| 1 | | LICENSEE EVENT REPORT |
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| | | CONTROL BLOCK: [] [] [] [] [[] [] [] [] [] |
| Ę | 0 1 | 0 H D B S 1 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 |
| - | 0 1 8 | REPORT LICE S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S |
| 1 | 0 2 | (NP-33-81-70) On 9/15/81 it was discovered that both Emergency Core Cooling System |
| - | 0 3 | (ECCS) room air coolers for ECCS Room 2 were isolated due to minor tube leaks and that |
| - | 0 4 | steps were not taken to detail the corrective action required to restore a cooler in |
| - | 0 5 | the event of a loss of coolant accident. The event is being reported under Technica! |
| 1 | 0 6 | Specification 6.9.1.9.c as an inadequate implementation of procedural controls. |
| | 0 7 | There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or station personnel. |
| | 0 8 | There were no unit power reductions. |
| | 0 9 | SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE SUBCODE SUB |
| 1 | | LES RO EVENT YEAR REPORT NO REPORT NO 1 24 25 27 28 29 30 31 32 CODE TYPE NO. 1 32 COMPONENT NO. PRIME COMP. COMPONENT |
| | | TAKEN ACTION ON PLANT METHOD G B H 19 Z 20 Z 21 P 9 9 9 26 33 34 35 36 37 36 47 23 47 23 47 23 47 23 47 24 47 25 44 47 26 |
| | 1 0 | The cause of the event was due to administrative oversight. The Ecca Toom Coolers are |
| | TI | necessary for long term equipment operability, but their support function is not |
| | 1 2 | specifically addressed in the Technical Specifications. A memo was written to all |
| | 1 3 | supervisor, personnel re-emphasizing operability requirements, and the need for |
| | 1 4 | procedural controls to cover non-standard system configurations. |
| 1 | 7 8 | FACILITY STATUS SPOWER OTHER STATUS (30) DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32) [E] [28] [0] [9] [9] [9] [20] [NA |
| | 1 6 | ACTIVITY CONTENT 12 13 RELEASED CS RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY 35 Z 33 Z 34 NA 45 NA 45 NA 45 |
| | | PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION (39) |
| | 1 7 | 9 PERSONNEL INJURIES 13 80 |
| | 1 8 | NUMBER DESCRIPTION (41) 0 0 0 40 NA |
| | 1 0 | 11 12 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43) TYPE DESCRIPTION [Z] (42) NA 60 |
| | 2 0 | 9 PUBLICITY 45 PDR ADOCK 05000346 PDR 5 PDR 68 69 80 5 |
| D | VR 81 | (419) 259-5000, Ext. 316 c |
| | | |

TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-81-70

DATE OF EVENT: September 15, 1981

FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Failure to provide adequate instructions to return Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) room air coolers to service in case of a loss of coolant accident (LOCA)

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 1 with Power (MWT) = 2764 and Load (Gross MWE) = 915

Description of Occurrence: On September 15, 1981, it was discovered by the NRC Resident Inspector that service water to both ECCS room air coolers in Room 115 was isolated due to small leaks for approximately 80 hours. The condition of both ECCS room air coolers being temporarily isolated was known, however, steps were not taken to document corrective action to be taken in the event of a LOCA.

The event is being reported under Technical Specification 6.9.1.9.c as an inadequate implementation of procedural controls which caused a reduction of the degree of redundancy provided in the reactor protection systems or engineered safety feature systems. There were no unit power reductions.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: Instructions were not provided requiring the return to service of one or both of the ECCS room coolers in the event of a LOCA. One ECCS cooler had been previously isolated in an effort to plug leaking tubes wher the second cooler developed a small leak. The second room cooler was isolated to minimize the need for processing the leakage as radwaste. The requirement for restoring the cooler in the event of a LOCA was understood, however, not properly administratively controlled.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or to station personnel. The equipment described in Technical Specification 3.5.2 was not inoperable during this occurrence. However, this event is being reported because there was no formal procedural changes to insure that the cooler would be returned to service upon a LOCA.

Within approximately 45-60 minutes after a worst case LOCA, when ECCS suction has been transferred from the BWST to the hot containment emergency sump, additional ECCS room cooling would be required to maintain ambient temperatures less than design values.

Corrective Action: A room cooler was unisolated, and a memo was sent to all supervisory personnel reminding them of the importance of some auxiliary equipment that is not directly addressed in Technical Specifications which provide assurance of long term operability of the ECCS, and for the need for procedural controls to cover non-standard system configurations.

The second ECCS room air cooler had its leaking coil replaced under Maintenance Work Order 81-3495 on October 13, 1981.

Failure Data: There have been no previous occurrences of this type.

LER #81-057