

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
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(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0	1	N	C	B	E	P	2	2	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	3	4	1	1	1	1	4		5
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CONT

0	1	L	6	0	5	0	-	0	3	2	4	7	1	0	0	7	8	1	8	1	0	3	0	8	1	9
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EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 During plant operation, HPCI System Steam Leak Detection Ambient Temperature High

0 3 and HPCI Logic Power Failure annunciators were received. An immediate investigation

0 4 revealed the HPCI System isolation logic power supply fuse, located in distribution

0 5 panel P614, was blown. The HPCI System was then declared inoperable and was isolated.

0 6 This did not affect the health and safety of the public.

0 7

0 8 Technical Specifications 3.3.2, 3.5.1, 6.9.1.9b

0	9	S	F	11	E	12	X	13	I	N	S	T	R	U	14	E	15	2	16
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17	8	1	1	0	9	0	3	L	0
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18	Z	19	Z	20	Z	21	0	0	0	0	Y	23	Y	24	N	25	F	0	8	0	26
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CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 Electrical shorting to ground of HPCI steamline tunnel temperature switch, 2-E41-TS-

1 1 3314, Model No. 170002-40, due to moisture accumulation in the switch housing resul-

1 2 ting from corrosion of the switch housing caused the event. A new temperature switch

1 3 and logic power supply fuse were installed which returned the HPCI leak detection

1 4 system to normal. The HPCI system was declared operable and returned to normal

1	5	E	28	0	7	2	29	NA	A	31	Operational Event
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1	6	Z	33	Z	34	NA	NA
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1	7	0	0	0	37	Z	38	NA
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1	8	0	0	0	40	NA
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1	9	Z	42	NA
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2	0	N	44	NA
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NAME OF PREPARER M. J. Pastva, Jr.

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LER ATTACHMENT - RO# 2-81-109

Facility: BSEP Unit No. 2

Event Date: 10/7/81

This event occurred as a result of the electrical shorting to ground of the power supply to HPCI system steamline tunnel temperature switch, 2-E41-TS-3314, which made the switch and the HPCI isolation logic system inoperable when the isolation logic power supply fuse blew. This shorting to ground occurred when moisture accumulated in the switch housing through a small hole corroded in the housing which then provided the current path to ground. During the investigation of this event, a few moisture droplets were discovered on the electrical leads to the switch housing. However, this switch is located in an area of normally high humidity.

Prior to the event, on 10/5/81, a service water system leak occurred above the elevation on which the HPCI temperature switch is located causing an undetermined amount of water to be deposited in the room containing the switch.

The evaluation of this event could not determine whether the moisture which accumulated in the switch housing resulted from the service water leak or from normal room humidity.

A check of plant documentation revealed no history of events involving corrosion associated with these type temperature switches, therefore, this event is considered isolated and requires no additional corrective action. These switches are functionally tested on a monthly basis and calibrated quarterly to ensure dependability of operation.