NRC FORM 366 (7.77) LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION) (1)CONTROL BLOCK: 4 1 1 1 $\left| (3) \right|$ 0 0 0 0 0 Ø Ø D B LICENSE NUMBER LICENSEE CODE 8 1 1 0 2 8 1 CON'T 4 6 7 1 0 0 4 8 1 REPORT L (6) Ø 5 Ø Ø Ø 3 0 1 SOURCE DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10) (NP-33-81-83) On 10/4/81 at 1300 hours during the performance of the Containment Inte-0 2 grity Monthly Test ST 5060.01, SA535 was found open. This valve forms the double iso-0 3 lation of containment (CTMT) penetration 26 off of the CTMT spray header. The station 0 4 complied with the action statement of Technical Specification 3.6.1.' by immediately 0 5 closing the valve. There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or to 0 6 station personnel. The first isolation valve off the CTMT spray header was in the 0 7 closed position and would have prevented leakage. VALVE COMP. CAUSE SYSTEM CAUSE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUBCODE D (16) E Z (13) VI E X A LI V D SIDI 152 REVISION OCCURRENCE REPORT SEQUENTIAL TYPE NO. CODE REPORT NO. TYEAR LER RO ØI 013 L Ø 161 2 8 1 REPORT NUMBER COMPONENT MANUFACTURER NPRD-4 FORM SUB. PRIME COMP. ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED SHUTDOWN METHOD ACTION FUTURE EFFECT ON PLANT (22) SUPPLIER HOURS Z 25 Z | 9 | 9 | 9 (26 N (24) YI Ø 01010 ZI GI CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27) The valve was opened to provide station air for contractor personnel working in the 1 0 Since the valve was not identified as required to form double isolation or conroom. 1 1 trolled by a lock, it was repositioned without the Shift Supervisor's permission. 1 Information tags were hung. A facility change request is being prepared to control SA535 and three other valves related to the CTMT spray header as locked valves. 1 4 80 METHOD OF DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32) (30)FACILITY OTHER STATUS S POWER Surveillance Test ST 5060.01 B (31) 0101 NA 80 9 10 ACTIVITY CONTENT LOCATION OF RELEASE (36) AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) RELEASED OF RELEASE NA Z (34) Z (33) | NA 80 45 44 10 11 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES DESCRIPTION (39) TYPE NUMBER 0 0 0 Z (38 NA 37) 80 PERSONNEL INJURIES DESCRIPTION (41) NUMBER 0 0 (40) NA Ø LOSS OF OF DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43) ESCRIPTION TVPF NA (42 ADOCK 05000346 8111130271 811102 NRC USE ONLY PUBLICITY PDR DESCRIPTION (45) ISSUED, (44) NA N 69 68 (419) 253-5000, Ext. 225 g PHONE .-Jan Stotz NAME OF PREPARER -DVR 81-154

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATURI CO.

TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-81-83

DATE OF EVENT: October 4, 1981

FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Containment Isolation Valve SA535 off the containment spray header found open

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 1 with Power (MWT) = 2772 and Load (Gross MWE) = 919.

Description of Occurrence: On October 4, 1981 at 1300 hours, during the performance of the Containment Integrity Monthly Verification Test ST 5060.01, SA535 was found in the open position. SA535 is a valve on the station air header to the lower containment spray header. Since the station air header connects downstream of any isolation valve on the containment spray header, SA533 (the first valve off the header) and SA535 (the second valve off the header) form a double isolation of penetration 26 to the station air header. Technical Specification 3.6.1.1 requires primary containment integrity to be maintained in Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4. The conditions of the action statement were met as the valve was immediately closed.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The valve had been opened to provide station air for contractor personnel working in the room. SA535 was opened in order to line up a source of air. Since the valve was not locked or otherwise identified as required to form double isolation, it was opened without the knowledge or permission of the Shift Supervisor. The valve needed more positive control such as locking.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or to station personnel. The first value off of the containment spray header was closed and locked and would have prevented leakage.

Corrective Action: The valve was immediately closed when found open. Tags were hung to inform all personnel not to open the valve. A facility change request is being prepared to control SA535 as a locked valve per AD 1839.02. Three other valves related to the containment spray header were found to need similar control measures (SA536, SA117, and SA118) and will be included in the above facility change request.

Failure Data: There has been no similar event previously reported.

LER #81-062