
Licensee Event Report
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/81-51/3L

This letter forwards three copies of a Licensee Event Report to report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/81-51/3L in compliance with paragraph 6.9.2.b(1) of the Technical Specifications.

Very truly yours,


J. T. Carroll, Jr.
Acting Director Oyster Creek

JTC:dh
Enclosures

cc: Director (40 copies)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Director (3)
Office of Management Information
and Program Control
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

NRC Resident Inspector (1)
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Forked River, N. J.

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OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

Licensee Event Report
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/81-51/3L

Report Date

November 18, 1981

Occurrence Date

October 17, 1981

Identification of Occurrence

Electromatic Relief Valve (EMRV) High Pressure Sensor IA83E was found to exceed the limiting safety system actuation setpoint, Technical Specification 2.3.4.

This event is considered to be a reportable occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.9.2.b(1).

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

The plant was shutdown with reactor coolant temperature less than 212°F.

Description of Occurrence

On Sunday, October 17, 1981, during performance of the Electromatic Relief Valve Pressure Sensor Test and Calibration (Plant Procedure 602.3.004) high pressure switch IA83E was found to trip at a setting less conservative than the Technical Specification limit of <1070 psig. Surveillance test data on high pressure switches was as follows:

<u>Sensor</u>	<u>*Tech. Spec. Limit (psig)</u>	<u>*As Found Trip (psig)</u>
IA83A	1079.15	1059
IA83B	1084.5	1084
IA83C	1076.8	1075
IA83D	1082.2	1070
IA83E	1082.2	1086

*Includes head corrections

Apparent Cause of Occurrence

The cause of the occurrence is attributed to set point drift.

Analysis of Occurrence

Purpose of the EMRV's is to limit the primary system pressure. The EMRV's are the first line of defense to maintain the primary system integrity whose design pressure is 1250 psig.

The EMRV's technical specification limit of 1070 psig (not including head correction) was chosen to maintain adequate margin between the electromatic relief setpoint and that of the first group of the code safety valves (whose limiting technical specification setpoint is 1212 ± 12 psig). Since the affected EMRV (NRL08E) was still functional and tripped at slightly higher pressure than the desired setpoint, the safety significance is considered minimal.

Corrective Action

The switch was reset to trip within the required Technical Specification setpoint.

Failure Data

Barksdale Pressure Switch
Model #B2SH12SS
Range 50-1200 psig/proof 1500 psig