

SEP 2 8 1981

APPENDIX A

NOTICE OF VIOLATION

Tennessee Valley Authority
Browns Ferry 1, 2, and 3

Docket Nos. 50-259, 260, & 296
License Nos. DPR-33, 52, & 68

As a result of the inspection conducted on July 27 - August 25, 1981, and in accordance with the Interim Enforcement Policy, 45 FR 66754 (October 7, 1980), the following violations were identified.

- A. Technical Specification 3.9.A.4.e requires that prior to startup from a cold condition the undervoltage (UV) relays shall be operable on start buses 1A and 1B.

Contrary to the above, the requirement that the UV relays be operable prior to startup from a cold condition was not met in that on August 15, 1981, Unit 2 was started up and operated at power with one UV relay being inoperable. This condition was identified by the licensee on August 19, 1981.

This is a Severity Level IV Violation (Supplement I.D.2.) and is applicable to Unit 2.

- B. Technical Specification 3.1 requires that a minimum of instrument channels must be operable as given in Table 3.1.A. The table requires that 2 average power range monitor (APRM) channels per trip system be operable for high flux protection during reactor power operation.

Contrary to the above, from 9:30 p.m. on July 8, 1981 until 10:30 a.m. on July 9, 1981, the APRM channels were not operable as required in Table 3.1.A nor was the proper action taken within the time period stated in the table notes, in that the trip setpoints on the APRMs were set above the value given in the Table for a period of 13 hours.

This is a Severity Level IV Violation (Supplement I.D.2.) and is applicable to Unit 2.

- C. 10 CFR 50, Appendix B Criterion III, as implemented by TVA Topical Report TVA 75-01 paragraph 17.2.3 requires that measures shall be established to assure that the design bases for those components to which this appendix applies are correctly translated into specifications drawings, procedures and instructions. The operation - maintenance instructions and parts catalog for the hydrogen - oxygen (H2-O2) sample and return solenoid valves requires the licensee to adequately seal the conduit connections to the solenoid to prevent entrance of moisture in order to maintain IEEE 323 qualifications.

Contrary to the above, the design bases for the H2-O2 system was not met in that on July 31, 1981, the licensee determined that the sample and return solenoid valves for the H2-O2 monitoring system in Unit 3 torus were not

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adequately sealed where the conduit connects to the solenoid which allowed moisture to enter the solenoid and caused the return solenoid to fail during normal operation. The H2-O2 monitoring system is required to be operable under a Post-loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). The vendors requirement that the solenoid be adequately sealed where the conduit connects to the solenoid was not specified in any work plan, drawing or procedure.

This is a Severity Level IV Violation (Supplement II.D.1.) and is applicable to Unit 3.

Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, you are hereby required to submit to this office within thirty days of the date of this Notice, a written statement or explanation in reply, including: (1) admission or denial of the alleged violations; (2) the reasons for the violations if admitted; (3) the corrective steps which have been taken and the results achieved; (4) corrective steps which will be taken to avoid further violations; and (5) the date when full compliance will be achieved. Consideration may be given to extending your response time for good cause shown. Under the authority of Section 182 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, this response shall be submitted under oath or affirmation.

The responses directed by this Notice are not subject to the clearance procedures of the Office of Management and Budget as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, PL 96-511.

Date: SEP 28 1981